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“The conversations I have had with continental lawyers left me with the 
impression that abus de droit is regarded as a dangerous expedient which 
should only be utilized to prevent manifest injustice [...] It [abuse of rights] 
resembles a drug which at first appears to be innocuous, but may be followed by 
very disagreeable after effects. Like all indefinite expressions of an ethical 
principle it is capable of being put to an infinite variety of uses, and it may be 
employed to invade almost any sphere of human activity for the purpose of 
subordinating the individual to the demands of the State. […]. But it is clear 
that the theories of abuse and of relativity of rights, in general, have no place in 
our law as it now stands” 
 H. C. Gutteridge1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article explores a crucial, though often neglected, episode in the 
history of modern private law: the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
debate over the concept of “abuse of rights”. In broad terms, the formula evokes 
the idea of an abusive, because malicious or unreasonable, exercise of an 
otherwise lawful right. The doctrine was applied in a variety of subfields of 
private law: property, contract, and labour law. It was conceived as a response 
to the urgent legal questions posed by the rise of modern industrial society: the 
limits of workers’ right to strike, the limits of industrial enterprises’ property 
rights on land vis a vis the rights of residential neighbours, the limits of a 
landowner’s property right on crucial economic resources, such as water or 
coal-land. This article uses a comparative analysis of European and American 
cases and legal writing to interrogate a widely-shared understanding of the 
impact and significance of abuse of rights, neatly articulated in H. C. 
Gutteridge’s passage. First, it challenges the notion that abuse of rights is a 
peculiar “invention” of civil law jurists, absent in the common law. Second, it 
questions the idea that abuse of rights operated as an effective social 
“corrective” preventing the “manifest injustices” allowed by modern 
individualist private law.  
 
More broadly, this article touches upon a number of critical debates in 
comparative law and legal historiography. It investigates the relation between 
                                               
1 H. C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L. J.22, 44 (1933-1935). 
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law and social change, between the conceptual constraints and potentialities of 
legal doctrine and private lawyers’ aspirations to social reform. Moreover, it 
attempts a comparative inquiry into styles of judicial reasoning, inviting 
further reflection on the coexistence of “deductive” and “instrumental” modes of 
justification in American, as well as in continental European, late nineteenth 
century cases. Further, the article draws upon and revisits the “functionalist” 
method of comparative legal analysis, arguing for the enduring relevance of a 
“textured functionalism”. Finally, the story of abuse of rights, speaks to the 
critical issues faced by contemporary private lawyers: the nature and the role 
of private law in the era of the crisis of traditional social democracy and the 
need for new legal tools that would broaden the conversation about the future 
of our socio-economic institutions. 
 
Abuse of rights was a most typical “invention” of the wave of social legal 
thought that developed in France and Germany starting from mid-nineteenth 
century. Swift technological progress, change in the industrial structure, 
notably the shift from small, artisanal producing units to large scale 
enterprises, and the consequent outburst of social unrest and class antagonism 
brought to the fore the question of the terms of liberty in new social and 
economic conditions. Confronted with the need to foster freedom of enterprise 
and economic development while attenuating its social repercussions, “social 
jurists” revolted against “classical” modern private law. They deemed the 
formalistic and deductive mode of reasoning relied upon by classical “civilistes” 
as well as their individualistic assumptions inadequate to accommodate 
economic change and social cohesion, freedom of action and security. In 
contrast, “social jurists” called for a sociological and organicist mode of 
reasoning that takes into account the purpose of legal rules and the complexity 
of “social mechanics”2. At the substantive level, they advocated complementing 
                                               
2 RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (trans. Mac Millan, New York 1924). In “Law as a Means 
to an End” Jhering furnishes  both a critique of conceptual formalism and a purposive definition of law. Jhering’s 
“naturalist” conception of law reveals the illusionary nature of the grandiose formalist conceptual architecture, 
bringing to light the reality of “social mechanics”. The formalist image of law as clockwork that runs its regulated 
course into which no disturbing hand enters is contrasted with the image of law as a ”mighty machine” in which 
“thousands of rollers, wheels, knives move restlessly, some in one direction, some in another, apparently quite 
independent of one another as if they existed only for themselves, and yet all work ultimately together 
harmoniously for one purpose”. The force that moves the wheelwork is the “will of thousands and millions of 
individuals, the struggle of interests, of the opposition of efforts, egoism, self will”. Purpose is the moving force 
behind law; “everything found on the ground of law was called into life by a purpose and exists to realize some 
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“individual law”, i.e. law that regulates conflicts among individuals by 
delimiting their respective rights with a “social law”, i.e. law that favours social 
cohesion and privileges collective interests3.  
 
The doctrine of “abuse of rights” reflected both the yearning for a new style 
of legal reasoning and the call for social solidarity. The concept of “subjective 
right”, elaborated over the centuries by continental legal science and defined by 
German Pandectist Windscheid as the sphere of the individual’s absolute and 
unlimited will,4 appeared to “social jurists” formalistic and unworkable. 
Rapidly changing socio-economic conditions demanded a conceptual tool that 
would account for “subjective rights”’ relative and relational nature. Abuse of 
rights was thought to be such tool. It allowed a purposive analysis of competing 
rights in light of larger social interests and it promised to deliver distributively 
fair outcomes. 
 
Conceptually, the doctrine was variously articulated; while subjective 
formulations focus on the right holder’s motive or intent, objective formulations 
scrutinize the right holder’s conduct. Thus, different formulations of the 
doctrine may be arranged along a spectrum that runs from subjective to 
objective, each, potentially, entailing a different degree of compression of the 
right.  
 
In a first formulation, located at the subjective end of the spectrum and 
known as “aemulatio”, the right holder is said to abuse her right when her 
                                                                                                                                               
purpose. 
3 GEORGES GURVITCH, L’IDEE DU DROIT SOCIAL. NOTION ET SYSTEME DU DROIT SOCIAL (1932, reprint 
Scientia Verlag 1972). See also, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, (preface by Roscoe Pound) 166 (1947 reprint Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 1973) for a later formulation of the idea of “Social Law”; “First we observe the contrast between social 
law and individual law (or better inter-individual law) corresponding to the contrast between sociality by 
interpenetration and sociality by interdependence (intuitive union and communication by signs). “Social Law” is a 
law of objective integration in the “We”, in the immanent whole. It permits the subjects, to whom it is addressed, 
to participate directly in the whole, which in turn effectively participates in jural relations. That is why “Social law” 
is based on confidence, while individual law, i.e. inter-individual and inter-groupal law is based distrust. One is the 
law of peace, mutual aid, common tasks, the other the law of war, conflicts, separation. For, even when individual 
law partly draws together subjects as in the case of contracts, it simultaneously separates them and delimits their 
interests. All law being a linking of the claims of some with the duties of others, an “imperative-attributive” 
regulation, in social law claims and duties interpenetrate each other and form an indissoluble whole, while in 
individual law they only limit and crash against each other. In social law distributive, in individual law, 
commutative justice predominates”. 
4 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS (1862). 
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exercise of the right is driven by the sole malicious intent to harm another. The 
classical text-book example of the landowner who erects a tall fence for the sole 
malicious purpose of depriving her neighbour of light illustrates this narrow 
subjective formulation of the theory.  
 
In a second formulation, an abuse of a right is detected any time malice is 
the dominant, though not the exclusive, motive animating the actions of the 
right holder. For instance, in the previous example, while the fence also serves 
the purpose of holding ornamental vines, the landowner would have never 
erected it if not moved by ill will towards her neighbour.  
 
According to a third formulation, a subject is deemed to abuse her right 
when acting with a lack of “legitimate interest”, though not necessarily 
spitefully. In late nineteenth century developing economies, the landowner who 
pumped from her land the groundwater feeding her neighbour’s mill only to 
end up wasting it was often found to have abused her right. Although this 
formulation centres on the subject’s motive, it entails a dose of objectiveness in 
the definition of what amounts to a “legitimate interest”.  
 
In a fourth articulation, a right holder acts abusively if she exercises her 
right contrary to the “normal function” of the right. While, similarly to the 
previous, this formulation gauges the subject’s purpose against the objective 
criterion of “normal function” of the right, it may entail a higher degree of 
compression of the right, “normal function” being, potentially, susceptible of a 
more restrictive definition than “legitimate interest”. At the height of 
nineteenth century industrial struggles, unions were found to abuse their right 
to strike when their action departed from the right’s “normal function”.  
 
Finally, in a fifth formulation, located at the objective end of the spectrum, 
a right is abused when exercised contrary to its “socio-economic purpose”. In 
this articulation, the focus of the scrutiny is shifted from the subject’s intent to 
the nature of her conduct. The test allows sharp limitations of the right holder 
whose conduct is weighed in light of larger social needs and interests. A 
landowner who in an arid region drains ground water, diminishing the 
community’s supply, to sell it for the irrigation of distant lands may be deemed 
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to use of her right contrary to its “socio-economic destination”, defined as the 
productive use and enjoyment of land respectful of the larger needs of the 
community.  
 
Drawing on an influential comparative law tradition, this article 
investigates the “functional equivalents” of abuse of rights in the common law. 
In the 1950s and 60s, at the height of functionalist comparative law5, a copious 
literature cast light on the operation of “functional analogues”. Arthur von 
Mehren magisterially examined the various techniques employed in French 
and German law to solve the problems that the common law handles through 
the doctrine of consideration6. More recently, John Langbein has suggested 
that trust is a uniquely Anglo-American institution, foreign to the civil law 
tradition and that Europeans achieve mostly by means of contract what the 
                                               
5 On “functionalism” in comparative law see: Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL STUDIES. TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, 100, (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Ralf 
Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). Max Rheinstein has offered the clearest account of the 
functionalist method to date. Every rule, according to Rheinstein, “has to justify its existence under two inquiries: 
first, what function does it serve in present society ? second, does it serve this function well or would another rule 
serve better?”.  See Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law: Its Functions, Methods and Usages, 22 ARKANSAS LAW REV. 415 
(1968-69); Id, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany, 2 UNIV. CHICAGO LAW. REV., 232 (1934-35); Id, 
Teaching Comparative Law, 5 UNIV. CHICAGO LAW REV 615 (1937-38). Functionalism was a crucial methodological 
innovation of early twentieth century comparative lawyers. Saleilles and Lambert’s emphasis on rules’ “function” 
was meant as a powerful critique of the formalism of conceptual analysis and “legal dogmatics”. The second 
generation of comparative lawyers further developed functionalism’s critical potential. Pound’s functionalist 
approach rested on a set of critical moves: a critique of “mechanical jurisprudence”, a  functional definition of law 
as an instrument of social control and an “is to ought” move that derives the normative assessment of law from 
the positive facts of social life. A pragmatic legal science solicits the adjustment of legal principles and doctrines to 
the human condition they are to govern, to the findings of the science of society. Legal rules derived from social 
needs and functions are effective in ordering the satisfaction of conflicting and overlapping individual claims with 
a minimum of friction and waste. In other words, law is to be tailored on the discoverable “social objectives” of 
an ultimately coherent “society”. The “is to ought ”move  was one of the main targets of the Realist critique. If on 
the one hand, Felix Cohen appropriated the functionalist discourse, denouncing conceptualist legal science as 
“transcendental nonsense” and advocating a functionalist jurisprudence, on the other hand, he rejected the” is to 
ought” move, viewing functionalism as a crucial tool for an “ethical criticism” of law. Cohen envisages the 
normative use of a functional definition of law as the prime danger of the functional approach. In order to avoid 
blindness, functionalism is to couple an objective legal science and a critical theory of social values. In recent 
decades functionalism has come under attack on several fronts. It has been charged of reductionism in that it  
focuses exclusively on rules’ socio-legal function and overlooks a whole range of complicating factors: culture, 
mentality, ideology. Further, critics claim, functionalism assumes a “mirror theory” of the relation between law 
and society and ignores the fact that law acts upon social interests and needs: the facilitative and ideological role 
played by law.  Finally, functionalism  interrogates the comparative effectiveness of functionally equivalent rules, 
eluding questions of broader legal reform.  
6 Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV. 
1009 (1958-1959). 
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Anglo-American systems do through trust7. Similarly, Friedrich Kessler and 
Edith Fine showed that while the common law seems to have no counterpart to 
the German doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, notions of good faith as well as 
the doctrines of negligence, estoppel and implied contract have served many of 
the functions of culpa in contrahendo8.  
 
This corpus of literature has focused mostly on the socio-legal function 
performed by analogous private law doctrines, neglecting their rhetorical 
dimension, that is, the arguments and the justifications common lawyers and 
civilians provided for functionally equivalent doctrines as well as the 
expectations and the anxieties the latter spurred. Rather than merely 
identifying abuse of rights’ “functional equivalents”, this article seeks to do full 
justice to the rich rhetorical texture of the abuse of rights debate. 
 
In France and in Italy, abuse of rights spurred reactions of dire 
condemnation and hyperbolic eulogy. Its critics envisaged it as “a barren 
logomachy”9, a “medieval relic thoughtlessly carried over”10 or, at best, as “a 
pure piece of sentimentality”. By contrast, its champions acclaimed it as the 
triumph of “a more perfect and broad vision of justice”. The wave of 
emotionality stirred by abuse of rights seems to be far from drying up. Writing 
in 1965, Italian jurist Pietro Rescigno noted that the changing fortunes of 
abuse of rights are evidence of “the jurist’s agony in redeeming law’s ancient 
misery”11. More recently, an experts’ report published by the Council of Europe, 
retrieving nineteenth century social rhetoric at its best, concluded that abuse of 
rights makes it possible “to establish the connection between the justice 
ostensibly guaranteed by positive law and genuine justice”12.  
 
In England and in the United States the debate over the concept of “malice” 
                                               
7 John T. Langebein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 667 (1995-1996) at 669 ff. 
8 Fredriech Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Baragining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract. A 
Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1963-1964). 
9 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, v. 2 n. 870 (Paris, 1907) 
10 Vittorio Scialoja, Aemulatio, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA ITALIANA, Napoli-Milano (1884) I 2. I 426 ff. 
11 Pietro Rescigno,  L’Abuso del Diritto, Riv. Dir. Civ.  vol. I 205 (1965); PIETRO RESCIGNO, L’ABUSO DEL 
DIRITTO (1998). 
12 ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS: THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS PRESENT DAY APPLICATION, 
Proceedings of the nineteenth colloquy on European Law, Luxembourg 6-9 November 1989 p. 10. 
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reached similar rhetorical peaks. When discussing “malice” common lawyers 
seemed to loose their habitual aloofness. Gutteridge described abuse of rights 
as “an instrument of dangerous potency in the hands of the demagogue and the 
revolutionary”13. In a 1905 article on the role of malicious torts in the field of 
labor relations, Bruce Wyman, from Harvard Law School, evoked “the horror of 
anarchy or the hopelessness of socialism”. 
 
Exploring the rhetoric surrounding abuse of rights and its analogues may 
help elucidate the actual stakes of the debate, the multiple, and complexly 
intertwined, questions and interests laying behind doctrinal disputes and 
judicial argumentation. Rhetoric illuminates abuse of rights’ political saliency. 
The debate over abuse of rights pitted against each other jurists with different 
political commitments and various power allegiances. Further, rhetoric sheds 
light on jurists’ relation with larger legal ideological models. The debate over 
abuse of rights is also a duel between proponents of different models of 
property, the unitary and absolutist and the pluralized and relativized14. 
Finally, rhetoric allows a glimpse on jurists’ hidden professional agendas. In 
France and in Italy, the debate over abuse of rights was critical to the conflict 
between different segments of the legal-academic profession as well as to the 
relation between the professoriate and the judiciary. 
 
Relying, thus, on a “textured functionalism”, this article advances and 
interrogates two hypotheses. First, it suggests that, in vast and highly 
transversal areas of the law, such as water law, nuisance, tortious interference 
with contractual relations or economic expectancies and labor law, nineteenth 
and early twentieth century American courts weighed defendants’ motives and 
conduct through malice tests and reasonable user rules that closely parallel 
abuse of rights. However, contrary to continental European systems where 
rules limiting a malicious or unreasonable exercise of one’s right congealed in 
the unitary conceptual and legislative category of “abuse of rights”, in the 
                                               
13 H. C. Gutteridge, supra note 1 at 44. 
14 For the US, see Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1985-1986). Bone discusses the normative theories that jurist used to reason about nuisance 
disputes between the 1850s and the 1920s; he focuses on three different legal-ideological models: the “competing 
rights” model, the “static absolute dominion” model and the “relative property rights” model. 
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United States, these same rules remained largely non-integrated.  
 
This article investigates the reasons why a unitary conceptual category of 
“abuse of rights” was never developed in the United States. In France and in 
Italy, I suggest, the shaping of an overarching concept of “abuse of rights” was 
part of the jurists’ struggle to preserve the conceptual coherence of private law 
at a moment when, under the pressure of social and economic change, new 
fields of law were being carved out of “droit privé”15. These new legal 
disciplines, zoning law, labor law, welfare law, were deemed to be more apt to 
govern social and economic change. Private lawyers stood up as the staunch 
defenders of the systematic unity of private law as well as of their own 
professional power as the “legal architects of modern society”. Conversely, in 
the United States, where pretensions to law’s conceptual coherence were 
increasingly coming under attack, rationalization of these non-integrated 
reasonableness tests and malice rules was achieved by means of a unitary style 
of reasoning rather than by means of conceptual integration. This 
instrumentalist style of reasoning, featuring “balancing”, cost-benefit analysis 
and policy arguments, differed significantly from orthodox late nineteenth 
century American legal thought. Judges consistent reliance on this pragmatic 
style of reasoning, I argue, invites a revision of the traditional portrait of 
nineteenth century classical orthodoxy16.  
 
Further, this article advances a second hypothesis. The comparative 
analysis of American cases suggests that, despite the rhetorical hysteria it 
spurred, abuse of rights’ potential as a tool for social reform was consistently 
defused. Abuse of rights heralded two promises. First, it promised to provide a 
social corrective to the individualistic language of modern private law, the 
language of will, property and fault. Second, it promised to operate as critical 
tool for progressive lawyering, enabling fair distributive outcomes. Both 
promises remained largely unfulfilled.  
 
As to the latter promise, rarely and timidly did courts deploy abuse of 
                                               
15 FRANZ WIAECKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GERMANY, (Tony Weir trans. 
1995) at 430ff. Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private Law in THE 
POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Martijn W. Hesselink ed 2006) at 9. 
16 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HISTORY REV. 631 (2002);  
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rights and its analogues to effect distributive choices that shifted the balance of 
power and wealth from socio-economically strong actors, i.e. owners, employers 
or stronger contractual parties, to weaker actors or to privilege collective 
interests over individuals’ self-interest. At times, the doctrine was articulated 
as to impose duties on strong parties only to secure and reinforce their 
“absolute” rights. In “spite fences” cases, abuse of rights served as a buttress to 
individual property rights, imposing a limit to owners’ self-interest to protect 
the symmetrical “absolute” rights of other property holders. More often, duties 
of “reasonableness” or “fairness” in the exercise of rights were imposed on 
weaker parties rather than on strong parties. For instance, in labor cases, 
abuse of rights was often operated against the weaker party, courts finding 
unions to have exercised abusively their right to help themselves in the “free” 
and “fair” competition with employers or with rival unions. 
 
As to the first promise, even when abuse of rights did in fact relieve weaker 
parties, as often in the case of malicious interference with contractual 
relations, it did so by virtue of the pervasive individualistic proprietary logic. 
Existing contracts or future economic expectancies were considered “property” 
and abusees “owners” to be protected in the quiet enjoyment of their property 
or in the effort to gain it.  
 
Abuse of rights’ corrective potential has been largely overestimated. In the 
United States the functional equivalents of abuse of rights served as tools for 
governing and facilitating economic life and the “release of individual creative 
energy”17 rather than as social correctives. Time and again, courts’ reliance on 
malice rules and reasonableness tests was premised on the desirability of 
maximizing economic growth18. In water law cases and in nuisance cases, courts 
consistently deployed “reasonable user” standards to favour technological 
improvement and new productive uses of land by mills, mining companies and 
large developers. In cases of interference with contractual relations, judges relied 
on reasonableness rules and malice tests to define the sphere of legitimate 
economic competition. Further, at the height of late nineteenth century labor 
                                               
17 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED 
STATES (1984). 
18 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) 35 ff.  
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upheaval, courts used malice rules were to govern industrial struggle, curbing the 
effectiveness of the various tactics with which unions threatened proprietary 
capitalists. 
 
The American developments invite closer scrutiny of the impact of abuse of 
rights in continental Europe. In France and in Italy, I suggest, abuse of rights 
was a critical element of a private law system centred on property and 
paramount to the solidity and longevity of the modern bourgeois socio-economic 
order. More specifically, abuse of rights paralleled the ambiguities of a wider 
strategy of “social solidarity” aimed at boosting industrialization while 
mitigating its social repercussions. Animated by humanitarian impulses, 
paternalistic concerns and the quest for maximum economic profit, this 
strategy entailed social legislation and experiments in “avant-garde 
capitalism”. Judges and jurists joined policy makers and capitalists in the 
effort to demonstrate that, in the era of predatory capitalism, enlightened 
economic development was possible. Incorporated into the conceptual “system” 
and purged of its radical potential abuse of rights seemed to allow a fair, and 
innocuous, compromise between development and solidarity. Abuse of rights 
was less the vehicle of radical aspirations to social reform than the site where 
other crucial methodological and political battles took place. It was the battle-
field where jurists and writers voiced claims of cultural identity and sought to 
delineate the boundaries between law and morals and law and politics. 
 
This article is divided in two parts. Part I. tracks the various malice rules 
and reasonableness tests that worked as functional equivalents of abuse of 
rights in the common law. It investigates the techniques of legal reasoning 
through which nineteenth and early twentieth century American courts 
operated these rules as well as the social and economic concerns that drove 
judges’ resort to “reasonableness” and “malice”. Part II shifts the focus from 
judicial elaborations to scholarly discussions. It shows that the debate spurred 
by the theory of “intentional tort” at the turn of the nineteenth century in the 
United States parallels the contemporary European controversy over abuse of 
rights. Part III and part IV turn to France and Italy, tackling, respectively, the 
curbing of abuse of rights’ potential as a tool for redistributive policy and the 
methodological and cultural stakes of the academic debate over abuse of rights.  
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I. ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COURTS 
 
A.  The Functional Equivalents of Abuse of Rights: Malice Rules and Reasonableness Tests 
 
For some decades between the second half of the nineteenth and the first 
half of the twentieth century abuse of rights assiduously occupied the minds of 
continental European jurists. It dominated academic discussions and it 
appeared with increasing frequency in courts’ decisions. A newly crafted 
unitary conceptual scheme resting on medieval sources, it allowed judges to 
weigh conflicting individual rights, tempering their absoluteness and 
amplitude, in a variety of legal subfields. Susceptible of application to both 
extra-contractual rights and contractual rights, it helped courts deal with 
questions regarding relations among neighbours, conflicts over water 
resources, marital and paternal authority, the formation of contracts, 
unilateral recess, business competition and conflicts between capital and labor. 
A central organizing concept on the Continent, abuse of rights was, allegedly, 
hardly of any concern to common lawyers. The relatively sparse English 
literature on abuse of rights insinuates that the concept is nowhere to be found 
in the common law. A unitary notion of abuse of rights was neither part of the 
conceptual armoury of academic writers nor readily available in the courts’ tool 
box.  
 
However, a look at courts’ records suggests that abuse of rights was, indeed, 
silently at work in English and, more significantly, in American law. The 
scattered references to continental European theories should not deceive. In 
various areas of the law, judges relied on “functional equivalents” of abuse of 
rights. In other words, the socio-legal function played by abuse of rights on the 
continent, i.e. limiting the amplitude of individual rights and balancing 
conflicting rights, was performed by a variety of “malice” tests and “reasonable 
user” rules that, although not integrated into a unitary category of “abuse of 
rights”, presented a highly similar conceptual pattern. In disputes as diverse as 
conflicts between riparian owners and controversies between employer and 
employees, defendants’ conduct, otherwise lawful, was deemed to entail 
liability either because of its malicious nature or by virtue of its 
unreasonableness. Significantly, the hidden conceptual unity of these various 
rules did not elude common lawyers. Opinions abounded with allusions to the 
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parallel operation of similarly structured malice rules in different areas of the 
law. 
 
1. Water Law 
 
Water law had long been the terrain on which continental theories of 
abuse of rights were elaborated and tested. Justinian law contained scattered 
provisions prohibiting aemulatio in relation to water rights, provisions which 
were of avail to medieval jurists in their effort to work out a general theory of 
aemualtio. Drawing on these Roman and medieval precedents, nineteenth 
century French and Italian jurists framed conflicts over competing uses of 
water as abuses of landowners’ property rights. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque 
ad coelum.  As the maxim recites, a landowner’s right was said to extend to 
surface of the land as well as to everything that is upon or above it to an 
indefinite height. However, although exclusive and absolute, this right was 
deemed to be susceptible of abuses. Spitefully pumping off the water 
percolating underneath one’s land thereby draining the neighbour’s well 
amounted to one such instance of abuse. 
 
Not surprisingly, in England and in the United States, courts dealt with 
abuses of water rights relying on rules that closely parallel the continental 
doctrine. In Acton v. Blundell, a case decided by the Exchequer Chamber in 
184319, the plaintiff, a cotton spinner, used for the operation of his mill a well 
which was fed by underground streams of water percolating from the soil 
underneath the land of the defendants. The latter erected engines and pumps 
which drained the water preventing it from flowing and percolating to the 
plaintiff’s well and thereby procuring him pecuniary loss. In the court’s 
assessment, the draining of the well amounted to damnum absque iniuria and 
could not become the ground of an action20. A landowner, the court noted, has 
the right to avail herself of all that lies beneath the surface, unless she does so 
                                               
19 Acton v. Blundell, [1843] 12 M. & W. 324. The cause was tried before Rolfe, B. at the Liverpool Spring Assizes 
in 1841. Against the direction of the Judge, the counsel for the plaintiff tendered a bill of exceptions which was 
argued before the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Tindal J). 
20 The inferior court directed the jury that, if the defendants had proceeded and acted “in the usual and proper 
manner” for the purpose of working a coal mine, they might lawfully do so and that the plaintiff’s evidence was 
not sufficient to support his allegations. Against the direction of the inferior court, the counsel for the plaintiff 
tendered a bill of exceptions which was argued before the Court of Exchequer Chamber. 
di Robilant ABUSE OF RIGHTS  14 of 99 
animo vicino nocendi, i.e. maliciously, with the intent to injure the neighbour. 
However, since ill will was not alleged, the malice qualification was obiter.  
 
 In Chasemore v. Richards (1859), Lord Wesleydale, hinted at a notion of 
“reasonable use” that resembled continental notions of “normal function”21. The 
appellant had owned and operated for sixty years a mill on a river which was 
fed by the water percolating through the underground strata from higher 
lands. The respondent, the local Board of Health of the town of Croydon, for the 
purpose of augmenting the town’s supply of water and for other sanitary 
purposes, sunk a large well in a piece of land situated above the plaintiff’s mill. 
The operation of the well drained the subterranean stream that would have 
otherwise oozed in the river, diminishing its flow and therefore hampering the 
working of the appellant’s mill. The latter brought action for damages. The 
Court of Exchequer and the Court of Exchequer Chamber gave judgement in 
favour of the respondents. The House of Lords confirmed the decision of the 
lower courts, affirming the respondent’s right to intercept subterranean 
streams. Lord Wensleydale, in an opinion which is “as close to a dissenting 
judgement as possible without recording a formal dissent”22, carefully 
investigated the modalities and purposes of the respondents’ use of the water, 
suggesting that a use not connected with the enjoyment of the land may be 
“unreasonable”23. 
                                               
21 Chasemore v. Richards [1859] 7 H. L. Cas 349. 
22 MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE STORY OF 
EDWARD PICKLES AND THE BRADFORD WATER SUPPLY (2002). 
23 However, a few decades later, in Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, the House of Lords stepped back, finding 
motives to be immaterial. The Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford Appellants v. Edward 
Pickles Respondent, [1895]AC 587. Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles is another case involving interference with 
underground water. The respondent, Mr Pickles, owned land on a higher level than the parcel of land acquired by 
the appellants and used for the operation of the Bradford Waterworks Company. Allegedly for the purpose of 
working minerals, Mr Pickles drained from the soil the ground water, which would have otherwise percolated to 
the appellants’ land, thereby reducing the latter’s supply of water. The appellants brought an action seeking an 
injunction to restrain the respondent from continuing to  sink the shaft  or doing anything to draw off the water 
or diminish its quantity. They claimed that the respondent was motivated by the intent to injure thereby inducing 
them to purchase his land, rather than by a bona fide intention to work his minerals. While the inferior court 
granted the injunction, the Court of Appeals reversed. The House of Lords confirmed the latter court’s decision, 
dismissing the appeal. In the court’s analysis it is the act, not the motive for the act, that must be regarded. The 
deliberate nebulosity of Mr. Bell’s Principles of the Law of Scotland should not deceive, Lord Watson warned. 
Aemulatio is a misleading expression and, while its operative scope in the law of Scotland is narrow, translating in 
mere variations of degree in the courts’ assessment in cases of nuisance, it was never part of English law. On 
Bradford v. Pickles see: MICHAEL TAGGART, supra note 26. 
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In the United States, notions of “reasonable use” closely resembling 
continental objective formulations of “abuse of rights” proved crucial organizing 
concepts in nineteenth century water law, a legal field key to the progress of 
industrialized agriculture as well as to the development of manufacturing 
industry. Starting from the 1820s, water law took shape as a distinctively 
American conceptual creation24. Joseph Angell’s “A Treatise on the Common 
Law in Relation to Watercourses” appeared in 1824, laying the foundations on 
which Justice Story and Chancellor Kent were to shape the common law of 
waters25. ”Reasonable user” rules were central to this new conceptual 
structure. In all of the three major sub-domains of water law, surface 
watercourses, ground water and diffuse surface water, “reasonable user” 
doctrines gradually supplanted earlier rules of allocation.  
 
With regard to the first category of waters, i.e. surface watercourses, in 
the humid eastern states, riparianism soon emerged as the controlling 
doctrine. According to the riparian doctrine, ownership of riparian land creates 
a perpetual usufructuary right in the landowner to use the water. As to the 
allocation of water among riparian owners, the earlier “natural flow” rule26, 
dominant in the eighteen and early nineteenth century was gradually replaced 
by the “reasonable user” principle27. The latter accords the riparian a right to 
alter the flow when, balanced against the uses of other riparians, the use is 
reasonable. Anticipated by Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson28, the reasonable 
                                               
24 Samuel C. Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1919), notes that:  “the 
common law of watercourses is not the ancient result of English law, but is a French doctrine received into 
English law only through the influence of two eminent American jurists”. 
25 JOSEPH ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATERCOURSES (1824); JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1889). 
26 The “natural flow” rule prohibits any use of the stream by one riparian so as to diminish the natural flow to the 
other riparian owners; it allows for modest domestic use, preventing waste, malicious diversion or extraordinary 
use of water. See Michael Taggart, supra note 26; See  
27 MORTON J. HORWITZ, supra note 16. 
28 In Tyler v. Wilkinson 4 Mason 397 Fed Cas no 14 312 (1827), Justice Story provided a schizophrenic 
articulation of the rule that reflected an uneasy transition between the older rule and the new reasonableness 
principle. The case involved a typical case of conflict between riparian mill owners where the owners of the upper 
dam appropriate and use a large quantity of water to the detriment of lower dam. In Story’s reasoning, the natural 
flow principle was still commanding and the reasonableness test was timidly added as a qualification. “The right 
being common to all the proprietors on the river, no one has a right to diminish the quantity which will, according 
to the natural current flow to a proprietor below or throw it back upon a proprietor above. This is the necessary 
result of the perfect equality of right among all proprietors of that which is common to all. […] When I speak of 
this common right, I do not mean to be understood, as holding the doctrine that there can be no diminution 
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use rule was fully articulated in Cary v. Daniels, a 1844 case involving a 
conflict between lower and upper mill owners29. Chief Justice Shaw of the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that each proprietor is entitled to such 
use of the stream, so far as it is reasonable in light of the needs of the 
community and the developments in hydraulic technologies.  
 
A similar development occurred in the legal regime governing the second 
category of waters, i.e. underground percolating waters. While earlier cases 
rely on the “absolute ownership” rule, occasionally tempered by a narrow 
subjective malice qualification, by the late nineteenth century courts and 
writers were shifting towards either a “reasonable user” criterion or a 
“correlative rights” rule30. Professor Ernst Huffcut of Cornell Law School, 
writing in 1904 on the Yale Law Journal stated confidently that “the prevailing 
view in America is that, in order to justify the cutting off of another’s water 
supply derived from percolating waters, it is necessary that this should be 
result of a reasonable user of defendant’s rights in his own land”31. In Bassett 
v. Salisbury (1862)32, a case regarding the obstruction of the natural drainage 
of percolating water, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire while spelling 
neatly the “reasonable user” rule, also showed awareness of the hidden 
conceptual unity of reasonableness rules operating in various legal subfields: 
 
The maxim “sic utere” & c., therefore applies, and, as in many other cases, 
                                                                                                                                               
whatsoever, and no obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor in the use of the water as it 
flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use of it. There may be, and there must be, allowed of that, which is 
common to all, a reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is whether it is to the injury 
of the other proprietors or not. […] The law, here, as in many other cases, acts with a reasonable reference to 
public convenience and general good and it is not betrayed into a narrow strictness, subversive of common sense, 
nor into an extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights. The maxim is applied “ sic utere tuo ut non 
alienum leadas”.  
29 Cary v. Daniels 8 Metcalf 466 (1844). 
30 The reasonable use rule was anticipated in a number of earlier cases. In De Bok v. Doak 188 Iowa 597, 176 N. 
W. 631 (1920), the plaintiff complained of an alleged injury caused him by the fact that the defendant appellant 
used an excessive amount of water percolating from the ground not only as drink for his horses and cattle but 
also to furnish drink and make a wallow for his hogs. The Supreme Court of Iowa, affirming the decision of the 
Circuit Court which had granted injunctive relief, held that the appellant defendant had wasted the water in excess 
to the detriment of the plaintiff. Justice Salinger emphasized the “modern trend” towards a “reasonable use” rule 
taking into account “the local conditions, the purpose for which the landowner excavates and the use or non use 
she makes of the water”. 
31 Ernst W. Huffcut, Percolating Waters: The Rule of Reasonable User, 13 YALE L. J. 222 (1903-1904). 
32 Bassett v. Salisbury 43 N. H. 569 (1862). 
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restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own right, a reasonable use of his 
own property, in view of the similar rights of others. Instances of its similar 
application in cases of watercourses, where the detention, pollution or unnatural 
discharge of the water is complained of, of highways, of alleged nuisances in 
regard to air or by noises &c., &c., and of the manner of the application are too 
numerous and familiar to need more special mention.  
 
Finally, reasonableness tests were also developed in relation to the third 
category of waters, i.e. diffused surface waters. In the nineteenth century and 
earlier twentieth century, run-off water was considered mainly in terms of 
disposal and relatively little use was made of it. Earlier governed by an 
absolutistic “common enemy” rule or by the so called “civil law” rule33, conflicts 
over surface run-off increasingly came to be controlled, by a “reasonable use” 
rule. In Short v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland weighed the competing rights of the appellant, the owner of a house 
in a Baltimore neighbourhood, and the appellee, a railway company, in light of 
the reasonableness of the latter’s use of its property34. After a heavy fall of 
snow the railway company in clearing its track, threw the snow into the 
adjoining street. The same night it rained hard and the mass of snow 
obstructed the natural flow of the water which flooded the appellant’s house. 
The court affirmed the judgment of the inferior court finding that the railway 
company had acted in a “reasonable, usual and proper manner” and hence the 
appellant’ injury was damnum absque injuria. Similarly, in City of Franklin v. 
Durgee, the court declared that “the doctrines of reasonable necessity, 
reasonable care and reasonable use prevail in this state in a liberal form, on a 
broad basis of general principle”35.  
 
 
                                               
33 In Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106 (1865), a Massachusetts case, the defendant, who owned an upper parcel 
of land, had placed turfs on his own land to protect it from a considerable flow of surface water caused by the 
melting of the snow and the spring rains, thereby causing the water to flow off upon the plaintiff’s land33. 
Resorting to the language of absolute rights and declaring that “cujus est solum,ejus est usque ad coelum” the court 
applied the “common enemy” rule.  The owner of a piece of land, Justice Bellow stated, may lawfully use it in 
such manner as either to prevent surface water which accumulates elsewhere from coming upon it or to allow 
surface water to come upon his land from elsewhere, although the water is thereby made to flow upon the land of 
an adjoining landowner to her loss. 
34 Hicks Short v. The Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company 50 Md. 73 (1878). 
35 City of Franklin v. Durgee 58 L. R. A. 112, 51 A. 911 (1901). 
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2. Nuisance 
 
Nuisance was another area in which issues of abusive exercise of 
property rights typically arose. In the common law world, disputes concerning 
the spiteful erection of fences, walls, chimneys and other structures, largely 
framed by civilians as hypotheses of “abuse of rights”, were treated as “private 
nuisances”. As G. H. L. Fridman noted in an article on “Motive in the English 
Law of Nuisance”, nuisance, as an area of tort liability, is central to the 
discussion of abuse of rights in the common law. 
 
In systems of law derived from the Digest a great deal is said about abuse of 
rights; and the law is certainly made simpler and more patently straightforward 
by provisions in codes and case law developments therefrom, dealing with jus 
abutendi, abus des droits, or schikanerverbot. Such ideas are not to be found as 
part of the common law. But it should not be thought that the common law 
provides no remedy for such wrongs. There is an ample provision in the present 
law relating to the tort nuisance for control of activities envisaged by the 
continental codes36. 
 
The essence of private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the 
use and enjoyment of land37. Liability may rest upon the defendant’s 
intentional interference with the plaintiff’s interest as well as upon a merely 
negligent interference or an abnormally dangerous conduct carried out 
inappropriately.  Therefore, subjective notions of malice, closely resembling 
continental aemulatio, and more objective reasonableness tests, echoing French 
and Italian notions of “normal function” of a right proved critical to 
determining liability for nuisance. While malice is not necessarily implied in 
nuisance, it may be an element in the commission of nuisances. Liability may 
result from a course of activity maliciously designed to inflict harm. More often, 
liability results from the defendant’s unreasonable and excessive exercise of 
her right. Most late nineteenth and early twentieth century American courts 
saw nuisance disputes as arising from a conflict between two absolute property 
rights; in struggling to determine the proper limits on those competing rights 
they relied, largely, on “reasonableness” and “malice rules” 38. 
                                               
36 G.H. L. Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L. REV. 583 (1954). 
37 Robert G. Bone, supra note 14 
38 Robert G. Bone, supra, at 1137. 
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American courts’ treatment of “spite fence” cases varied significantly and 
changed over time39. While, in an earlier stage40, in six of the ten states in 
which actions had been brought for the spiteful erection of a fence, the opinion 
of the court was against the plaintiff, by the first decade of the twentieth 
century, courts consistently held defendants liable for maliciously erecting 
fences or other constructions41. Further, in several states, statutes were passed 
making the erection of a spite fence a tort42. In Rideout v. Knox43, Justice 
Holmes reluctantly upheld one such statute. In Holmes’s reasoning, the power 
to use one’s property malevolently is, to a large extent, an incident of a right 
established for very different ends, which cannot be taken away even by 
legislation. However, Holmes concedes, limits to property rights are a matter of 
degree: while larger limitations would entail too incisive a constraint on the 
owner’s right, smaller limitations may be imposed for the sake of avoiding a 
manifest evil44. Similarly, In Horan v. Byrnes (1903)45, the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire applied the “reasonable use” and upheld a statute declaring 
                                               
39 A 1937 case furnished a telling photograph of a “spite fence” complete with the following description: “a fence 
erected for no benefit or pleasure to the person erecting it, but solely with the malicious motive of injuring the 
adjoining landowner by shutting out his light, air and view”. 
40 In Mahan v. Brown 13 Wend 261(1835), the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York held that an action on 
the case does not lie against a defendant for erecting a spite fence whereby he obstructs the lights of his 
neighbour, let the motive of the obstruction be what it may, if the lights be not ancient lights or his neighbour has 
not acquired a right by grant or occupation and acquiescence. In a nice display of formalistic reasoning, the court 
distinguished the case at hand from the Aldred’s case where the construction of a hog house infesting the 
neighbour’s property with fetid smells had been found to be a nuisance. In the latter case, Justice Savage argued, a 
positive right had been invaded, every person having a right to the use of natural elements in their purity. 
Conversely, in the case at hand, the plaintiff  enjoys a mere easement that may ripen into a right. But, before 
sufficient time has elapsed to raise a presumption of a grant, he is deprived of no right, but only prevented from 
acquiring a right, without consideration, in his neighbour’s property.  
41 See James Barr Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV., 
411 (1905). 
42 Id., at 415; the states were: Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Washington. 
43 Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass 368, 19 N. E.  390 (1889). 
44 Holmes’ concern with the arbitrariness of jury’s inquiry into motives echoes the arguments raised by opponents 
of abuse of right on the Continent: “It has been thought by respectable authorities that even at common law the 
extent of a man’s rights in cases like the present might depend upon the motive with which he acted. […] We do 
not so understand the common law, and we concede further that to large extent the power to use one’s property 
malevolently in any way which would be lawful for other ends is an incident of property which cannot be taken 
away even by legislation. It may be assumed that under our constitution the legislature would not have the power 
to prohibit putting up or maintaining stores or houses with malicious intent and thus to make a large part of the 
property of the commonwealth dependent upon what a jury might find to have been the past or to be the present 
motives of the owner. But it does not follow that the rule is the same for a boundary fence, unnecessarily built 
more than six feet high. It may be said that the difference is only one of degree. Most differences are, when nicely 
analyzed”. 
45 Horan v. Byrnes, 72 NH 93 54 A 945 (1903). 
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that any fence unnecessarily exceeding five feet in height and erected to annoy 
an adjoining owner, shall be a private nuisance. Chief Justice Parsons’ 
reference to Franklin v. Durgee, the earlier water case mentioned above, 
betrays awareness of the underlying conceptual unity of the various 
“reasonable use” tests operating in different fields of the law: 
 
The common law right of the ownership of land […] does not sanction or 
authorize practical injustice to one landowner by the arbitrary and unreasonable 
exercise of the right of dominion by another (Franklin v. Durgee), but makes the 
test of the right the reasonableness of the use under all circumstances. In such 
case the purpose of the use, whether understood by the landowner to be 
necessary or useful to himself, or merely intended to harm another, may be 
decisive upon the question of right. It cannot be justly contended that a purely 
malicious use is a reasonable use. 
 
Reasonableness rules were also deployed in cases of nuisance involving 
conflicts between industrial enterprises and residential landowners. In the St. 
Helen case (1865)46, involving a major episode of industrial pollution, the 
House of Lords formulated a reasonableness rule placing emphasis on time and 
locality. Again, the existence of a unitary conceptual pattern linking malice 
rules and reasonableness tests in disparate legal domains could hardly elude 
the court. Lord Wesleydale, who a few years before, in Chasemore v. Richards, 
had boldly alluded at a “reasonable use” rule far exceeding the narrow scope of 
subjective “malice”, approvingly concurred in his bretherns’ articulation of 
“reasonableness”.  
 
3. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations or Economic Expectancies 
 
Cases of tortious interference with contractual relations were a third 
category of cases raising issues of “abuse of rights” solved through malice rules 
and reasonableness tests similar to continental doctrines. The typical instance 
of interference with contractual relations was that of a third party who, in the 
exercise of her lawful right to compete on the market, interfered with an 
existing or prospective contractual relation between two parties in order to 
obtain some advantage. The question facing the courts was whether the 
interloper had abused her right to compete. Until the 1850s, it was widely 
                                               
46 St. Helen Smelting Co. V. Tipping XI HLC 642 (1865). 
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assumed that a remedy for a breach of contract could be obtained only against 
the other party to the contract. Courts accorded contractual relations 
protection from a variety of third parties interferences, but no formally unified 
tort had developed. While the master-servant relation was shielded through an 
action of enticement against third parties who persuaded a servant to leave her 
employment, other contractual agreements were protected from a variety of 
interferences such as slander, libel, fraud, coercion.  
 
By the 1850s, socio-economic developments and conceptual innovations 
had cast new light on the problem of third parties’ interference. Courts were 
now inclined to envisage contractual expectations as a form of property to be 
afforded absolute protection47. Once again, the concept of “malice” well served 
courts’ efforts to provide such protection. The defendant’s right to compete and 
the plaintiff’s “contractual property” were balanced in light of standards of 
“malice” or “unreasonableness”. As Prosser lamented in his treatise “On Torts”, 
the law of interference with economic relations became “shrouded in a fog of 
catchwords and rubber-stamp phrases”,48 most of which turned on the question 
of the defendant’s malicious motive or purpose.  
 
In Lumley v. Gye (1853)49, the Court of Queen’s Bench extended the 
action of enticement to malicious interference with contractual relations other 
than the master-servant relation. The case involved a contract between the 
plaintiff, the lessee and manager of the Queen’s Theatre in London, and Miss 
Johanna Wagner, a singer, for the performance by her for a period of three 
months at the plaintiff’s theatre. The court found that the defendant, the 
impresario of a competing theatre, had procured Miss Holmes to breach the 
contract animated by a “malicious intention” and awarded damages to the 
plaintiff.  
 
                                               
47 See John T. Nockleby, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relation in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of 
Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1979-1980). Frances Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 663, 675 (1922-1923).  “If this tort it not to be regarded as simply a particularized manifestation of 
the old doctrine of Keeble v Hickeringill its true basis would seem to lie in the policy of the law to accord to 
promises the same or similar protection as is accorded to other forms of property. By lending its protection to 
promised advantages, the law creates and secures additional property values which further the social welfare”. 
48  WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, (4TH ED. 1971)at 927. 
49 Lumley v. Gye, Court of Queen’s Bench (Coleridge, Erle, Wightman and Crompton, JJ.)  [1853] 2 E&B 216. 
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In Temperton v. Russell (1893)50, the Court of Queens Bench extended 
the principle of liability for interference beyond existing contractual relations 
to relations which are merely prospective or potential. Lord Esher saw no 
distinction between the two categories of relations, the malicious, and hence 
wrongful, intent and the kind of injury being the same. As nicely put in a later 
American case, since a large part of what is most valuable in modern life seems 
to depend more or less directly upon “probable expectancies”, it would seem 
inevitable that courts will “discover, define and protect from undue interference 
more of these “probable expectancies”51. However, in Allen v. Flood, a 1897 case 
involving a union’s interference with the employment relation between the 
employer and employees affiliated to a rival union52, the role of malice was 
minimized.  A classic in the literature on abuse of rights, Allen v. Flood is seen 
as the undisputable evidence that “abuse of rights” had a short life in England. 
The House of Lords recast and deactivated the doctrine of malice. Malice, Lord 
Watson noted, depends not upon evil motive but upon the illegal character of 
the act committed53 
                                               
50 Temperton v. Russel (Lord Escher, MR, Lopes and A. Smith LJJ [1893] 1QB 715. 
51 Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63  NJ Eq 759, 53 A 230 (1902). 
52 Thomas Francis Allen Appellant v. William Cridge Flood and Walter Taylor Respondents, supra note 19. Along 
with Pickles v. Bradford, Allen stands as the foremost authority for the absence of abuse of right in English law. 
The appellant, Allen, the delegate of the union of iron-workers, in order to punish the respondents, a group 
shipwrights who had in the past engaged in practices resisted by the union, had informed the employer that unless 
the latter were discharged, all the iron-workers would be called out. Pressed by this threat, the employer 
discharged the shipwrights and refused to employ them again. The respondents brought an action against the 
appellant. The inferior court awarded damages to the respondents. The decision was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal. Reversing the latter court’s decision, the House of Lords  gave judgement in favour of the appellant 
arguing  that, however malicious or bad his motive might be, he had done no unlawful act. A deep and hardly 
disguisable anxiety permeates the court’s profuse discussion of the essence and the scope of malice. The court is 
eager to vindicate and defend its role as the arbiter of social and economic conflict. The conceptual vagueness of 
malice is said to threaten legal certainty by putting the assessment of human actions at the mercy of juries, hence 
resulting in great danger for the community and for individual freedom. Retrieving the well-know adagio of 
malice’s conceptual obscurity, the court restates the doctrine. The definition provided by the court is the same 
offered by the Mogul Steamship case “a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse”; the 
emphasis, however, is on the wrongful nature of the act, rather than on the presence of a just cause. By shifting 
the emphasis from the motive to the nature of the act, the court closes the narrow space left open for a theory of 
abuse of right in the  Mogul case. In the Allen court’s words: “For the purpose then in hand [in the Mogul case] 
the statement of the law may be accurate enough, but if it means that a man is bound in law to justify or excuse 
every wilful act which may damage another in his property or trade then I say with all respect the proposition [of 
Lord Bowen] is far too wide; everything depends on the nature of the act, and whether it is wrongful or not” 
53 “The root of the principle is that, in any legal question, malice depends not upon evil motive which influenced 
the mind of the actor, but upon the illegal character of the act which he contemplated and committed. In my 
opinion it is alike consistent with reason and common sense that when the act done is, apart from the feelings 
which prompted it, legal, the civil law ought to take no cognizance of its motive” 
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From England, the tort of interference with economic relations migrated 
to America. Frances Bowes Sayre, writing in 1922 in the Harvard Law Review, 
lamented the little careful inquiry American courts devoted to the precise 
limits and fundamental nature of the doctrine. In Sayre’s words: 
 
Much of the uncertainty surrounding this tort comes from the shifting ideas 
which have clustered around the requirement of “malice”. Following in the 
footsteps of Justice Crompton, courts still carefully repeat the formula which 
requires “malice” as one of the essential elements of the tort. But thus far what 
constitutes “malice” has been passed over in silence or covered by remarks of the 
most ambiguous nature54. 
 
In fact, in cases of interference with contractual relations as well as in cases 
of interference with prospective advantage, malice was variously framed. While 
in sparse instances American courts deemed malice irrelevant, a majority of 
cases held the defendant liable for maliciously or unreasonably interfering with 
the plaintiff’s “contractual property”. In Chambers v. Baldwin, a 1891 case of 
interference with a contract for the sale of a crop of tobacco, the Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky found that the defendant, in procuring the purchaser of 
the crop to break the contract, had exercised, rather than abused, his right to 
compete on the market of goods, his alleged malicious motives being 
immaterial55. Once again, the reasoning of the court betrays awareness of a 
hidden unitary conceptual structure. The court explicitly drew on water cases 
to affirm the irrelevance of motive and the absoluteness of the defendant’s 
right. Justice Lewis quoted Chatfield v. Wilson and other earlier water cases to 
the effect that “an act legal in itself, and which violates no right, cannot be 
made actionable on account of the motive which induced it”. As the landowner 
who diverts subterranean percolating waters does so in the exercise of her 
absolute property right, so a tobacco dealer who interferes with contractual 
relation between the seller and another buyer to become purchaser in his 
stead, does so in the exercise of his right to compete on the market.  
 
 To the contrary, in Jones v. Leslie, a 1910 case of interference with an 
                                               
54 Frances Bowes Sayre, supra note 53, at 672. 
55 Chambers v. Baldwin 11 L. R. A. 545 15 SW 57 (1891). 
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employment contract, the court found malicious motives material56. The 
plaintiff, formerly an employee of the defendant, had found a better job and 
stipulated an oral contract with the new employer. The defendant induced the 
latter to discharge the plaintiff by threatening to drive him out of business if he 
engaged the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Washington fitted the fact pattern 
within the mould of a subjective notion of malice as wanton malevolence.  
 
Most courts, however, privileged broader tests that focused on the 
reasonableness of the interloper’s purpose rather than on her mere malevolent 
intent. In a 1911 case of interference with economic relations, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa assessed the interloper’s conduct in light of a “reasonableness” 
standard and explicitly suggested the parallel with water cases and nuisance 
cases. A wealth of water cases and labor cases, Justice Weaver noted, provide 
authority for the proposition that an act which is legally right when done 
without malice may become legally wrong when done “maliciously, wantonly or 
without reasonable cause”. 
 
4. Labor Law 
 
Finally, inquiries into motives and notions of “reasonable exercise of a 
right” were central to emerging modern labor law. In 1901, in Quinn v. 
Leathem57, the House of Lords, faced with a conflict between capital and labor, 
retrieved the notion of malice previously ruled out in Allen v. Flood. The 
appellant was an official of a meat workers union determined to unionize the 
respondent, owner of a slaughter yard, who was not willing to bend to the 
union’s pressures. Quinn and other officials notified the retail butcher to whom 
the respondent regularly sold all of his product, that, unless he ceased dealing 
with the latter, they would call out his workers. As a consequence, the retail 
butcher sent a telegram to the respondent, letting him know that he would no 
longer buy his meat. The latter, who, having just killed a quantity of fine meat, 
suffered great economic loss, brought action against the appellants. The 
inferior court gave judgement in favour of the respondent and the Irish Court 
of Appeal affirmed. Quinn alone appealed and the House of Lords affirmed the 
                                               
56 Jones v. Leslie 61 Wash. 107, 112 P. 81. (1910). 
57 Quinn v. Laetham, [1901] A.C. 495 85 LT 289. 
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decision of the latter court, finding the appellant to have acted maliciously.  
Lord Shand disguised the court’s sudden drift in the understanding of malice 
with bold and abstract claims as to law’s illogical nature: 
 
[…] a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it 
can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a 
mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every 
lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. My lords, I think 
the application of these two propositions [the first being that every judgement must 
be read as applicable to the particular facts proved] renders the decision of this case 
perfectly plain, notwithstanding the decision of the case of Allen v. Flood. 
 
Likewise, in the United States, at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
notions of “malice” played a significant role in the development of labor law. 
American courts deployed reasonableness tests to widen or narrow the scope of 
permitted collective action. Early American labor cases are said to reflect “a 
spirit of medievalism with its antagonism to the working classes”. These cases 
involved criminal indictments for conspiracy rather than injunction or damage 
suits. The unions’ very right to exist was at stake. In the 1806 case of the 
Philadelphia cordwainers a combination to raise wages was held illegal; in a 
1835 New York case, People v. Fisher, the court took the same view. As Edwin 
Witte noted in the Yale Law Journal in 1925, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842) 
marked “the overthrew of these archaic doctrines and the beginning of the 
modern law of labor combinations”58. Rather than questioning the union’s right 
to exist or the legality of the combination itself, the court focused on the 
purpose sought and the means employed by the union. In the following decades 
criminal conspiracy cases became less frequent and, in a number of states, 
legislation repealing the conspiracy doctrine was enacted.  
 
By the 1890s, with the tremendous rise in both the size and the 
organization of labor unions, the old doctrine of criminal conspiracy had been 
abandoned. Courts came to rely extensively on the labor injunction, an equity 
remedy, justifying it as the protection of a newly coined concept of 
“entrepreneurial property rights” from irreparable injury59. Further, tort law 
                                               
58 Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases 35 YALE L. J. 825 (1925-1926). 
59 Haggai Hurvitz, American Labour Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the 
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came of avail. Picketing, strikes and secondary boycotts were subsumed within 
the category of malicious torts. Courts focused on the purposes driving unions 
assessing them in terms of wanton malice, reasonableness and lack of 
legitimate interest. 
 
For instance, in Moores v. Bricklayers Union, a 1889 Ohio boycott case, 
Justice Taft resorted to a reasonableness test that echoed continental ideas of 
“normal function of a right”60.  A bricklayers union, seeking to coerce an 
employer to accept its requests, sent the latter’s customers a circular stating 
that any dealings with him would lead to similar measures against them. Since 
one of the customers, the Moores Lime Company, upon receiving the circular, 
stopped selling lime to the employer by delivery, the latter sent a teamster who 
bought it for cash at Moores’ car. Having disregarded the union’s circular, the 
Moores Lime Company was banned and brought an action for damages. The 
question facing the court was whether the defendant union had unreasonably 
or maliciously exercised its right to the free pursuit of trade. Taft assessed the 
“immediate motive” driving the Bricklayers’ Union in light of the “normal 
operation of the right to labor”, and found it  malicious. 
 
5. A Hidden Unitary Concept? 
 
Although operating in an analogous fashion in all these various legal 
subfields, “malice” and “reasonableness” rules never congealed into a unitary 
category of “abuse of rights”. At times, common lawyers have regarded the 
absence of a unitary category of abuse of rights with regret, attributing it to the 
flaws of common law-style legal thinking. As an observer noted: 
 
The piece-meal, empiricist approach to judicial decision making that characterizes 
the common law is its greatest weakness as well as its greatest strength. […] in so 
far as malicious or improper motive is relevant to the determination of a legal right 
in our law, we probably will now reach the same result as those jurisdictions which 
have the doctrine [of abuse of rights]; but the reluctance of our courts to consider the 
theoretical foundations of our law has resulted in a legal fabric that abounds with 
loose ends, and requires constant and ad hoc patching61.  
                                                                                                                                               
Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895 in 8 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL 307 (1986). 
60 Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers Union et Al., 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 665 (1889). 
61 Hamar Foster, Abuse of Rights. Civil Law, Legal Reasoning: Bradford v. Pickles Revisited, 8 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 
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However, cross-references in cases dealing with water rights, nuisance, 
tortuous interference with economic relations and labor law are not the only 
evidence of courts’ awareness of an overarching conceptual scheme. Individual 
personalities also played a role in designing an unstated, though powerfully 
operative, conceptual structure resembling “abuse of rights”. A significant 
number of the decisions discussed in this article were rendered by the Supreme 
Courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The vanguard of legal thinking, 
these two courts, under the guidance of, respectively, Chief Justice Shaw and 
Chief Justice Doe, were the laboratory where reasonableness standards 
fashioned on a unitary mold were elaborated. Well-read jurisprudents, 
conversant with European legal theory, Doe and Shaw may have been well 
aware of the parallel with the continental theories of abuse of rights62. In any 
case, Doe and Shaw’s innumerable discussions of “reasonable use” or 
“reasonable exercise of a right” betray awareness of an underlying unitary 
framework63.  
 
Furthermore, a clear sense of the conceptual unity of the scheme emerges 
from Jeremiah Smith’s opinions and writings. A colleague of Doe on the New 
Hampshire bench, Smith, in a series of articles, analyzed the questions raised 
by “malice” and “reasonableness” rules in apparently distant fields, i.e. 
relations among neighbors and labor disputes64. Although aware of the unitary 
nature of such rules, Smith expressed skepticism towards the general 
categories and mathematical formulas relied upon by his continental 
colleagues: 
 
The question of legal regulation of conflicting rights is not confined to rights in 
regard to the use of land, but extends to all cases of conflicting rights as to other 
matters or subjects. […] It is generally admitted that it is impossible to frame a rule 
so definite that its application will instantly solve all cases of conflicting rights. […] 
                                                                                                                                               
343 (1973). 
62 LEONARD LEVY, LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); JOHN PHILIP REID, CHIEF 
JUSTICE. THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967); FREDERIC HATHAWAY CHASE, LEMEUL SHAW: CHIEF 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1830-1860 (1918). SEE ALSO G. E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN 
JUDICIAL TRADITION (1978). 
63 Green v. Gilbert, 60 NH 144 (1880); Thompson v. The Androscogging River Improvement Co., 54 NH 545 
(1874). 
64 Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One’s Own Property As A Justification for Damage to A Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. 
REV., 383 (1917); Crucial Issues in Labour Litigation, 20 HARV. L. REV., 345 (1906);  
di Robilant ABUSE OF RIGHTS  28 of 99 
The respective rights and liabilities of adjoining landowners cannot be determined 
in advance  by a mathematical line or a general formula. As we said in regard to so 
called “private nuisances”: “No hard and fast rule controls the subject, for a use that 
is reasonable under one set of facts would be unreasonable under another”65 
 
 
B.  Reasonableness Tests: Unorthodox Legal Reasoning? 
 
Although not integrated into a unitary concept of “abuse of rights”, as in 
France and in Italy, malice rules and reasonableness tests were, in fact, unified 
through a unitary mode of reasoning. When applying these rules, American 
courts relied on techniques for doctrinal analysis and modes of justification 
that were hardly consistent with the dictates of so-called “Classical Legal 
Thought”. Attempts at balancing and cost-benefit analysis, justifications drawn 
from social morals and inquiries into the social consequences of legal doctrines 
coexisted, at times in the same opinion, with deductive and formalistic 
reasoning. Although still rudimentary and abstract if compared with post-WW2 
“conflicting considerations” analysis, these early instances of balancing and 
policy reasoning invite a re-characterization of nineteenth century legal 
reasoning, one that places less emphasis on the discontinuity between 
subsequent styles of thought and more on courts’ continuous reliance on both 
instrumentalist and formalist modes of reasoning.  
 
A substantial body of legal historical scholarship has traced a neat 
picture of the orthodox mode of legal thinking dominant in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century66. The “Formal Style” which, around the 1850s, 
ousted an earlier “Grand Style”, featuring clear reasoning and attention to 
policy, was seen as resting on a number of related assumptions. In Llewellyn’s 
words: “the rules of law are to decide the cases”; policy is for the legislature 
rather than the courts; “opinions run in deductive form with an air, or 
expression, of single-line inevitability”; the legal order is an ordered system of 
rules and principles. 
 
Subsequent historical work has further elaborated this picture. 
                                               
65 Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use supra at  385 
66 ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION. DECIDING APPEALS (1960); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
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Variously named, “Classical Legal Thought”, or “Formalism” or “Classical 
Orthodoxy”67 has been described as a relatively homogenous and coherent 
mode of thought. While the actual characterization and the political nature of 
legal classicism are a matter of dispute68, there is substantial agreement on its 
two major implications for judicial reasoning. First, judicial outcomes were 
deduced, either logically inferred or analytically derived69, from a relatively 
small number of conceptually ordered abstract principles. Further, in justifying 
their outcomes judges appealed to law’s internal coherence rather than to “the 
norms’ purposes, the general policies underlying the legal order or the 
                                               
67 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1860-1960 (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); Thomas C. Grey, Landgell’s Orthodoxy 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1 (1983-1984). 
68 American historians have drawn different images of late nineteenth century formalist legal thought. Duncan 
Kennedy’s account focuses on the internal structure of “Classical Legal Thought” as a mode of consciousness. 
The unity of a mode of thought or consciousness comes from the existence within this structure of a dominant 
doctrinal subsystem within which concepts, reasoning techniques, ideals and images are analogous across legal 
domains. In classical legal thought this dominant subsystem consisted of a number of elements: a) all legal rules 
were built out of a “will theory” using strictly analogous conceptions of public power and private right; b) private 
law rules were organized around the public/private distinction; c) the preferred mode of reasoning was 
induction/deduction d) the ideal was the deployment of democratically validated power as the framework for 
private freedom e) the key image was powers and rights “absolute within their spheres”. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, 
THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT , supra. Morton Horwitz, on the other hand, focuses more 
on the relation between legal thought and ideology, between Classical Legal Thought and Liberal Legalism. 
Classical legal thought was intimately linked to a central aspiration of American legal thinkers, the separation 
between law and politics, the quest for an autonomous system of law untainted by politics. After the trauma of 
the Civil war and at the moment of swift social and economic change jurists sought even more fervently to create 
a system of autonomous law. Through a process of systematization, integration and abstraction they built a 
coherent legal architecture that sought to depoliticize law by mediating a series of basic contradictions of ante-
bellum American law. This legal architecture was characterized by: a) the private-public distinction; b) the creation 
of increasingly abstract  and general legal classifications and categories such as will, ownership or fault;  c) clear, 
distinct bright-line classifications of legal phenomena; d) deductive and analogical reasoning which conferred 
upon legal reasoning the qualities of “certainty” and “logical inexorability”. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 supra. Finally, Thomas Grey focuses on the epistemological 
premises of Classical Orthodoxy. In Grey’s analysis, Classical legal science was a set of ideas to be put to work 
from inside by those who operate legal institutions. It envisioned the legal system as “complete” (i.e. its 
substantive norms provide a uniquely correct solution for every case that can arise under it.) through “universal 
formality” (i.e. the outcomes of the system are dictated by rationally compelling reasoning. The system can be 
made “universally formal” through “conceptual order (i.e. the substantive bottom level rules can be derived from 
a small number of relatively abstract principles and concepts which themselves form a coherent system. Grey 
emphasizes the analogy between classical orthodox legal science, which claims to be empirical and yet highly 
conceptual, experimental and inductive, and Euclidean geometry, seen, in the late nineteenth century, as a set of 
well confirmed inductive generalizations about the physical world. For legal science the universe of data was not 
the totality of sense experience of the physical world but the restricted set of reported common law decisions. See 
Thomas C. Grey, supra. More recently see WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886-1937 (1998). 
69 Thomas C. Grey, supra note 65 at 7-8. 
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extrajuristic preferences of the interpreter”70. Vague standards, such as 
reasonableness, or rules requiring determinations of state of mind, such as 
malice, are deemed to have been largely foreign to this style of reasoning71.  
 
Abuse of rights cases complicate this understanding of legal classicism, 
presenting us with courts consistently resorting to unorthodox reasoning 
techniques. The operation of reasonableness standards required two major 
modifications in courts’ “orthodox” reasoning technique. First, deduction 
yielded to balancing. Rather than deducing limits to individual rights from 
abstract principles, judges weighed the defendant and the plaintiff’s conflicting 
rights in light of multi-factor reasonableness standards allowing an assessment 
of geographical, technological and economic elements. Second, justificatory 
arguments changed significantly. The factual nature of a judgement of 
“reasonable exercise of a right” opened up space for policy-based justifications. 
Rather than invoking the legal system’s logical cogency or internal coherence, 
judges became more inclined to discuss openly the social consequences of their 
decisions and to rely on extra-juristic considerations.  
 
Nevertheless, this instrumental style of reasoning retained elements of 
formalism. While the language of balancing and cost-benefit comparison was 
often abstract and vague, the outcomes’ “air of single-line inevitability” was 
hardly attenuated. Moral norms supposedly rooted in the aspirations of the 
community, policies allegedly finding wide support in society, and informed 
experiential propositions72 substantiated the standard of “reasonableness”, 
conferring a patina of universality and inevitability upon courts’ justifications, 
and lifting them out of the incandescent arena of policy preferences. 
 
Numerous of the thousands of decision rendered by Chief Justice Shaw 
during his thirty years at the head of the Massachusetts bench exemplify this 
unorthodox style of reasoning. A figure of transition, operating at the moment 
when the “Grand Style” was gradually yielding to classical orthodoxy, Chief 
Justice Shaw heavily relied on reasonableness tests. On the one hand, Shaw, 
                                               
70 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES  8634 (2001). 
71 Thomas C. Grey supra note 65 at 11. 
72 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988). 
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deeply preoccupied with basic principles, envisaged law as a science founded on 
reason and strove to impart to the law system and symmetry. On the other 
hand, in the course of Shaw’s tenure, Massachusetts experienced swift 
economic development and social change. Shaw embarked resolutely in the 
task of accomodating legal doctrine to meet the new problems posed by a 
rapidly changing environment and turbulent economic growth. Constantly 
searching for ways to adapt the old to the new, Shaw used reasonableness 
tests, to be extracted from a shared, and hence non-contentious, common sense, 
to restate legal fields as diverse as water law and labor law as to make them 
“practical and plastic”73. Reasonableness satisfied both his quest for general 
principles as well as his idea of law as responsive to shifting social conditions.  
 
In Shaw’s analysis, a variety of factors determines the judgement of 
reasonableness. A reasonable use of one’s property is a question of degree74, 
purpose, natural and geographical conditions75, and technological 
advancement. For instance, in Thurber v. Martin, Shaw, called to assess the 
reasonableness of the use of a stream of water, declared that: 
 
In determining what is such reasonable use, a just regard must be had to the 
force and magnitude of the current, its height and velocity, the state of 
improvement in the country in regard to mills and machinery, and the use of 
water as a propelling power, the general usage of the country in similar cases 
and all other circumstances bearing upon the question of fitness and propriety in 
the use of the water in the particular case. 
 
While Shaw’s balancing of the landowners’ competing interests is an exercise in 
pragmatic and purpose-oriented comparative reasoning, the allusion to social 
customs and shared notions of propriety and fitness prevented him from seeing 
the case as requiring an analytic choice between alternative policies as to the 
nature and goal of property. 
 
A similar judicial philosophy, and a similar propensity towards 
reasonableness standards, is typical of another anomalous “classicist”76, Justice 
                                               
73 Leonard W. Levy, supra note at 24. 
74 Lewis Elliott v. The Fitchburg Railroad Co., 64 Mass 191 (1852). 
75 John Thurber v. Benjamin Martin 2 Gray 394 Mass 1854. 
76 Llewellyn saw Doe as an exception in the “Formal Style, see KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note 64. 
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Doe of New Hampshire.  Basset v. Salisbury (1862) and Swett v. Cutts (1870) 
signalled the Supreme Court’s of New Hampshire turn to the standard of 
“reasonableness” that Doe will further perfect. In the latter case, Chief Justice 
Bellow, weighed the conflicting rights of two adjoining landowners disputing 
over the diversion of the flow of surface water in the season of melting snow, 
and equated “reasonable use” to domestic, agricultural and manufacturing 
purposes. Further, Bellow clarified the factual assessment of reasonableness by 
listing, among the circumstances to be considered, “the nature and importance 
of the improvements sought to be made”, “the extent of the interference with 
the water”, “the amount of injury done to the other land-owners as compared 
with the value of such improvement” and, finally, “whether such injury could or 
could not have been reasonably foreseen”.  
 
An Associate Justice when Swett v. Cutts was decided, Charles Doe 
became Chief Justice in 1876. In the twenty years of Doe’s tenure, 
reasonableness became a general principle in the law of torts and the 
instrument for balancing conflicting rights77. Doe’s predilection for 
reasonableness was rooted in his methodological beliefs. In Doe’s 
understanding law was “experience developed by reason and reason checked 
and directed by experience”78. For Doe, legal doctrines were justifications for 
results obtained by reason and justice, where the latter stood for fairness and 
practicality. This notion of “justice” led the Chief Justice to favour balancing as 
a reasoning technique and reasonableness as the guiding criterion. Far from 
being a vague standard for the lazy, reasonableness took effort to apply; it was 
to be extracted from the shared norms and practices of a changing society.  
 
In Thompson v. Androscogging R. I. Co., Doe laid bare the complexities 
of an assessment of reasonableness in the use of property. Drawing on an 
earlier case, he discussed an hypothetical “unreasonable use” by a riparian 
                                               
77 See JOHN P. REID, supra note at 133 ff.  Though Mr Holmes has received most of the credit for awakening the 
bar to the need for a theory of torts and for developing the main lines along which that theory was first 
formulated, others were working in the vineyard, notably Charles Doe; his determination to bring rationality to 
the chaotic patterns of tort liability is one of the most significant  contributions to American law” and p. 145 “As 
we shall see in a future chapter, few judges expected as much from the concept of “reasonableness” as did Doe. 
He called it a general principle and in the law of torts made it the instrument for resolving most factual issues”. 
See also G. E. WHITE, supra note 60. 
78 JOHN P. REID, supra ,at 339. 
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owner who had a made a deep cut through the river’s bank. Doe emphasized 
that the reasonable expectation of damage is only one of the many factors 
figuring in “the catalogue of all the possible elements of reasonableness and 
unreasonableness”. In Green v. Gilbert, called to decide whether a mill owner 
who had devised an ingenious mechanism to discharge the sawdust into a river 
had exercised his property rights reasonably, Doe further specified the nature 
of the judgement of reasonableness. Reasonableness is a question of fact 
depending upon the circumstances of the case, including the purposes, old and 
new of the parties’ use and upon a comparative assessment of the respective 
costs and benefits.79 Doe recognized, with the founder of German ’s “Interests 
Jurisprudence”, Philip Heck, that “law operates in a world full of competing 
interests and, therefore, always works at the expense of some interests”, but for 
him, as for Shaw, a multifactor standard of “reasonableness” grounded in 
societal experience, mandated the correct and desirable balance. 
 
 Courts were well aware of the implication of reasonableness standards 
for legal reasoning. Occasionally, they engaged in an explicit and sharp critique 
of the classicist deductive mode, advocating an instrumental style of judicial 
analysis. In Tuttle v. Buck, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, faced with the 
question of defining the proper scope of competition and of deciding which 
injury to permit without compensation, declared that abstract maxims about 
malicious motives are of little avail to courts. Rather, the court acknowledged, 
the question of competition is to be decided by weighing competing social and 
economic objectives. Justice Elliott profusely elaborated on this new style of 
reasoning and the judicial philosophy inspiring it. In Elliott’s vision, balancing 
is a corollary of a new organicist notion of law and legal change: 
 
Mr Justice Black  said that malicious motives make a bad case worse, but they 
cannot make that wrong which in its own essence is lawful. […] Such 
generalizations are of little value in determining cases. […] We do not intend to 
enter upon an elaborate discussion of the subject, or become entangled in the 
subtleties connected with the words “malice” and “malicious”. We are not able to 
accept without limitations the doctrine above referred to, but at this time 
content ourselves with a brief reference to some general principles. It must be 
remembered that the common law is the result of growth, and that its 
                                               
79 ID., at 342-343. 
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development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it 
governs. It is the resultant of conflicting social forces, and those forces which are 
for the time dominant leave their impress upon the law. It is of judicial origin, 
and seeks to establish doctrines and rules for the determination, protection and 
enforcement of legal rights. Manifestly it must change as society changes and 
new rights are recognized. To be an efficient instrument, and not a mere 
abstraction, it must gradually adapt itself to changed conditions. Necessarily its 
form and substance has been greatly affected by prevalent economic theories. 
For generations there has been a practical agreement upon the proposition that 
competition in trade and business is desirable, and this idea has found 
expression in the decisions of the courts as well as in statutes. But it has led to 
grievous and manifold wrongs to individuals , and many courts have manifested 
an earnest desire to protect the individuals which result from unrestrained 
business competition. The problem has been to so adjust matters as to preserve 
the principle of competition and yet guard against its abuse to the unnecessary 
injury to the individual. 
 
 Courts’ language and reasoning techniques in abuse of rights cases seem 
to add evidence to the growing strand of revisionist scholarship that invites a 
more nuanced understanding of late nineteenth century legal thought. Writing 
in the mid 1970s, Harry Scheiber significantly downplayed the allegedly blunt 
discontinuity between an instrumental “Grand Style”, dominant until the 
1850s, and a subsequent formalist style, heavily dependent on deduction and 
conceptual coherence80. Rather, Scheiber contended, late nineteenth century 
judicial reasoning may be best characterized as an “amalgam” of 
“instrumentalism” and “formalism”. Scheiber’s study of post-1865 decisions on 
property, eminent domain and resource-allocation law sought to show that 
instrumentalism was well and alive in the late nineteenth century. Even when 
they posited highly formalist theories of higher law and inalienable rights, 
judges simultaneously relied on reasoning methods and on concepts, such as 
“public purpose” or “public use”, that validated broad discretion in setting 
economic priorities.  
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 More recently, legal historians have questioned the idea that all late 
nineteenth century private law jurisprudence operated under a unified 
Langdellian paradigm, pointing at the diversity that characterizes Classical 
legal thought. “Anomalous” figures, such as Justice Stephen Field or James 
Coolidge Carter, it has been argued, may be more exemplary of late nineteenth 
century legal thinking than Landgell81. A theistically-oriented historical 
jurisprudence that looked at morals and social customs coexisted with and 
rivalled Landgellian formalist orthodoxy.  Others seek to discard the formalist-
realist antithesis. Throughout the formalist age, Brian Tamanaha contends, 
prevailing understandings of law and of judicial decision-making were, in 
essential respects, as realist as the accounts propounded by later Realists82.  
Most legal professionals were well aware that law is indeterminate, that judges 
make policy decisions and that personal predilections may influence judicial 
outcomes. 
 
 The exam of abuse of rights cases may contribute to a further 
“thickening of the revision”. While the political tilt of Classical Legal Thought 
has been intensely debated, its style of legal reasoning may be more various 
than assumed. In circumscribed, though critical, legal subfields, courts resorted 
to rudimental forms of balancing and extra-juristic justificatory arguments 
well before the echoes of Sociological Jurisprudence were heard. This technical 
and stylistic variety may have conferred Classical Legal Thought an inner 
resilience, contributing to its longevity.  
 
                                               
81 See the Forum “Once More Unto the Breach: Late Nineteenth Century Jurisprudence Revisited” in 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 
(2002); see in particular Stephen A. Siegel, supra note; Manuel Cachan, Justice Stephen Field and Free Soil, Free Labor 
Constitutionalism at 541; Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence at 577; Id., Extending the 
Revisionist Project at 639. 
82 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the Formalist Age (on file with author, St John’s University School of Law); 
Tamanaha challenges the view that depicts Holmes as a solitary “proto-Realist”. By contrast he argues that the 
standard account of the “formalist” age is fundamentally wrong; prevailing understanding of law and of judicial 
decision making throughout the formalist era period were, in essential respects, every bit as “realistic” as the 
accounts propounded by the later Realists. (p.4) “Realist” notions and a “realist” vocabulary were used in a variety 
of contexts: effectuating legal reform or legal change, doing justice in particular cases, expressing concern about 
judicial elections, promoting codification, and criticizing courts for excessive judicial invalidation of legislation. In 
Tamanaha’s account, the Realists are the latest episode in a long history of skepticism about the common law and 
judging  prompted by concerns about the disordered state of the law or by objections, often politically motivated, 
to the actions of courts” (p. 66).“See also David Seipp, Formalism and Realism in Fifteenth Century English Courts (on 
file with author, Boston University School of Law).  
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C.  A Drug With Very Disagreeable After-Effects or a Buttress for Economic Growth? 
 
Despite the anxiety with which Professor Gutteridge was left after 
conversing with civilian colleagues, in the United States, the “continental drug” 
fell short of having “very disagreeable after-effects”. Malice rules and 
reasonableness tests were deployed to achieve a wide variety of outcomes. 
Occasionally, courts used them to redress distributional asymmetries. More 
often, through reasonableness rules, judges sought to stir and govern economic 
growth, creating the conditions for the “release of creative energy”. Rather than 
directly responding to the entrepreneurial class’ particularized demands, the 
functional equivalents of abuse of rights may have played a more general 
facilitative role. While belief in the facilitative potential of reasonableness and 
malice rules was only one of a larger set of beliefs driving judges, it is plausible 
to claim that it was an important one. “Reasonableness” and “malice” were 
among the legal tools affirmatively deployed to create a legal framework for 
economic change. Easily manoeuvrable, they allowed courts to expand or 
restrict at need the range of reasonable, and hence lawful, social and economic 
“uses” or “activities”. The facilitative role played by these rules is not to obscure 
their ideological function. As suggested earlier, emphasis on shared socio-
ethical standards of “reasonableness” helped justify and naturalize changing 
notions of “permitted” uses of property, “legal” organized labor activity and 
“lawful” business competition, ultimately precluding alternative arrangements 
and different distributive outcomes.  
 
 The relationship between doctrinal developments in water law, most 
notably the shift from the “natural flow” rule to the “reasonable user” standard, 
and economic growth has been discussed at length. Some have posited a direct 
relation83. Reasonableness tests allowed courts to balance the relative 
efficiency of conflicting uses of water, effectively promoting newer economically 
valuable uses and sweeping away established and less remunerative uses. 
Others have challenged the thesis of a direct influence, claiming that, for all 
their talk of balancing, courts rarely denied relief to an established user whose 
interests were interfered with by a newcomer. These critics foreground non-
                                               
83 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, supra note 16. 
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utilitarian elements in riparian water law84. While the language of 
reasonableness might be taken to suggest that courts tended to privilege more 
valuable uses and hence divest the old, this was not the case. Only in cases of 
flagrantly wasteful use, did courts wipe out an established use. Further, the 
argument runs, especially in the Western regions of the country, courts bent 
the reasonable user doctrine to achieve outcomes that did not necessarily 
favour new economically profitable uses of water. 
 
However, while actual divestment of established users might be less 
frequent than broadly assumed, judicial opinions show that courts were well 
aware of the potential of reasonableness rules for fostering economic growth 
and were often keenly oriented towards such end. In a large number of cases 
the conflicting rights of riparian owners were balanced with a bias towards 
dynamic and productive property85. In Cary v. Daniels, Chief Justice Shaw of 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts neatly enunciated the productivity 
rationale of the new rule: 
 
“But one of the beneficial uses of a watercourse, and in this country one of the 
most important, is its application to the working of mills and machinery; a use 
profitable to the owner and beneficial to the public. It is therefore held, that each 
proprietor is entitled to such use of the stream, so far as it is reasonable, 
conformable to the usages and wants of the community and having regard to the 
progress of improvement in hydraulic works and not inconsistent with a like 
reasonable use by the other proprietors of land”. 
 
Shaw’s words suggest that, at the time when, as his biographer notes, “out 
of the older rural agrarian-merchant society was evolving a complex industrial 
one”, the reasonable user rule appeared to him as an effective trigger for 
economic development. Rhetorically, the allusion to the conditions and needs of 
the country and to the interest of the community struck a critical chord in a 
society where energy and dynamism, particularly in the realm of the economy, 
were dominant values.  
                                               
84 Stephen Williams, Transforming American Law: Doubtful Economics Makes Doubtful History, 25 UCLA L. REV 1187 
(1977-1978). 
85 MORTON HORWITZ supra note 16 at 31; JAMES WILLARD HURST, supra note 15 at 24 “dynamic property as an 
institution of growth: when new forms of technology required an abridgement of older types of property the 
older forms were forced to yield. 
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Similar developmental concerns permeate the court’s reasoning in Wheatley 
v. Baugh (1855). Chief Justice Lewis held the defendant, a mining company, 
not liable for reducing the flow of the subterrenean spring which fed the 
machines of the plaintiff, a neighbouring tannery86. The defendant, Lewis 
suggested, was not animated by malice but by the reasonable purpose of 
working his coal mine. Replete with references to continental theories of abuse 
of rights, the opinion betrays Lewis’ favor for valuable economic activities such 
as mining. An absolutistic notion of property rights of continental flavor is 
marshalled in support of developmental considerations:  
 
In conducting extensive mining operations, it is in general impossible to 
preserve the flow of the subterranean waters through the interstices in which 
they have usually passed, and many springs must be necessarily destroyed in 
order that the proprietors of valuable minerals may enjoy their own. The public 
interest is greatly promoted by protecting this right, and it is just that the 
imperfect rights and lesser advantage should give place to that which is perfect, 
and infinitely the most beneficial to individuals and to the community in 
general.  
 
On the other hand, critics rightly point at the ambiguous persistence of 
non-utilitarian concerns in courts’ articulation of the new rule. While the 
maximization of growth and productivity were critical concerns driving judges, 
occasionally “reasonable user” rules were deployed to reach bold distributive 
outcomes. In Western states, the “correlative rights” rule brought into sharp 
focus the notion of general welfare at the expense of individual economic 
dynamism and new valuable uses of water. Courts equated “reasonable use” 
with use on riparian land, thereby severely limiting flexibility in water use87.   
 
For instance, in Katz v. Walkinshaw, the critical potential of the 
reasonable use doctrine was fully exploited and the notion of a social function 
of property, although not explicitly articulated, was alluded to. The defendant, 
who owned a lot of land in arid Southern California, drained from his land with 
powerful pumps the underground water which would have otherwise 
percolated to plaintiffs’ land feeding their artesian well. The defendant 
                                               
86 Wheatley v. Baugh 25 Pa 528, (1855). 
87 Williams, Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 16 OREGON L. REV. 203 (1937); Id., Theories of Water Law 27 
HARV. L. REV., 530 (1913-1914). 
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diverted the water in order to sell it to for the irrigation of distant lands. The 
Supreme Court of California reversed the decision of the inferior which had 
given judgement in favour of the defendant. Considerations of public policy 
drove the court’s reasoning. Having profusely examined the impact of the 
reasonable use rule in light of California’s peculiar climatic situation, the court 
weighed the profit of the individual owner against the interest of the 
community at large88. 
 
In short, the members of the community, in the case supposed, have a common 
interest in the water, It is necessary for all, and it is an anomaly in the law if 
one person can for his individual profit destroy the community and render the 
neighbourhood uninhabitable. 
 
A similar variety of results, and an analogous tension between the 
promotion of productive and economically valuable uses of property and the 
protection of static property, characterizes nuisance cases involving questions 
of malice or reasonableness. In dealing with disputes among residential 
neighbours, courts relied upon malice rules and reasonableness tests to weigh 
neighbours’ respective right to a peaceful enjoyment of their property, 
favouring quiet habitation, agriculture and other time-honoured uses of the 
land.  
 
In Christie v. Davey, a 1892 English case, the Chancery Division 
carefully examined the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, holding that 
while the giving of musical lessons seventeen hours a week by a music teacher 
did not constitute a nuisance, the annoying noises produced by the latter’s 
neighbour as a malicious response did amount to a nuisance to be restrained89. 
In a 1888 West Virginia case concerning the troublesome cohabitation of two 
                                               
88 Katz v. Walkinshaw  64 L. R. A. 236 70 P. 663 (1902). “Such law as has been made upon the subject comes 
from countries and climates where water is abundant and its conservation and economical use of little 
consequence as compared with a climate like Southern California. The learned counsel for appellants state in their 
brief that water at San Bernardino is worth $ 1,000 per inch of flow. Percolating water or water held in the earth is 
the main source of supply for domestic uses and for irrigation without which most lands are unproductive. 
[….]But the maxim cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad inferos furnishes a rule of easy application and saves world of 
judicial worry in many cases. And perhaps in England and in our Eastern states a more thorough and minute 
consideration of the equities of parties may not often be required. The case is very different, however, in an arid 
country like Southern California where the relative importance of percolating water and water flowing in definite 
courses is greatly changed. 
89 Christie v. Davey, [1893]1 Ch. 316. 
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litigious families, the court gauged against the yardstick of reasonableness the 
defendant’s right “to enjoy the privileges of a home” and the plaintiff’s right “to 
security in their home”, finding that the former had been exercised 
unreasonably and maliciously90. Conversely, in a Michigan case, the intrinsic 
usefulness of the purpose, excused the defendant’s conduct. A shed used for 
coal and wood, although spitefully erected by the defendant so as to shut off 
some of the neighbour’s light, was not considered a nuisance on account of it 
serving a useful purpose91. 
 
However, with the expansion of industry and the development of steam-
powered, coal-burning and synthetic alkali technology, the question of the 
reasonable use of property assumed a new dimension. Effective in protecting 
landowners’ quiet enjoyment of their “static” property in cases involving 
disputes among residential neighbours, reasonableness tests soon became a 
critical tool for protecting “dynamic” property in cases pitting against each 
other residential landowners and industrial enterprises. As the century 
progressed, conflicts between residential or agricultural and industrial uses of 
land came to comprise a greater portion of courts’ dockets. “Reasonable user” 
tests allowed courts to weigh exploitive and conservatory uses of land, often 
favouring the former. For the most part, productive and manufacturing firms 
were not found to abuse their rights over the land. In analysing the 
“reasonableness” of the use, courts’ focused on the economic context and social 
utility of industrial activity.  
 
Legal historians and social historians have debated at length the 
relationship between developments in the law of nuisance and the 
advancement of the Industrial Revolution in England. Some have suggested 
that courts consciously established a new balance between industrial uses and 
other uses, effectively emasculating the law of nuisance as a useful curb on 
industrial pollution and leaving little room for successful legal action by 
                                               
90 Medford v. Levy, 2 L.R.A. 368 8 S.E. 302 (1888) The defendants’ habit to open the door leading from the 
kitchen to the hall, thereby “filling the whole house with objectionable odors owing to the frequent cooking of 
cabbage, onions, and other things the odor of which is particularly nauseating” was deemed unreasonable in light 
of the plaintiff’s wife suffering from a form of neuralgia that made her “nervous and excitable” and hence 
peculiarly affected by the incidents of domestic habits not conform to those of “a neat and tidy housewife”. 
91 Kuzniak v. Kozminski 107 Mich. 444 65 N.W. 275 (1895). 
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individuals and communities adversely affected by it92. Others have posited a 
more loose relationship between courts’ articulation of nuisance and the needs 
and demands of nascent big industry, pointing at a variety of institutional, 
procedural and social factors complicating too easy a deterministic account93. 
The cost of litigation, the difficulty of establishing cause and effect in the 
absence of sophisticated scientific monitoring, the existence of private ordering 
as a valid alternative to litigation, and, finally, the social exclusion of the prime 
victims of industrialization, the urban working classes, to whom legal action 
was largely unavailable, explain the weakness of the common law of nuisance 
as a response to the adverse effects of industrialization. And, overall, these 
observers note, “the body of nuisance law which developed during the 
Industrial Revolution was anything but monolithic in quality and could well 
have encouraged the victim of industrial pollution, as it may have done the 
perpetrator”.  
 
While the relation is a highly ambiguous and layered one, in a 
significant number of cases, English courts relied on reasonableness tests to tilt 
the balance between residential and industrial uses in favour of the latter. By 
the mid nineteenth century, courts expanded the range of factors to be 
considered in assessing the reasonableness of defendants’ use of the land, 
increasingly often taking into account not only the modalities of use but also 
the locality in which the contested use was carried out. In Hole v. Barlow 
(1858), the Court of Common Pleas found the defendant not liable for erecting a 
brick-kiln in front of the house of the defendant and burning a large quantity of 
bricks thereby causing a noxious and unwholesome vapour which invaded the 
plaintiff’s house and garden. The court ruled that no action lies for the 
                                               
92 Joel F. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1973). Brenner’s thesis is that 
until the very end of the eighteen century courts strongly held the view that in nuisance cases, unless the 
inconvenience caused by a defendant’s activity was trivial, liability would follow once the plaintiff had established 
an interference with the use and enjoyment of her land. The predominant thought was that the plaintiff had a pre-
eminent claim to protection; it was considered no defence the fact that the defendant had acted reasonably in the 
circumstances or that her activity was of public utility. With the advent of industrialization, and the new relavence 
and frequency of conflicts between ttime-honoured conservatory uses of land and new exploitive industrial uses, 
courts’ view changed. After a period of vacillation, the House of Lords compromised with industrial interests, 
emasculating the common law of nuisance as a curb on air, noise and water pollution.  
93 John P. S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution. Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 155 (1983).  See also, A. E. Dingle, “The Monster Nuisance of All”: Landowners, Alkali Manufacturers, and Air 
Pollution, 1828-64, 35 THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, 529 (1982). 
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reasonable use of a lawful trade in a convenient and proper place, even though 
some one may suffer inconvenience. The court reported and approved the trial 
judge’s finding that: 
 
It is not every body whose enjoyment of life and property is rendered 
uncomfortable by the carrying on of an offensive or noxious trade in the 
neighborhood, that can bring an action. If that were so, -as has already been 
observed by the learned counsel for the defendant,- the neighbourhood of 
Birmingham and Wolverhampton and the other great manufacturing towns of 
England would be full of person bringing actions for nuisances arising from the 
carrying on of noxious and offensive trades in their vicinity to the great interests 
of the manufacturing and social interests of the community”. I apprehend the 
law to be this that no action lies for the use, the reasonable use, of a lawful place 
in a convenient and proper place, even though some one may suffer annoyance 
for its being so carried on.94 
 
Judge Willes of the Court of Common Pleas neatly spelled out the link between 
public interest and the needs of productivity: 
 
The common law right which every proprietor of a dwelling house has to have 
the air uncontaminated and unpolluted, is subject to this qualification, that 
necessities may arise for an interference with that right pro-bono publico, to this 
extent that such interference be in respect of a matter essential to the business 
life, and be conducted in a reasonable and proper manner, and in a reasonable 
and proper place. 
 
A few years later, the House of Lords’ decision in the St. Helen case95, 
arguably the most important case of industrial pollution of the era96, made 
residential owners’ “actions in respect of discomfort virtually impossible in the 
industrial Midlands and in regions such as Swansea and Cardiff.”97. The 
activity of the St. Helen Copper Smelting Company caused large quantities of 
“noxious gases, vapours and other noxious matters” which diffused over the 
land of the plaintiff, damaging the vegetation and injuring the cattle. The 
House of Lords upheld the Exchequer Chamber’s decision that the company 
                                               
94 Hole v. Barlow [1858] 4 C. B. (N.S.) 334. 
95 St. Helen Smetling Co. v. Tipping supra note 44. 
96 See Joel F. Brenner, supra note 50 at 413. 
97 Id., at 413-414. 
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was liable for any physical damage but not for the deterioration of the 
plaintiff’s comfort. When the cause was tried before Mr Justice Mellor at 
Liverpool in 1863, the defendant’s counsel submitted that the three questions 
which ought to be left to the jury were “whether [the copper smelting activity] 
was a necessary trade, whether the place was a suitable place for such trade 
and whether it was carried on a in a reasonable manner”.  The opinion of the 
House of Lords focused on the reasonableness of the locality. In Lord 
Cranworth’s words: 
 
You must look at it not with a view to the question whether,  abstractedly, that 
quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a person 
living in the town of Shields. 
 
A few paragraph later, Lord Wesleydale neatly spelled out the court’s concerns: 
a more stringent articulation of the reasonableness test would impact 
adversely national economic development: 
 
The defendants say: “If you do not mind you will stop the progress of works of 
this description” I agree that it is so, because no doubt, in the county of 
Lancaster above all other counties, where great works have been created and 
carried on, and are the means of developing the national wealth, you must not 
stand on extreme rights and allow a person to say “I will bring an action against 
you for this and that and so on”.  
 
Similarly, in the United States, in pollution cases, courts deployed 
reasonableness tests with an eye at economic growth, largely disregarding the 
costs imposed on the victims of development, i.e. workers and residential 
owners. The impact of nineteenth century tort doctrine on the economy has 
been the object of a well-known debate. A substantial body of scholarship has 
agreed, although with different methodological and political nuances, on the 
view that courts deliberately structured tort law to promote industrial 
expansion and powerful economic interests, by exempting corporate enterprises 
from liability for the harm caused by their activity98. In its most controversial 
                                               
98 This view has been variously articulated, reflecting different methodological approaches and political positions. 
JAMES WILLARD HURST, supra note 15 argued that the development of 19th century American private law 
promoted economic growth in that it was shaped by a variety of economic, social, geographical and technological 
needs. More specifically, it reflected the needs of the emerging industry and a broad societal consensus, among 
the various social groups, on a set of shared societal values, above all, “the release of individual creative energy”. 
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formulation, this thesis claims the doctrinal development of tort law translated 
into a “subsidy” to the rising entrepreneurial class; this “subsidy” was coerced 
from the very victims of economic growth and ultimately increased the 
inequalities of wealth and power in nineteenth century America. Others have 
objected that, depending on the industrial sector, the latter thesis is either 
irrelevant or false.99 Generally speaking, these critics note, evidence of 
utilitarian or growth-driven judicial reasoning is scant100. Further, records 
show that the negligence system was applied with impressive sternness to 
major industries and that courts exhibited a keen concern for victim’s welfare. 
While a critical appraisal of the debate is largely beyond the scope of this 
article, a glance at air and water pollution cases seems to add evidence in 
support of the “maximization of economic growth” thesis.  
 
More specifically, studies of pollution nuisance cases in states which 
were early bloomers in nineteenth century American industrialization, such as 
Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey, have shown that, by and large, 
courts deployed balancing tests to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief or 
damages101. In weighing the right of defendant industries against that of 
pollution victims, courts were inclined to emphasize the reasonableness of the 
former’s use and to overstate the ruinous impact a judgement in favour of the 
                                                                                                                                               
These economic and social factors shaped private law, and tort law in particular, in the sense that they exerted 
“pressure” on law; Hurst assumes a complex notion of historical causation and distinguishes between three types 
of such “pressure”: focused pressure, functional pressure and inertia. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW (1973) provides a more deterministic and materialist account of the development of nineteenth 
century tort law. The contours of American nineteenth century tort law, Friedman argues, are molded by 
economy and society, by the interplay of plural pressure groups motivated primarily by economic interests, an 
interplay where the group that wins is that of the capitalist-entrepreneurs. However, the most well known and 
controversial formulation of the thesis is due to MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1780-1860 supra note 16; Horwitz argued that in the nineteenth century courts, working in concert with big 
economic interests, effected a revolution in tort law, that from strict liability to negligence, which promoted 
industrialization by exempting corporate enterprises from liability for the harm caused by their activity. This 
doctrinal shift translated into a subsidy to the entrepreneurial class, a subsidy coerced from the very victims of 
industrialization.    
99 Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L. J. 1717 
(1980-1981). 
100 Other s have placed emphasis on other factors, such as the litigation costs, that, along with or more than the 
judiciary’s ideology and its conscious objectives in shaping tort doctrine, explain tort law’s weak response to 
industrial pollution at the moment of industrialization. See John P. S. McLaren, supra note 92 and, more generally, 
Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991-1992). 
101 Christine Rosen, Differing Perceptions of the Value of Pollution Abatement Across Time and Place: Balancing Doctrine in 
Pollution Nuisance Law, 1840-1906, 11 LAW AND HISTORY REV., 303 (1993).  
di Robilant ABUSE OF RIGHTS  45 of 99 
plaintiff would exert on economic life. Courts’ judgements of reasonableness 
betray a constant preoccupation with economic growth and a tendency to 
“domino-effect” thinking. Typically, a judgement granting injunctive or damage 
relief was seen as originating a parade of horrific effects: from the termination 
of all coke manufacturing in Pennsylvania, to the automatic stifling of all 
industrial development in the state, to decline of industrial cities and people’s 
deprivation of all the benefits of urban life102.  
 
The Sanderson case (1886), the last episode of a protracted dispute 
among residential owners and a coal mining company, may be exemplary of 
courts’ attitude103. The defendant, the Pennsylvania Coal Company discharged 
large volumes of mine water into the stream flowing through the Sandersons’ 
land thereby corrupting the water to such an extent as to render it totally unfit 
for domestic and agricultural purposes. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
did not found the defendant to have abused their property rights, declining to 
award damages to the Sandersons. In the court’s analysis, “reasonable use” 
was equated with “ordinary and natural use” The defendants, the court argued, 
being the owners of a lot of coal land, had the right to the “natural use and 
enjoyment” of their property. Since coal mining in the ordinary and usual form 
is the “natural use” of coal land, the court concluded, any damage resulting 
from such natural use is, in the absence of negligence or malice, damnum 
absque injuria. Developmental concerns were key to the court’s notion of 
“reasonableness”. Justice Clark profusely examined the dimensions and the 
social utility of coal mining in Pennsylvania’s economy: 
 
It has been stated that 30.000.000 of tons of anthracite and 70.000.000 of 
bituminous coal are annually produced in Pennsylvania. It is therefore a 
question of vast importance, and cannot, on that account, be too carefully 
considered. […] Indeed if the right to damages in such cases is admitted, equity 
may, and under the decisions of this court undoubtedly would,  at the suit of any 
riparian owner, take jurisdiction, and, upon the ground of a continuous and 
irreparable injury, enjoin the operation of the mine altogether104.  
                                               
102 Christine Rosen, supra at 319 
103Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson 113 Pa 126 (1886).  For an extensive discussion of the Sanderson case, see 
Robert Bone supra note 35. 
104 Similarly, in the Huckenstine case (Huckenstine Appeal 10 Penn St. 102 Am Rep 669 (1872), the court 
reversed the decision of the lower court which had issued an injunction preventing the defendant from burning 
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 A few years later the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania embarked in a 
bolder argumentation105. The plaintiff brought an action against a coal 
company to recover damages for injury to his farm caused by the smoke and 
gas from the coke-ovens erected on the adjoining land. The defendants relied on 
Sanderson to claim that the alleged injuries did not entitle the plaintiff to 
recover, since they were the natural and necessary consequence of a reasonable 
use of their property. The court distinguished the case from Sanderson. Since 
the land in question is not coal land, the court reasoned, the injury results from 
the defendant’s decision to devote their land to the burning of coal mined 
elsewhere, rather than from the natural use of their land. However, Justice 
Williams found the selection of the location reasonable and proper. The court’s 
discussion of the measure of the damages betrays its developmental concerns: 
 
The plaintiff’s farm is a in a region in which bituminous coal is obtained in large 
quantities. He himself mines coal upon his own land for sale. The conversion of 
coal into coke to supply fuel for the great iron and steel mills of Western 
Pennsylvania is one of the great industries of the region. Many millions of 
money are invested in, an many thousands of men are employed about, its 
production. It has been largely instrumental in the development, growth, and 
general prosperity of the region. The plaintiff shares the general benefits […] 
these considerations should be borne in mind in adjusting the damages if any 
have been sustained 
 
Economic preoccupations also pervade opinions dealing with instances of 
malicious interference with contractual relations. Loaded with distributive 
implications, this relatively new tort raised critical questions as to the role and 
                                                                                                                                               
bricks, thereby causing injury and annoyance to the plaintiff. The defendant’s use of his land, the court argued, 
was a reasonable one, the land having upon it a deposit of fine brick clay which could be made into bricks with 
profit if this was done near the pit form which the clay was taken. See also Doellner v. Tynan 38 How. Pr 176, 
NY Super (1869): the court found that the defendant exercised his business of blacksmithing reasonably and 
refused to grant an injunction; Quoting an earlier English case the court noted: an action does not lie for a 
reasonable use of my right, though it be of annoyance of another. The court dismissed the plaintiffs injury as 
mere annoyances and remarked the usefulness of the blacksmith trade in urban life.  See also, Rhodes v. Dunbar 
16 Am. Law Rec. W.L. 7175 (1868): the defendants owned a planning mill  that produced shavings, chips and saw 
dust; further the material used in it was highly inflammable, rendering it dangerous to buildings in the vicinity.  In 
May 1866 the mill burned, injuring many houses in the neighborhood. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the 
defendants form re-building the mill. Chief Justice Thompson conceded that the species of property in question is 
extra-hazardous ( but this is a question of policy to be decided by the legislator, we only decide about legal rights) 
but claimed that if carried on reasonably, the business cannot be a nuisance. Justice Thompson discussed at length 
the benefits and the problems of modern urban life. 
105 Robb v. Carnegie Bros & Co. 145 PA 324, 22 A. 649. 
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scope of market competition. Most instances of interference involved 
employment contracts or sale contracts, thereby calling courts to define the 
proper and reasonable limits of “the right to compete in business life or in the 
labor market”. As Prosser’s treatise on the law of torts notes, “in this field, 
perhaps more obviously than any other, the problem has continuously been one 
of adjustment of the conflicting claims of different enterprises, industries, 
classes and groups where interests are nicely balanced and decisions on the 
basis of social policy is not an easy matter”106. 
 
In cases involving business competition, reasonableness tests and malice 
rules proved useful tools for governing and stirring economic life by delimiting 
the sphere of fair and permissible market competition. In Dunshee v. Standard 
Oil and Co. (1911) the Supreme Court of Iowa struggled with the perplexities 
arising “in the effort to sustain, on the one hand, the widest practicable liberty 
of men to engage in any and every line of business, and, on the other, to protect 
the business of each from wrongful encroachment or interference by others”107. 
The plaintiff, who retailed oil from tank wagons driven about the streets, used 
to leave green cards with customers to display in their windows when in need 
of oil. The defendant, a former wholesale supplier of the plaintiff seeking 
revenge upon the latter, entered the retail business trying to sell his oil  
wherever the plaintiff’s green cards were exposed. The court found that the 
defendant had transgressed the bounds of legitimate competition. While the 
defendant, the court conceded, has the right to establish a retail oil business 
and to send their agents over the same routs covered by the plaintiff, he ought 
to exercise such right reasonably and without malice. The court expressed its 
view as to the perversions of unbound competition. The laws of competition in 
business are harsh enough; the rule that motive is irrelevant would lead to 
pernicious consequences, justifying the worst wrongs upon the theory that “it is 
business”. Fortunately, Justice Weaver added: 
 
There has for many years been a distinct tendency of the courts to look beneath 
the letter of the law and give some effect to Its beneficent spirit, thereby 
preventing the perversion of the rules intended for the protection of human 
rights into engines of oppression and wrong. 
                                               
106 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, (4TH ED. 1971) at 927. 
107 Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 
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 Justice Waeaver ’s bold social language should not deceive.  The 
functional equivalents of abuse of rights left largely untouched and, ultimately 
strengthened, the pervasive individualistic vocabulary of “rights” and 
“property”. In justifying the protection granted to the victims of the 
interference, courts resorted to the theory of “contractual property”. Contracts 
were conceptualized as a form of intangible property to be protected. In Jones 
v. Leslie, the Supreme Court of Washington deployed a subjective notion of 
malice as wanton malevolence to protect the weaker contractual party. 
Significantly, however, the court’s effort to “correct” the balance of power 
between the stronger actor, the former employer, and the weaker party, the 
employee seeking a better job, was not paralleled by a “correction” of the 
individualistic notion of “contractual property”. Rather, the court profusely 
articulated the property rationale underlying the protection of employment 
relations from malicious interference: 
 
It would be well to remember in the beginning that a man has a right to be 
protected in his property. This was the doctrine of the common law, is, and 
always has been, the law in every civilized nation. It is of necessity one of the 
fundamental principles of government, the protection of property being largely 
one of the objects of government. […] Is, then, the right of employment in a 
laboring man property?  That it is we think cannot be questioned. The property 
of the capitalist is his gold and silver, his bonds, credit etc., for in these he 
deals and makes his living. For the same reason, the property of the merchant 
is his goods. And every man’s trade or profession is his property because it is 
his means of livelihood, because through its agency, he maintains himself and 
family and he is enabled to add his share towards the expenses of maintaining 
the government. […] To destroy this property, or to prevent one from 
contracting it or exchanging it for the necessities of life is not only an invasion 
of a private right but it is an injury to the public, for it tends to produce 
pauperism and crime. 
 
Not dissimilarly, in Huskie v. Griffin (1909)108, the court’s decision to 
afford protection to the weaker party was couched in the language of ample and 
equal individual freedom rather than in that of solidarity and social duties. The 
issue presented by the case at hand, the court noted, is “that of the existence 
and extent of what has come to be known as the right to an open market”, a 
                                               
108 Huskie v. Griffin 75 NH 74 A 595, (1909). 
di Robilant ABUSE OF RIGHTS  49 of 99 
right “inherent in the idea of Anglo-Saxon liberty”. Far from being an absolute 
right, the right to an open market is to be exercised with respect of the equal 
right of others. How far one may lawfully interfere to prevent the making of 
contracts between third parties depends upon a reasonableness test that takes 
into account the motive of the defendant as well as the circumstances109.  
 
With the intensification of labor upheaval in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, the tort of interference with contractual relations became 
critical to the struggle between labor unions and capitalist employers. As in 
cases of business competition, courts relied on standards of “reasonableness” or 
“malice” to define the compass of legitimate labor competition. However, when 
dealing with episodes of unions’ interference with employment relations, 
courts’ commitment to ensuring fairness and to protecting weaker contractual 
parties often translated into an effort at stifling union’s energetic activism.  
 
A prolific literature has shed light on the powerful attack mounted 
against organized labor by courts alarmed by the economic power acquired by 
nationally organized trade unions and state federations110. The burgeoning of 
new types of collective action such as secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, 
recognition strikes, called for a prompt legal response111. The doctrine of 
“malice” was part of such response. A study of the re-orientation of labor law 
between 1886 and 1895, has shown that the concept of “malice” proved critical 
for containing labor’s ability to use concerted action112. The interloper union 
was often found to have acted maliciously rather than in the pursuit of free 
competition. In a similar vein, an analysis of late nineteenth century labor 
decisions in Massachusetts and Illinois has described how courts consistently 
                                               
109 One may not interfere with his neighbour’s open market or “reasonable expectancies” solely for the purpose 
of doing harm. It has been said, however, in several cases that a wrongful motive cannot convert a legal act into 
an illegal one, and many judges have thought this was the end of the law upon the question. They seem to 
proceed upon a theory of absolute right in the defendant […] [the right] is a qualified one and rightfulness of its 
exercise depends upon all those elements which go to make up a cause for human action. The reasonableness of 
the act cannot be satisfactorily determined until something is known of the state of the actor’s mind. The 
justification may be found sometimes in the circumstances under which it is done, irrespective of motive, 
sometimes in the motive alone, and sometimes in the circumstances and motive combined. 
110 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); DANIEL R. 
ERNST LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR. FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995). 
111 WILLIAM E. FORBATH supra.  
112 Haggai Hurvitz, supra note 57. 
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relied on a circular, and apparently neutral, notion of “malice” to assert unions’ 
rights in abstract while negating them in practice. Judges “referred to the 
actions of unions as malicious as if that was a finding of fact, in order to 
support a legal conclusion that the union actions were not legally justified”113.  
 
A widely known case of obstruction and interference with employment 
relations, Walker v. Cronin (1871) well exemplifies the use of “malice” to curb 
labor’s action114. The defendant, the agent of a union, in order to compel a shoe 
manufacturer to agree on higher wages, had persuaded a large number of the 
latter’s actual and prospective employees to abandon their job. The employer, 
who as a consequence of the union’s action had difficulties recruiting other 
skilled workmen and had to pay higher wages, brought an action for damages. 
The question around which the case revolved was whether the defendant union 
had exercised maliciously its right to freely compete for better conditions. The 
court refused to see the controversy as an instance of competition between 
labor and capital and fit the case into the template of subjective “malice”. The 
defendants’ efforts to induce the shoemakers to abandon their jobs were seen as 
driven by the arbitrary and malicious purpose of causing disturbance and 
economic loss rather than as instrumental to broader labor objectives. As the 
court concluded: 
 
Everyone has the rights to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own 
enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be protected against 
competition; but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton 
interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result 
of competition or the exercise of like rights by others it is damnum absque 
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. 
But if come from the merely wanton or malicious acts of others, without the 
justification of competition or the service of any interest or lawful purpose, it 
then stands upon a different footing and falls within the principle of the 
authorities first referred to [the suggestion in Greenleaf v. Francis that 
malicious acts without the justification of any right, that is, acts of a stranger, 
resulting in like loss or damage, might be actionable] 
 
                                               
113 Ellen M. Kelman, American Labor Law and Legal Formalism. How Legal Logic Shaped and Vitiated the Rights of 
American Workers 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 1 (1983-1984). 
114 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass 555 (1871). 
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In Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
examined the reasonableness of the means employed by the defendants the 
defendants’ and found them to fall outside the compass of permissible 
competition, amounting to an unlawful combination to injure the employer115. 
The case involved episodes of picketing, obstruction and intimidation in front of 
the employer’s factory on the part of workers seeking to obtain higher wages 
and shorter time schedules. The employer filed a bill for an injunction 
restraining the workers from picketing and obstructing. Again, the critical 
question was whether the defendants had exercised maliciously their right to 
freely communicate in a public space, the sidewalk in front of the employer’s 
premises, to improve their labor conditions116. Justice Allen examined the 
reasonableness of the defendants’ purpose and activity and granted an 
injunction:  
 
The defendants contend that these acts were justifiable because they were only 
seeking to secure better wages for themselves by compelling the plaintiff to 
accept their schedule of wages. This motive or purpose does not justify 
maintaining a patrol in front of plaintiff’s premises as a means of carrying out 
their conspiracy. A combination among persons merely to regulate their own 
conduct is within allowable competition and is lawful although others may be 
indirectly afflicted thereby. But a combination to do injurious acts expressly 
directed to another by way of intimidation or constraint either of himself or of 
persons employed or seeking to be employed by him is outside of allowable 
competition and is unlawful. 
 
In his widely quoted dissent, Justice Holmes investigated the possible 
malicious nature of the means employed by the defendants, i.e. a combination, 
to reach the opposite conclusion. While an individual has an undeniable right 
to freely communicate in order to better her position, a collective exercise of 
such right, entailing a higher degree of pressure and disruption, might be 
deemed an unreasonable, malicious and unjustified exercise of the right. 
However, Holmes noted, “free competition means combination and the 
organization of the world now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might 
                                               
115 Vegelahn v. Guntner 35 L. R. A. 722 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). By interfering with “his right to engage all persons 
who are willing to work for him at such prices as may be mutually agreed upon” and with the other actual or 
prospective employees’ right “to enter into or remain in the employment of any person or corporation willing to 
employ them”. 
116 Later free speech see Thornhill v. Alabama 310 US 88 (1940) 
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and scope of combination”.  
 
When the notion of subjective malice or the inquiry into the reasonableness 
of the means did not help, courts resorted to rigid and pre-fixed notions of 
“reasonable and legitimate purpose” as a restrictive, and apparently neutral, 
yardstick for assessing the objectives sought by unions. As discussed earlier, in 
Moores v. Bricklayers, the court analyzed the immediate motive driving the 
defendant union and found it to be that of “showing to the building world what 
punishment and disaster necessarily followed a defiance of their demands”. 
Such purpose, Justice Taft concluded, if assessed in light of the “normal 
operation of the right to labor”, defined as the securing of workers’ wages and 
terms of employment, appears malicious. Justice Taft’s opinion is ridden with 
anxiety. A new and effective form of organized action, boycotts spurred alarm 
among judges and lawyers. Labor historians have investigated the different 
modalities of capital’s response. Some have told the story of the American Anti-
Boycott Association, examining the efforts of proprietary capitalists to organize 
and lobby against labor117. Others have analysed the imaginative metaphorical 
language developed by judges to deal with boycott cases118. Abuse, malice and 
unreasonableness were central to this vocabulary, emphasizing labor’s 
irresponsible and tyrannical exercise of its rights. As Justice Carpenter noted 
in State v. Glidden (1887): 
 
If a large body of irresponsible men demand and receive power outside of law, over 
and above the law, it is not to be expected that they will be satisfied with a moderate 
and reasonable use of it. All history proves that abuses and excesses are inevitable. 
The exercise of irresponsible power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers, 
creates an unappeasable appetite for more.  
  
Although less inventive than Carpenter, Justice Taft must have shared these 
fears and, towards the end of his opinion, quoting an earlier case, described 
boycotts as “oppressive to the individual, injurious to the prosperity of the 
community and subversive of the peace and good order of society”.  
 
 Did the equivalents of abuse of rights operate as dangerous “social 
                                               
117 Daniel R. Ernst, supra note 107. 
118 GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA. HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999) 
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drugs” exerting potent after-effects? The cases discussed above indicate that 
malice rules and reasonableness tests were thought to perform a powerful role 
in facilitating and governing economic growth. Rather than being consistently 
deployed to redress distributive asymmetries, as the rhetoric surrounding 
abuse of rights suggests, they were used to allocate and to shift roles and costs 
between the various actors of nineteenth century blooming economic 
development: developers of land and large “static” landowners, industrial 
enterprisers and smaller residential owners, capitalist employers and 
organized labor. While not necessarily single-mindedly and systematically used 
to subsidize the “interests” at the expense of the weaker social strata,  
standards of “malice” and “reasonableness” were largely deployed to facilitate 
the needs of the more dynamic and  economic actors. Of course, as observers 
have noted, concern for economic development was only one element of a larger 
set of beliefs that determined judges’ reliance on “malice” and “reasonableness”, 
beliefs about the principles of legal reasoning, about the nature of rights and 
the value of property119. 
 
 
II. COMMON LAWYERS DEBATING MALICE AND THE THEORY OF INTENTIONAL TORT  
 
The frequent deployment by English and American courts of functional 
equivalents of “abuse of rights” raises the question of the place of the latter in 
the scholarly debate. The absence of a unitary concept of “abuse of rights” in 
the common law may be taken to suggest that, while on the continent a heated 
controversy pitted against each other proponents and critics of the doctrine, 
Anglo-American legal scholarship showed tepid interest for the continental 
querelle. However, this does not seem to be the case.  
 
Continental theories of “abuse of rights” were well-known and profusely 
reviewed. In his 1905 disquisition on the relevance of wrongful motive in tort 
liability, James Barr Ames corroborated his analysis with Continental 
examples, examining French and Belgian decisions along with American and 
English cases120. Similarly, in the 1910 issue of the Harvard Law Review, F. P. 
                                               
119 See Robert Bone, supra note 14. 
120 James Barr Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411 
(1904-1905). 
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Walton of McGill University accurately laid out the main positions in the 
French debate, contrasting the different articulations of the doctrine by 
Josserand, Saleilles, Charmont, and Esmein121.  
 
Further, “malice” was at the centre of a vibrant transatlantic 
conversation. For a twenty-year period spanning the turn of the twentieth 
century, Michael Taggart suggests in his study of Bradford v. Pickles, the place 
of “malice” in the law of torts was “a fashionable topic of conversation on both 
sides of the Atlantic, at a time when British and American lawyers spoke much 
the same language and listened to one another”.122 The conversation took place 
in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, the American Law Register and the 
Law Quarterly Review between the 1880s and the 1920s. Henry Terry, 
Frederick Pollock, Oliver Wendell Holmes, William Draper Lewis, James Barr 
Ames, Bruce Wyman and Ernst Huffcut were the participants. The 
conversation developed along lines similar to those of the continental debate on 
abuse of rights. Similar methodological and political questions were raised. At 
stake were the organization of the conceptually haphazard law of torts, the 
development of a new mode of legal thought, alternative to Classical Legal 
Thought, and, ultimately, the choice between competing models of socio-
economic governance.  
 
The question of malice, was, in the first place, a matter of clear 
analytical reasoning. The actual significance of the question of “malice” could 
only be elucidated through a re-organization of the conceptual structure of the 
law of torts. The abolition of the modern common law forms of action in the mid 
nineteenth century confronted American jurists with the problem of organizing 
the various forms of civil liability in a unitary conceptual scheme. Henry Terry, 
Frederick Pollock and Oliver Wendell Holmes struggled to draw an analytically 
clear map of the law of torts that would dispel the fog of empty abstractions 
that had long obfuscated the problem of malice, bringing to light its real 
                                               
121 F. P. Walton, Motive as an Element of Torts in the Civil Law and in the Common Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1908-
1909). 
122 MICHAEL TAGGART, supra note 20 at 167. See Cosgrove Our Lady The Common Law,  the formation of a 
community dedicated to the celebration of the common law for its unifying force dated from about 1870, reached 
a zenith of influence in the years before WWI and then declined until about 1930, when it ceased to  attract 
loyalty on either side of the Atlantic.  See FREDERICK POLLOCK THE LAW OF TORTS (1887 1st edition), p. V.  
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nature. The maps they sketched contributed to the refutation of one of the 
central tenets of classical legal science, i.e. the proposition that individuals 
exercise their rights, absolute within their spheres, so as not to injure the equal 
rights of others. Rather, there are instances in which individuals are permitted 
to exercise their rights maliciously or unreasonably to the injure of others. The 
question of “malice” is the question of defining these instances and is, 
ultimately, a question of policy.  
 
In an article on malicious torts published in 1884, Henry Terry 
integrated malice in a conceptual scheme that reflected the most sophisticated 
analytical tradition123. Terry’s scheme aimed at showing that there is a general 
duty not to act maliciously which is subject to exceptions motivated by reasons 
of policy and justice. Rather than questions about the nature of malice, 
malicious torts raise crucial questions regarding the possibility of admitting 
exceptions to the general duty to refrain from malicious acts. These questions 
are not to be decided by deduction from an abstract notion of malice, 
depending, instead, on broad considerations of justice and policy.  
 
The widespread misapprehension of the problem of malice, Terry noted, 
arises from a lack of clear views about certain elementary legal ideas and their 
relation to each other. By tracing a clear analytical scheme of legal ideas, Terry 
sought to disentangle the different kinds of questions posed by malicious torts, 
clarifying the actual role played by malice. Terry drew a threefold classification 
of legal duties: peremptory duties, duties of reasonableness and duties of 
intention. The latter include both duties not to act with a mere intention to 
produce a certain result, which may be broken without malice, and duties not 
to act maliciously, in the breach of which malice is essential. Malice means an 
intention to cause harm or damage to another, the harm or damage as such 
being the very thing desired.  
 
Further, Terry distinguished between two types of rights. Permissive 
rights are liberties to do or refrain from an act uncorroborated by a duty on 
others not to interfere. Protected rights, on the other hand, describe the legal 
condition of a person for whom the law protects a condition of fact by imposing 
                                               
123 Henry Terry, Malicious Torts, 20 L. Q. REV. 10 (1904). 
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duties on others. The protected condition of fact is the content of the right, any 
impairment of such condition amounting to a violation of the right. Terry 
delineated several classes of protected rights, i.e. rights of personal security, 
rights in the persons of others, normal property rights, abnormal property 
rights and rights of pecuniary condition, each displaying different features and 
corresponding to different duties. In rights of pecuniary condition the protected 
condition of fact is the holding of value or purchasing power in some form.  
 
Having laid out this table of elementary legal ideas, Terry confined the 
relevance of malice to a specific hypothesis. An actual question of malice, he 
noted, arises in case of breach of a duty not to act maliciously followed, as its 
proximate consequence, by the violation of a corresponding right of pecuniary 
condition.  
 
When it appears that there has been a violation of the right of pecuniary 
condition and of no other right and the case is not one of fraud, then the duty 
which must be proved to have been broken will usually be a duty not to act 
maliciously, malice will be an essential question on case of action and the 
question will arise, what is malice? And what is the legal duty as to malicious 
conduct? 
 
However, even in this hypothesis, Terry added, malice might be irrelevant, the 
question being whether there is any exception to that duty. There may be good 
reasons why a particular class of cases should be excepted out of the general 
rule; the opportunity of these exceptions “is to be decided upon grounds of 
justice or policy special to each class of cases”. 
 
To sum up: when malice is alleged the questions maybe be any of the 
following…..If there has been a malicious act and thus prima facie a breach of the 
last named duty, whether there is any exception to that duty that covers the case. 
Thus depends not on any theory of malice, but on considerations of justice and 
policy. 
 
A decade later, the appearance of Holmes’ article “Privilege, Malice and 
Intent” marked a shift in the conceptualization of malice124. Holmes’ 
conceptualization of malice further developed Terry’s idea that, in certain 
                                               
124 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV (1894-1895). 
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cases, policy reasons suggest that malicious acts may be done, without the 
actor being liable. However, Holmes took Terry’s scheme one step further, 
developing a general theory of intentional tort in which malice was purged of 
any moral connotation and equated with “the absence of just cause or excuse”. 
Holmes’ scheme proved extremely influential, setting the terms of a 
transatlantic conversation between Frederick Pollock and the Americans.  
 
“Privilege, Malice and Intent” represents the final stage in the shaping of 
a new conceptual structure of tort law; Holmes altered and refined his earlier 
conceptual scheme of tort law according malice a central role. Holmes’ earlier 
efforts were directed at anchoring liability to an external objective standard, 
ultimately dependent on policy considerations, rather than to an internal 
subjective standard based on fault125. The general purpose of the law of torts, 
Holmes argued, is to secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm, 
not because they are wrong but because they are harms. The preoccupation 
with articulating an objective, policy-based theory of liability, induced Holmes 
to arrange different types of torts in a “philosophically continuous series”, 
running from intentional torts to negligent torts to strict liability. The 
continuum was organized according to the degree of foreseebility of the harm, 
rather than on any subjective notion of fault. For this scheme to hold, the role 
of malice was to be eclipsed. Malice was deemed to be a comparatively 
insignificant form of liability, circumscribed to isolated instances, and 
malicious torts were disguised into the broader category of intentional torts. 
Holmes noted that there certain harmful acts which may done even with 
malevolent intent.  
 
[A man] may establish himself in business where he foresees that the effect of his 
competition will be to diminish the custom of another shopkeeper, perhaps to ruin 
him. He may erect a building which cuts another off from a beautiful prospect, or 
he may drain subterranean waters and thereby drain another’s well; and many 
other case may be put. 
 
Privileged malicious acts and strict liability functioned as the two extremes 
proving the irrelevance of any subjective moral standard of liability.  
                                               
125 Id., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1872-1873); see also lectures III and IV in ID., THE COMMON 
LAW (1881). 
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As the law on the one hand allows certain harms to be inflicted irrespective of the 
moral condition of him who inflicts them, so at the other extreme it may on 
grounds of policy throw the absolute risk of certain transactions on the person 
engaging in them irrespective of blameworthiness in any sense. 
 
The echo of Holmes’ scheme was heard on the other side of the Atlantic. 
In 1887, setting out to show that “there is really a Law of Torts, not merely a 
number of rules about various kinds of torts”, Frederick Pollock acknowledged 
his debt with Holmes, warning him that “you will recognize in my armoury 
some weapons of your own forging”. Pollock’ distinction between causes of 
action based on intentional conduct, negligent conduct and strict liability 
mirrored Holmes’ continuum. Further, similar to Terry and Holmes he 
emphasized the range of situations in which injury is legally permitted without 
compensation. Pollock pointed to trade competition and the interception of 
water as instances in which “the exercise of ordinary rights for a lawful 
purpose and in a lawful manner is no wrong even though it causes damages”. 
As to the role of malice, Pollock noted that, while in Roman law the exercise of 
a right accompanied by a malicious intent is ground for an action, there is no 
positive English authority on the matter.  
 
By the 1890s, Holmes had revised his conceptual structure of tort law, 
hinging it on intentional torts and according malice central relevance by 
linking it to the question of justification. The new arrangement was neatly 
spelled out in “Privilege, Malice and Intent”126. Acknowledging that the 
objective test of the degree of manifest danger does not exhaust the theory of 
torts, Holmes shifted the focus from the external objective standard of liability 
to the assessment of the subjective state of mind. Malice gained new centrality. 
In some cases, Holmes noted, the actor is not liable for a very manifest danger 
unless he actually intends to do the harm; in other cases actual malice may 
render the actor liable, when, in the absence of it, she would have not incurred 
in liability; still in other cases, the actor may even intend to do the harm and 
yet not have to answer for it. The intentional infliction of temporal damage, or 
the doing of an act manifestly likely to inflict such damage and inflicting it, is 
actionable if done without just cause. When acting with just cause, the actor is 
privileged to inflict the damage. Motive affects claims of privilege. Actual 
                                               
126 Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 119. 
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malice or improper motive is a crucial factor in weighing the defendant’s 
justification. While a good motive justifies the intentional infliction of harm, a 
bad motive may render the actor liable. The question of justification, Holmes 
warned, ultimately rests on delicate considerations of policy, rather than on 
empty logical deductions. Two years later in his famous dissent in the 
Vegelhan case127, Holmes restated the gist of the problem of malice. In 
numberless instances, Holmes noted, the law warrants the intentional 
infliction of temporal damages because it regards it justified. The true ground 
of justification, he continued, are considerations of policy and of social 
advantage which are rarely unanimously accepted. 
 
While at the conceptual level, the debate on malicious torts translated in 
an ambitious effort of analytical clarification, at the level of legal reasoning, it 
was the laboratory where a new mode of policy analysis, anticipating the 
relativist and pragmatic approach of Legal Realism, was developed. The 
conceptual clarification of the problem of malice confronted American jurists 
with the task of modifying and attuning their reasoning techniques128. If, as 
Terry and Holmes suggested, the question of malice was, essentially, the 
question of admitting exceptions to the general duty to refrain from 
intentionally inflicting damage, and, if such question was ultimately decided on 
the basis of considerations of policy, a new and more sophisticated mode of 
policy analysis was to be developed.   The tools of classical legal science, i.e. 
logical deduction and the rudimental forms of policy analysis that we have seen 
deployed by the courts, were to abandoned or refined. Terry, Holmes, Ames and 
                                               
127 Vegelhan v. Guntner, supra note 111. 
128 This organicist and policy-oriented mode of reasoning was proudly championed as a peculiarly American trait, 
distinguishing American jurists and judges from their English counterparts.. In a 1910 article on the influence of 
social and economic ideals on the law of malicious torts, Gordon Stoner effectively contrasted the social 
organicism of American judicial reasoning with the formalistic approach of the English courts. The questions 
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American judges, Stoner notes, were best equipped for this daunting task. Quoting Justice Park in Mirehouse v. 
Rennel, Stoner argues that English common lawyers aim at uniformity, consistency and certainty. Their mode of 
reasoning consisted in the mechanic application of rules derived from judicial precedents and their ultimate goals 
were the rigour and coherence of legal science. Justice Park’s words are contrasted with Justice Elliott’s bold 
organicist act of faith in Tuttle v. Buck. American courts, Stoner suggests, aim at adaptability to social needs 
rather than uniformity and consistency. Their reasoning techniques and their familiarity with policy questions 
enable them to facilitate law’s constant adaptation to changed conditions See Gordon Stoner, Influence of Social and 
Economic Ideals on the Law of Malicious Torts, 8 MICH. L. REV. 468 (1909-1910).  
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Lewis were eager to denounce the failures of hollow deductive reasoning in 
solving the question of malice. In Terry’s words: 
 
The real questions in Allen v. Flood and in Quinn v. Leathem were of this kind. 
They are not questions about the nature of malice or the general duty not to do 
malicious acts. Discussions of these points simply obscure the true issue. They 
are  of admitting exceptions to the general duty. They are not to be decided by 
deductions from legal theories about malice and there are very few precedents or 
established legal principles which will throw much light upon them. They are 
really questions of the adjustment of the law to new states of act arising out the 
new and complicated conditions of modern life…..the decisions of the courts upon 
them must and will amount in reality to somewhat bold and extensive judicial 
legislation, somewhat more bold and extensive than courts nowadays like to 
engage in, which must be based on broad considerations of justice and policy, 
with little help from precedents or theory. 
 
The forms of balancing and policy analysis that we have seen deployed 
by courts were to be further developed. When deciding the question of 
justification, courts had, by and large, weighed conflicting interests in light of 
multifactor standards of “malice” or “reasonableness” reflecting notions of 
social morals or policy considerations presented as “widely shared” and, hence, 
relatively uncontroversial. To the contrary, Holmes pointed at the fact that 
questions of privilege and malice call for analytic choices among alternative 
considerations of policy or justice. Judges are to balance, case by case, weighing 
the actual and concrete gains and losses entailed by alternative solutions. 
Balancing involves tracing the line in one place rather than in another and 
hence involves gains and losses that are the result of policy preferences rather 
than of universal notions of justice or the public good129. Holmes was generous 
in examples: 
 
Let us suppose another case of interference with business by an act which has 
some special grounds of policy in its favour. Take the case of advice not to 
employ a certain doctor, given by one in a position of authority. To some extent it 
is desirable that people should be free to give one another advice. On the other 
hand, commonly it is not desirable that a man should lose his business. The two 
advantages run against one another and a line has to be drawn. In such a case 
                                               
129 Duncan Kennedy & Marie Claire Belleau, Le place de René Demogue dans la généalogie depensée juridique contemporaine, 
56 REVUE INTERDCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES 163 (2006). 
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probably it would be said that if the advice was believed to be good and was 
given for the sake of benefiting the hearers the defendants would not be 
answerable. But if it was not believed to be for their benefit and was given for 
the sake of hurting the doctor, the doctor would prevail… 
 
The scholarly debate over malicious torts revealed the limits of courts’ 
reasoning tool kit and the need for a more sophisticated mode of legal analysis. 
But the ultimate stake of the debate lay elsewhere. Jurists and writers were 
quick to realize the implications of the question of malice in the larger and 
incandescent context of industrial struggles. Contrary to their continental 
European colleagues who discussed the problem of abuse of rights at a rather 
abstract level, they did not shy away from examining the problem of malice in 
light of the questions posed by labor/capital disputes. Holmes’s scheme of 
intentional tort proved a critical weapon in labor cases. As his Vegelhan 
dissent shows, Holmes envisaged his theory of intentional tort as a crucial tool 
for governing industrial warfare, furthering the cause of peaceful trade 
unionism. By focusing on motive, Holmes was able to expand the scope of 
justification, exempting from liability peaceful labor activities.  
 
In a lengthy and careful investigation of crucial issues in labor law, that 
appeared in 1907 in the Harvard Law Review, Jeremiah Smith further 
elaborated the question of justification, attuning the scheme of intentional tort 
to recent labor cases130.  Smith set four requisites for the validity of “just cause 
or excuse” in labor cases: pertinence, reasonable fitness, proportionality and 
direct conduct. First, there must be a conflict of interest between plaintiff and 
defendant as to the subject matter in regard to which the damage is done. 
Second, the damaging act must be reasonable calculated to substantially 
advance the interest of the defendant. Third, the resulting damage must 
proportional to the benefit to the defendant. Four, the justification must be 
                                               
130 Jeremiah Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, supra note 62. It is impossible to have any clear discussion of 
the crucial labour cases, he contended, unless “we either discard certain ambiguous expressions altogether or 
distinctly indicate the meaning intended to be affixed to them”. Seeking to bring clarity, he distinguished between 
“intent” and “motive”: the former describes the defendant’s immediate intent, the latter denotes the defendant’s 
ulterior intent. While intent is often material upon the question of the defendant’s liability, the cases where motive 
is material are comparatively rare. Smith quotes Ames’ articulation of the doctrine of intentional tort as an 
accurate representation of the law.  In Ames’ words, “The wilful causing of damage to another by a positive act 
whether by a man alone or by several acting in concert and whether by direct action against him or indirectly by 
inducing a third person to exercise a lawful right, is a tort unless there was cause for inflicting the damage”. 
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confined to those case where the defendant uses only his own conduct as a 
lever, rather than an outsider’s conduct.  
 
At closer inspection, Smith’s fourfold guide to justification translates in a 
restrictive approach to certain sophisticated forms of labor struggle, such as 
secondary boycott. The requisite of direct conduct rules out labor’s activity that 
rely on a third party. While the right to abstain from work is absolute, Smith 
notes, yet it cannot be used to induce a third person to take action damaging to 
the plaintiff. Moreover, the requisites of reasonable fitness and proportionality 
exclude methods of warfare dependent on inter-trade solidarity. Smith 
concedes that while workers in one trade may take measures to strengthen 
unionism in their own trade, they cannot do so to bolster unionism in another 
trade. 
 
Ultimately, the debate over malicious torts grew into a broader clash 
over different models of socio-economic development and power relations 
among social actors. Judicial decisions and juristic conceptualizations in the 
area of malicious torts, Gordon Stoner noted in 1909, reflect changes in the 
public opinion, registering variations in political, economic and ethic ideas131. 
Stoner’s survey of different lines of cases involving business competition, 
boycott and closed shop evinced a marked shift from individualistic thinking 
committed to absolute rights and freedom of action to a social outlook  weighing 
individual rights against societal welfare. Stoner was eager to denounce the 
asymmetry between courts’ treatment of malice in labor cases and in cases 
involving business competition. In the former, he suggested, judges, when 
determining liability, tend to consider the immediate motive of the defendant, 
i.e. the immediate result desired to be accomplished by the act, disregarding 
the ultimate motive, i.e. the result which the actor wishes to effect not by the 
act as part of a broader strategy.  
 
To illustrate suppose a labor union some of whose members are employed by a 
manufacturer who also employs non-union men orders him to discharge the non 
union men and threatens to compel its men to quit work if he does not comply 
with the order. To avoid a strike he discharges the non-union men. Here the 
immediate result desired is the injury-the discharge-of the non-union men. It 
                                               
131 Gordon Stoner, Influence of Social and Econmic Ideals on the Law of Malicious Torts, supra note 123. 
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may very well be that the ultimate motive is to force all laborers to join the 
union and thus to increase its power and usefulness. It may be stated as a 
general rule that in labor cases the courts have not regarded the ultimate motive 
of the defendants in determining their liability 
 
On the other hand, Stoner argued, courts seem reluctant to adopt the same 
principle in cases of business competition, when the interests of big business 
are at stake.  
 
Suppose this principle were to be applied in the same way in suits brought by an 
independent company against a trust where the trust has cut process so as to 
lose money in the district where it competes with the independent company in 
order to drive the independent concern out of business and so to destroy it or 
force it to enter the combination to preserve itself. Here the immediate motive is 
the injury or destruction of the plaintiff company, the ultimate motive the 
benefit to be derived by the trust through forcing the independent concern to 
unite with it or go out of business 
 
So far, in similar cases, Stoner noted, judges have tended to adopt an 
opposite principle, disregarding the immediate motive and focusing on the 
ultimate motive. While fear of an increment in labor power leads courts to gloss 
over the defendant union’s ultimate motive, an individualistic commitment to 
freedom of action and the sacredness of unrestrained competition has so far 
prompted them to deem the ultimate motive of business competition a valid 
justification. A similar awareness of the asymmetry veins Walter Wheeler 
Cook’s analysis . 
 
When the legality of attempts to close a market by economic pressure on those 
who deal with rivals has been called in question …the tendency has been to 
regard the acts of the defendants as lawful; when the legality of similar attempts 
to unionize a shop has been called in question, the tendency has been to regard 
such attempts as illegal132. 
 
On the contrary, advocates of unrestrained competition and “the open 
market” denounced the power of labor unions as a threat to individual 
morality, the independence of workers and employers, the natural equilibrium 
                                               
132 Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life 27 YALE L. J. 779 (1917-1918). 
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of competition and the principle of equality before the law133.  Bruce Wyman ’s 
denunciation of courts’ illiberal efforts to side with labor in the mounting 
industrial warfare betrays disquiet. Even to the most superficial observers of 
current events, he noted, it is clear that the competitive system is threatened 
from many quarters. Courts’ treatment of unions’ malicious competitive 
activity poses the greatest danger to individual freedom and industrial liberty. 
The doctrine of the closed shop is being surreptitiously established and the 
courts seem to be abdicating their task of “protecting the freedom of the 
individual against the oppression of the combination”. Unionizing and 
boycotting, Wyman claimed, pose a despotic and tyrannical threat to individual 
liberty, their efficacy resting on the overpowering force of numbers. Not only is 
strengthening the power of labor a menace to individual freedom, it is also 
prejudicial to the larger interest of society. While the public wants the best 
services that can be gotten at the lowest wages that will be accepted, 
unionizing means less efficient services and increasing wages. In a crescendo of 
anxiety, Wyman warns that the end of the open market and the disturbance of 
the competitive system would be “the final catastrophe beyond which there 
could be nothing but the horror of anarchy or the hopelessness of socialism”.  
 
 
 
III. ON THE CONTINENT: ABUS DE DROIT AND ABUSO DEL DIRITTO 
 
Comparative law is, ultimately, an exercise in self-reflection: 
comparativists use their examination of the “other” system to question their 
“own”134. Our long comparative detour in nineteenth century common law calls 
for a fresh look at the continental concept of abuse of rights and invites 
speculations about its actual significance and impact.  
 
In Europe, contrary to England and the United States, abuse of rights 
was expressly framed as a unitary conceptual category, one that sparked a 
raging controversy. Jurists holding different political and methodological 
                                               
133 Bruce Wyman, The Maintenance of the Open Shop, 17 GREEN BAG 21 (1905); Id., The Perpetuation of the Open Market, 
17 GREEN BAG 210 (1905). See also Daniel R. Ernst, supra note 103. 
134 Karen Engle, Comparative Law as Exposing the Foreign System’s Internal Critique: An Introduction, 1997 UTAH L. REV., 
359 (1997). 
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beliefs set out to either discredit the new jurisprudential creation or build a 
systematic theory of abuse of rights. The echo of the French debate soon 
reached Italian jurists, at the time intent in shaping a new private law for the 
newly unified country and, hence, alert to transalpine legal novelties. While 
Italian judges were reluctant to appropriate the new category, scholars were 
quick to re-elaborate the theories sketched by Louis Josserand, Raymond 
Saleilles and Francois Geny.  
 
The reason for the intensity and animosity of the debate, in both France 
and Italy, is said to lie in that abuse of rights was perceived by its opponents as 
a threatening inroad into individual liberty and freedom of action. However, an 
analysis of the language and the distributive outcomes of the decisions refracts 
a different image. Abuse of rights looses some of its fabled social aura. The 
alleged distance between civilians’ potent social “drug” and common lawyers’ 
pragmatic and growth-oriented use of “malice” and “reasonableness” shrinks. 
The two fields where abuse of rights could have exerted a significant 
distributive impact, i.e. property law and labor law, remained largely immune 
from its potentially corrosive effect. Rather, abuse of rights served a mildly 
conservative legal/political agenda. In cases dealing with property rights, 
courts curbed the excesses of the absolutist modern notion of property, 
ultimately strengthening it. Similarly, in labor cases, abuse of rights was part 
of a bland solidaristic strategy aimed at “domesticating” the nascent labor 
movement.  
 
A.  Abuse of Property Rights: A Cosmetic Corrective to Roman-Bourgeois Private Law ? 
 
Property is the field where the theory of abuse of rights was more 
extensively developed and carefully articulated. The effort of the French courts 
to tame the owner’s abusive exercise of her right was widely perceived as an 
attack to the grandiose and absolutist modern concept of property designed in 
the wake of the French Revolution135.  
 
The attack on modern property generated alarm136. It was seen as a fatal 
                                               
135 On modern Continental private law see: James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code,42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459 
(1994); ID., FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2006). 
136 LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE L’ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITÉ. THÉORIE DITE DE L’ABUS DES DROITS 
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blow to the product of centuries of highly sophisticated legal/philosophical 
elaborations. The cultural roots of modern property were deemed to rest in the 
Roman Classical notion of dominium137, as re-invented by nineteenth century 
Roman law scholars. More specifically, they rested in the new articulation of 
the relation between the subject and the thing delineated by the Spanish 
jurists/theologians of the Second Scholastic at the dawn of the sixteenth 
century. The influence of late medieval voluntarism, the questions raised by 
the Franciscan debate on poverty, the cultural sensitivity of Humanism and 
the Reformation as well as the needs of a pre-capitalist socio-economic order 
had concurred in shaping a new vision of property. Soto, Vitoria and their 
fellows of the Salamanca School gave legal shape to this new vision of property. 
Their voluntaristic premises translated in a new centrality of the 
subject/owner. An expansive and domineering force, property became the 
measure of the subject’s liberty. The owner’s absolute power over the thing was 
seen as the quintessential expression of autonomy and the highest guarantee of 
freedom138.  
 
This early-modern subjectivist notion of the relation between the owner 
and the thing was the basis on which modern property was built. The 
Enlightenment and the political rise of the bourgeoisie shaped a highly 
abstract and eminently individualist notion of property, enshrined in article 
544 of the Code Napoleon and in article 463 of the Italian 1865 Civil Code139. 
Property was endowed with absoluteness, exclusivity and irrevocability. The 
                                                                                                                                               
(1927 1st ed, Dalloz 2006) at 5: “Comment comprendre ques certains consciences, cependant trés averties, aient 
été choquèes par le développement d’une these sociale qui a deriére elle un tel passé et qui offer de semblables 
gages?  La responsabilité de cette  attitude hostile incombe, non pas au droit romain, ni meme aux glossateurs ou 
aux postglossateurs par les soins desquels il fut si souvent déformé, mais bien à notre droit révolutionnaire et aux 
grandes codifications […] Né des excés et des abus de l’ancien regime, ce droit, élaboré sous l’influence 
dominante des philosophes du XVIIIe siécle, est marqué au coin d’un individualisme exaspéré” 
137 The 1890s is the moment when the Roman archetype was actually “invented”. The Romanists and the civilisti 
were partners in a grandiose cultural and political operation: the  construction of “diritto romano borghese” ; see 
ALDO SCHIAVONE, ALLE ORIGINI DEL DIRITTO BORGHESE. HEGEL CONTRO SAVIGNY (1984). The archetype had 
thick ethical and political implications: a) RD Sanctioning the most ample power of a  single individual over a 
thing, was seen as the quintessential expression of freedom. b) RD granting to a privileged individual, the Roman 
citizen, full power over a thing, was seen as reinforcing the economic and political power of the ruling class. 
138 The Salmaticenses envisioned self-dominon, (Dominium Sui) as the quintessential expression of freedom and 
claimed that property over external things is the qualitatively identical external manifestation of self-dominion. See 
PAOLO GROSSI, IL DOIMINIO E LE COSE. PERCEZIONI MEDIEVALI E MODERNE DEI DIRITTI REALI (1992). 
139 Art 544: “la propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue pourvu qu’on 
n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements” 
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owner was consecrated “moderator and arbiter” of the thing, exercising over it 
an unlimited and despotic power140. Absolute and unitary, admitting no 
graduation in the scope of the right and no differentiation between proprietary 
relations, property was the backbone of modern codifications. In the Code Civil, 
Rene Savatier ironically noted, property and things took up 1766 articles while 
only 515 articles were devoted to rights of persons. Similarly, as one of its 
architects illustrated, the structure of the 1865 Codice Civile hinged on two 
pillars: property as “the fundamental idea” and persons as property owners. 
 
Not only was the attack on modern property a blow to the product of the 
most sophisticated Western legal culture, it was also a rift in the solid edifice of 
the bourgeois legal order, of which property was the central pillar. As Aldo 
Schiavone has argued, in nineteenth century capitalist Europe, two disciplines, 
a recent one, political economy, and an ancient one, Roman private law, 
concurred in designing a powerful, and apparently unassailable, socio-legal 
order: “Roman-Bourgeois private law”. The products of Roman legal science, 
and in particular Roman Classical dominium, were put in service of the needs 
of the capitalist economic system. The uninterrupted continuity of a millenary 
legal science conferred upon the “Roman-Bourgeois legal order” a patina of 
neutrality and universality. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, under 
the pressure of new social and economic conditions, this solid edifice began to 
shake. However, what in the fears of many, appeared an attack on “Roman-
Bourgeois private law” turned out to be a mere adjustment in its structure, 
ultimately contributing to its longevity. 
 
Courts’ resort to abuse of rights was part of this adjustment. It was a 
cosmetic corrective to the “volontarisme individualiste” informing the 
                                               
140 See LOIUS JOSSERAND supra note 131 at 15: “A tout seigneur tout honneur: le droit de propriété est considéré 
traditionellment comme le droit individuel par excellence, comme le prototipe de la prérogative absolue; c’est un 
dominium conferant à celui qui en est investi les pleins pouvoirs, plena in re potestas; le droit révolutionnaire, 
acceptant et fortifiant meme l’héritage du passé, lui a reconnu solennellment la valeur d’un attribute naturel et 
imprescriptible, inviolable et sacré, de la personnalité humaine, au meme titre que la liberté, la sureté et la 
résistance à l’oppression […] Dans la conception millénaire, le propriétaire est un souverain qui, rentranché dans 
sa chose comme dans une fortresse, agit à sa guise, discrétionnairement, sans qu’on puisse lui demander compte 
de ses actes et moins encore des mobiles qui les lui ont inspires”. In the Italian literature see: EMIDIO PACIFICI 
MAZZONI, ISTITUTZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO (1874) 
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absolutist model of property141, rather than its rejection. Aware of the 
unsettling potential of the device they had created and wary of the distributive 
issues at stake, judges tailored the doctrine of abuse of rights in a rather 
narrow fashion. By and large, decisions dealing with property rights, confined 
abuse of rights within the safe perimeter of a subjectivist notion. Rather than 
disrupting the absolutist notion of property, abuse of rights operated as a 
buttress to a more dynamic and efficient, though equally absolutist, idea of 
property. 
 
The Colmar case, decided in 1855, is considered path-breaking142. The 
appellant had built a fake chimney on his roof opposite to, and nearly against, 
the respondent’s window. The inspection ordered by the court showed the 
chimney to bear no utility for the appellant, serving no function other than that 
of obscuring the respondent’s window. Confirming the judgement of the inferior 
court, which had ordered the demolition of the chimney, the Court of Appeals of 
Colmar took a narrow subjectivist approach resting on a twofold test: the 
owner’s malicious intent to harm and the lack of a serious and legitimate 
interest. However, the court was eager to reassure that 
 
Property rights, are absolute, allowing the owner to use and abuse of her property; 
the exercise of property rights, however, finds a limit in that the use of property is 
to satisfy a serious and legitimate interest; principles of morals and equity demand 
that courts repress acts inspired by malicious passions that do not serve any 
personal utility while causing damage to another143. 
 
The ample and absolutist scope of property rights was left intact and 
ultimately strengthened, the court limiting its intervention to the repression of 
the most blatantly anti-social excesses, i.e. acts motivated by the sole purpose 
                                               
141 LOIUS JOSSERAND supra note 131 at 1 [….] l’abus de droits qui constitue une des pièces maitresses des 
systèmes juridiques de tous les pays civilises, ou, plus exactement, l’atmosphère, le “climat” dans lequel ces 
sysèmes se développent et se réalisent”. On “ volontarisme individualiste” p. 7. 
142 Colmar, May 2, 1855, D.P. 1856 2.9. 
143Id., “Considérant que, s’il est de principe que le droit de propriété est un droit en quelque sorte absolu, 
autorisant le propriétaire à user et abuser de la chose, cependant l’exercise de ce droit, comme celui de tout autre, 
doit avoir pour limite la satisfaction d’un intérèt serieux et légitime; que les principes de la morale et de l’èquité 
s’opposent à ce que la justice sanctionne une action inspirée par la malveillance, accomplice sous l’empire d’une 
mauvaise passion, ne se justifiant par aucune utilitépersonnelle et portent un grave prejudice à autrui;  qu’ainsi 
c’est le cas, tout en reconnaissant l’affranchissement de la propriété de l’appelant de tout droit de servitude de vue, 
de maintenir la decision des premiers juges quant à la demolition de la fausse cheminée. 
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of harming another and lacking any utility.  
 
The Saint Galmier mineral waters decision (1856) differs in style but not in 
substance144. Relinquishing the dry and pragmatic language of the Colmar 
court, the court of Appeal of Lyon indulged in a skirmish of Roman brocards, 
only to re-affirm the subjectivist notion of abuse of rights. Three sources of 
mineral water, that owned by the Andrè partners, the Badoit source and the 
source owned by the town of Saint Galmier, were located at the distance of a 
few meters from each other; the three sources were communicant, both through 
a common reservoir as well as through subterranean infiltrations. The Andrè 
partners built a powerful hydraulic system that pumped the water from the 
reservoir, reducing of two thirds the output of the Badoit source and lowering 
the level of the water of the communal Saint Galmier source. While the 
hydraulic system significantly interfered with the operation of the other two 
sources, the surplus of water obtained by the Andrè partners was wasted by 
letting it run along the terrain into a nearby creek. Confirming the judgement 
of the inferior court, the Court of Appeals of Lyon found the appellants’ conduct 
to be animated by the exclusive intent to harm and awarded damages to 
Badoit. The Court adopted the Colmar twofold subjective test. Andrè’s conduct 
met both the test of the intent to injure, being dictated by no purpose other 
than that of harming Badoit and the test of the lack of serious and legitimate 
interest, revealed by the fact that the water was wasted. A passage in the 
opinion is symptomatic of the Court’s reluctance to incisively curb the owner’s 
absolute right. The court seemed to suggest that the absolute nature of 
property rights entails the owner’s power to abuse of her property and merely 
set a limit to such power145. In the court’s words:  
 
Considering that the owner’s right necessarily finds a limit in the obligation to let 
the neighbour enjoy her property and [considering] that the [owner’s] power to 
abuse of the thing cannot describe an act which, inspired exclusively by the desire 
to harm, takes up, in reason of the subterranean communication between the two 
lots of land, the character of an action carried on the neighbour’s land and aimed at 
affecting its value by annihilating or reducing a natural resource that determines 
                                               
144 Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.P. 1856 2.199. 
145 Significantly the maxim reads: Le droit qu’a tout propriétaire d’abuser de sa chose trouve une limite dans 
l’obligation de laisser le voisin joiur aussi de sa proprété, et ne saurait autoriser l’accomplissement d’actes inspires 
uniquement par l’envie de nuire a celui-ci. 
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most of the value of the land; [considering] that, this act, rightly assessed in light of 
the maxim malitiis non est indulgendum, integrates an hypothesis of quasi-
delictum regulated by art. 1382146 
 
Several decades later, in the Clement-Bayard case, the Court of Appeals 
of Amiens imperceptibly expanded its concept of abuse of rights to include the 
hypothesis of “mixed motives”147. The Court suggested that, for the owner’s 
conduct to be abusive, the malevolent motive need not be the exclusive but the 
dominant motive. The Court also implicitly signalled that not any interest 
alleged by the defendant may count as a serious and legitimate motive. The 
case was a peculiar one. Mr Coquerel had bought a small piece of land facing 
the hangar for dirigibles operated by Mr. Clement Bayard. The relationship 
between the two neighbours was hardly a friendly one. Mr Coquerel decided to 
erect, on the border of his land, two 15 meters long and 11 meters tall wooden 
fences and to adorn it with steel spikes which were meant to obstruct the 
operation of the zeppelins in case of strong wind. Manifestly, the fences, 
separated by an interruption of a few meters and hence inapt to serve as a 
closure, did not serve any function other than damaging the dirigibles. Mr 
Coquerel contended that he was driven by the desire to attempt an economic 
speculation, by inducing Clement Bayard to buy his land at a conspicuous 
price, rather than by the sole intent to harm. The Court carefully weighed 
Coquerel’s alleged motivation. While the desire to speculate, fully profiting by 
one’s property is perfectly legitimate, the Court argued, the means employed by 
Mr. Coquerel are illegitimate and exclusively inspired by a malevolent intent to 
harm: 
 
Considering that, in fact, in order to justify his behaviour, Coquerel claims, that, by 
carrying out these operations, thereby spurring Clement Bayard’s interest in 
acquiring his land, he ventured in nothing but an act of economic speculation. 
Considering that it is  legitimate for the owner of a piece of a land to try to fully 
                                               
146 Considérant, sur l’exception ainsi formulée, que le droit du propriétaire trouve nécessirement une limite dans 
l’obligation de laisser le voisin joiur de sa propriété; que le pouvoir d’abuser de sa chose ne peut server à colorer 
un acte, qui, inspire excluivement par l’envie de nuire, prend, aà raison d’une communication souterraine entre 
deux fonds, le caractére d’une enterprise portée sur le fonds voisin, pour toucher à sa substance et anéantir ou 
amoindrir un bien naturel, qui en fait la principale valeur; qu’un pareil acte sainement apprécie à la lumiére de la 
régle malitiis non est indulgendum, constitue un des cas de quasi-délits prévus par l’art. 1382. 
147 Amiens, February 7, 1912 D.P. III 1913.2.177; in 1915 the Court de Cassation rejected Coquerel’s appeal 
confirming the arret of the Court of Appeals of Amiens, Req., August 3, 1915, D.P. 1917.1.79.. 
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reap the benefit of his property, acts of speculation being, in themselves and for 
themselves perfectly licit, provided that the means employed be not, as in the case 
at hand, illegitimate and inspired exclusively by a malicious animus….148. 
 
Finding that Coquerel’s conduct amounted to an abuse of rights, the court 
ordered to dismantle the fence and to pay damages. However, the court failed 
to fully build on the corrective potential of its expanded notion of abuse of 
rights. While this enlarged notion would have allowed a more thorough inquiry 
into the value and legitimacy of different uses of property, the court ultimately 
retrieved its subjectivist test. Rather than questioning Coquerel’s motives, 
weighing the latter’s speculative ambitions against the public utility of 
Clement Bayard ’s activity, the court focused on the malicious nature of the 
means employed. As in the previous cases, the court seemed reluctant to 
challenge the absolutist model of property and merely curbed it excesses.  
 
In a 1902 case dealing with subterranean waters the Cour de Cassation 
opted for a more decidedly objectivist approach, drawing a notion of abuse of 
rights that hinges primarily on the test of the owner’s lack of interest149. 
Confirming the judgement of the Court of Appeals of Lyon, the Cour de 
Cassation found the appellants, Mr Forissier and his wife, liable for persisting 
in drilling activities that, while lacking any utility for them, exerted a highly 
damaging impact on the Chaverots’ source. As a footnote in the Sirey report 
emphasizes, the Court went beyond the well-established subjectivist approach, 
focusing instead on the objective criterion of the lack of utility for the 
owners150. However, the language of the court is that of modern absolute 
property and the Code Napoleon. The court compensated the shift towards a 
potentially more invasive objective test with the reaffirmation of the 
                                               
148 Considérant que Coquerel prétend , il est vrai, pour justifier ses agissements, qu’il n’à fait, en exeécutant ces 
travaux et en augmentant ainsi l’intéret de Clement Bayard à se rendre acquéreur de sa piéce de terre, qu’un acte 
de spéculation; Considérant que s’il est loisible au propriétaire d’un fonds de chercher à en tirer le meilleur parti 
possibile, et si la spéculation est par elle-meme et en elle-meme un acte parfaitement licite, ce n’est qu’à la 
condition que les moyens employés pour la réaliser ne soient pas, comme en l’espéce, illégitimes et inspirés 
exclusivement par une inetntion maliceuse. 
149 Req., June 10, 1902, D.P. III 1902.1.454; S. 1903.1.11. 
150 Le propri[taire d’un fonds a le droit d’y faire des fuilles et de couper ainsi les veines d’eau alimentant un fonds 
voisin […] Mais c’est à la condition que les fouilles ne soient pas pratiquéesmécliamment et avec inetntion de 
nuire. […] L’arret actuel va plus lion, car il parait exiger que les fouilles présentent un  caractére d’utilité pour le 
propriétaire qui les pratique. 
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absoluteness of property rights:  
 
Given that, while art. 544 attributes everyone the right to enjoy and dispose of his 
thing in the most absolute manner, this right is tempered by the natural and legal 
obligation not to cause damage to another’s property; -  
 
If French judges deployed the doctrine of abuse of rights with 
remarkable caution, their Italian colleagues were even more hesitant. When 
dealing with cases of abusive exercise of property rights, Italian courts were 
wary not to exceed the safe notion of aemulatio151. In his now classic study of 
abuse of rights Mario Rotondi praised the court’s scrupulous attitude, 
contrasting it with the irresponsible audacity of the French courts152. All of a 
sudden, France, the revered transalpine sister, appears “foreign”: 
 
In our legal system, in all the cases in which the French courts invoke the concept 
of abuse of rights, either an express legislative disposition avails or our courts were 
able to reach, through a different path, these equitative solutions and 
temperaments that are the greatest pride of the foreign rhetoric. […] Why turn to 
dangerous constructions of liability for de iure acts, conflict of rights and similar, 
that mess up the basic concept of our legal system, when the same results can be 
reached through far more orthodox ways? 
 
 A widely commented 1877 decision of the Florentine Corte di Cassazione 
well exemplifies the courts’ predilection for a narrow concept of aemulatio153. 
The case was a relatively ordinary one. Signor Sguanci had elevated the 
common wall separating his orchard from Signor Contini’s courtyard. 
                                               
151 For Italian decisions relying on the notion of aemulatio see: Corte Appello Palermo 24 gennaio 1890, (Foro it. 
1890, I, 203) “però per quanto illimitato voglia ritenersi il diritto del proprietario, suprema ragione per la 
convivenza sociale impone che non possa farsene un uso sfrenato e selvaggio”. Corte di Cassazione di Torino 24 
maggio 1898 (Foro it. 1898, I, 157): “ne il ricorrente cerchi rifugio nell’ art. 436 c.c. che assicura al proprietario la 
facoltà di usare e disporre nel modo l più assoluto della cosa sua, purchè non ne faccia un uso vietato dalle leggi o 
dai regolamenti. La legge garantisce l’uso peperò esclude l’abuso che apparisce evidente nel fatto di chi, col 
pretesto di esercitare il proprio diritto,  si propone e raggiunga il solo iniquo intento di nuocere ad altri”; See also 
Cassazione Torino 20 aprile 1907 (Foro it. 1907, I, 163) ; Vittorio Scialoja, in his entry on aemualtio, is dismissive 
of  Italian courts’ use of aemulatio: “le corti italiane trascinate dalla corrente tradizionale, ammettono in generale il 
divieto dell’emulazione: ma fortunatamente lo spirito pratico dei magistrati fa si, che spesso poco logicamente ma 
con molta utilità da un falso principio essi deducano buone conseguenze; giungano cioè ad un giusto risultato 
senza accorgersi che questo non è giusto in forza della massima, che essi credono di applicare, bensì in forza di 
principi ben differenti”; see Vittorio Scialoja, supra note 9. 
152 MARIO ROTONDI, L’ABUSO DI DIRITTO. AEMULATIO. (1923 first ed., 1979). 
153 Cassazione Firenze 4 maggio 1877 (Foro it. 1877, I, 96) 
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Confirming the judgement of the Court of Appeal, the court held that Sguanci’s 
elevation works served no purpose, being exclusively directed at depriving 
Contini of light and prospect, and ordered the demolition of the elevation. The 
court noted that amplitude of property rights is tempered by principles of 
“natural honesty” and that the law intervenes to moderate abuses and excesses 
and to neutralize malice and emulation. According to the court, the prohibition 
of acts ad aemulationem, implicit in the Italian Civil Code, has both the 
sanction of morality, being dictated by higher principles of natural honesty as 
well as that of time, being the superlative creation of medieval jurists.  
 
B.  Abuse of Rights in Industrial Relations: An Experiment in Avant-Garde Capitalism? 
 
In France and in Italy, labor activity and strikes, relatively sparse until 
the 1880s, multiplied in the latter part of the nineteenth century, changing in 
size and duration and gaining new economic and political significance. 
Organized labor’s new vigour called for legal and institutional responses. Abuse 
of rights was private lawyers ’ response. 
 
The changing structure of French industry had rendered the 1791 Le 
Chapelier Loi, prohibiting any form of association in all trades, inadequate. In 
1864 a new bill sanctioning workers’ right of coalition was passed, followed, in 
1884, by the Loi relative à la creation des syndicates professionels. A new 
institutional structure for organized labor was soon established. In 1895 the 
Federation of the Bourses du Travail and the syndicates combined in the 
Confederation Generale du Travail. Empowered by more solid institutional 
foundations, the labor movement launched an active strategy of strikes and 
non-violent work stoppages. While the Glass Strike of 1895 in Carmaux and 
the coal-miners strikes of the 1880s and 1890s in the Lower Languedoc are 
well-known, the Statistique des grèves chronicles the large number of strikes 
that inflamed industrial relations in the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century154.  
                                               
154 Edward Shorter & Charles Tilly, The Shape of Strikes in France 1830-1960, 13 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN 
SOCIETY & HISTORY  60-86 (1971); Harvey Goldberg, Jaurès and the Carmaux Strikes: The Glass Strike of 1895 17 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY 307-319 (1958); Id., Jaurès and the Carmaux Strikes: The Coal 
Strike of 1892, 17 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY 167-178 (1958); Leo Loubére, Coal Miners, 
Strikes and Politics in the Lower Languedoc 1880-1914, 2 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY 25-50 (1968). 
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In Italy, by the late 1890s the form and scale of labor organization and 
the frequency and size of strikes were very similar to those in France. Although 
trade unions had no legal recognition until 1890 a vital network of mutual aid 
societies, local unions and workers’ cooperatives existed. The victory of the 
liberal Zanardelli-Giolitti government in 1900 marked the beginning of what is 
known as “The Golden Age of Italian Labor”. Labor’s institutional structure, 
designed along the lines of the French, consisted of Camere del Lavoro, 
organized in a federation and later, in 1906, in the Confederazione Generale del 
Lavoro.  As in France, the 1880s witnessed the intensification of strikes. The 
Zanardelli Criminal Code, which entered into force in 1890, is said to have 
legalized strikes, punishing strikes only when accompanied by violence and 
threats. Inaugurated by the agricultural strikes of the 1890s in the Po Valley 
the new season of industrial strife culminated in the general strike of 1904155.  
 
Intensified labor activity confronted nascent labor law with intractable 
legal questions. Still in its formative moment, labor law was developing in 
constant dialogue with the “old” science of private law. And it was in the 
latter’s toolbox that a response to the problems posed by industrial strife was 
found. Courts resorted to the civilistes’ concept of abuse of rights to control 
labor activity.  
 
Two famed decisions stirred clamour and alarm among commentators. In 
1903, in an interlocutory appeal of a decision of a justice of the peace, the 
Tribunal of Bordeaux found that an employer who had refused to hire 
unionized wood workers had abused his right, having acted out of pure 
malice156. The facts were straightforward. An employer, Canis, disregarding a 
written agreement reached with the Syndicat des ouvriers en bois merrains 
binding him to hire members of the union, notified his intention not to hire 
workers affiliated with the said union. The justice of the peace noted that 
endorsing the employer’s refusal to hire unionized workers, in the name of 
freedom of contract, would have frustrated the goals of the 1884 statute 
                                               
155 Francesco Saverio Nitti, Strikes in Italy  3 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 719-733 (1893); Nicola Rossi & Giovanni 
Toniolo, Catching Up or Falling Behind? Italy’s Economic Growth 1895-1947 45 THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW  
537-563 (1992); GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, SCIOPERO, POTERE POLITICO E MAGISTRATURA 1870-1922 (1969); 
UMBERTO ROMAGNOLI & TIZIANO TREU, I SINDACATI IN ITALIA: STORIA DI UNA STRATEGIA (1977). 
156 Bordeaux, December 14, 1903 S 1904.217 note Ferron 
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recognizing and regulating unions, and thereby awarded damages to the union. 
Confirming the decision of the inferior court, the Tribunal of Bourdeaux, raised 
the heated question of abuse of rights, suggesting that the crucial legal issue 
was whether Canis had exercised his right to freely select his own collaborators 
or had committed a wrong157. As Georges Ferron emphasized in the Sirey note, 
of the two alternative conceptual articulations of abuse of rights, i.e. abuse of 
rights as excessive exercise of a right or as malicious exercise of a right, the 
court privileged the latter158. The former, Ferron suggested, would have 
infringed the sacred dogma of the employer’s widest freedom of contract 
symmetric to the employee’s equally ample freedom to sell or not to sell her 
labor. The court remained instead within the safer perimeter of a subjective 
notion of abuse of rights. Having secured, at the conceptual level, the 
individualistic pillars of the system, the court surprisingly and courageously 
deployed this narrow notion in favour of the union. Noting that the employer 
has an ample liberty to refuse to hire unionized workers when the refusal 
serves a specific professional interest, the court found that, in the case at hand, 
the employer’s refusal was exclusively motivated by the intent to harm the 
union, an institution sanctioned by the law, by hindering its activity.  
 
Given that, according to the current legislation, it seems that an employer cannot 
be prevented from announcing his intention of hiring unionized workers; But, given 
that the general principles of law entail limitations to this faculty; that while, for 
example, this faculty cannot be contested when the employer acts in order to 
safeguard an interest, it is to be denied when the employer’s interest is not at 
stake, the latter acting simply to harm the union, blacklisting it… 
 
Relinquishing the traditional arid judicial style and venturing in a bold 
endorsement of labor’s claims, the Tribunal added: 
 
[given] that, besides, employers will claim in vain that “harming the unions serves 
in fact our interest!”; that justice will be deaf to such scathing words betraying 
social hostility and resistance to a law….. 
 
                                               
157 Attendu, en effet, que toute la question est de savoir si Canis à supposer établi ce qui lui est imputé, devrait etre 
considéré comme ayant usé d’un droit ou comme ayant commis une faute. While attempts to limit the employer’s 
liberty not to hire or to discharge unionized employees were still at the stage of mere legislative proposals, the 
employer was deemed to have an ample right to freely choose her own collaborators.  
158 Ferron attributes the first to Charmont and Capitant and the second to numerous judicial decisions. 
di Robilant ABUSE OF RIGHTS  76 of 99 
In a 1905 case dealing with a union’s boycott of an employer, the Cour de 
Cassation took a similar position, adopting a pro-labor decision while 
struggling to prevent further conceptual inroads, potentially corrosive of 
capital’s power159. The case involved an episode of boycott. Monsieur Dumont, 
who ran a printery in Limoges, refused to sign a clause that would subject to a 
mixed commission of employers and employees any future controversy between 
him and his employees concerning the tariffs negotiated with the union of the 
typographers. As a reaction to Dumont’s refusal, the union called a strike and 
published an announcement on several newspapers proscribing Dumont’s 
printery. The boycott protracted, fuelling incidents and Dumont sued the union 
for damages. The Tribunal of Limoges rejected Dumont’s claim for damages 
and the Court of Appeal confirmed the judgement. The Cour de Cassation 
confirmed the previous decisions and exempted the union from liability. At first 
glance a full blow struck to capital’s power, the decision is, in fact, highly 
ambiguous. In a succinct paragraph, the court skilfully restated the doctrine of 
abuse of rights to tame its corrosive potential and to prevent further conceptual 
inroads160.  The boycott, the court found, did not amount to an abuse of rights 
because it met a three-fold test. First, the boycott was exclusively motivated by 
the need to safeguard the worker’s professional interest, and hence free from 
any form of malice, violence or fraud; further, it was exclusively directed to the 
members of the union; finally, it had not inflicted any appreciable harm on the 
employer. As Marcel Planiol suggested in the Dalloz note: 
 
The decision should not be attributed a reach that, in fact, it does not have. It falls 
short of recognizing to the unions an absolute faculty to blacklist an employer 
without incurring in liability. While undeniably, in the decision at hand, the 
employer’s claim for damages is rejected, it is rejected for factual considerations; 
and if we examine the conditions and the restrictions to which the right to boycott 
is subjected, it appears that the union’s liability, excluded in this case, can be 
                                               
159 Cass, March 13, 1905, D. 1906.I.113 
160 Attendu qu’il est declarè, en fait, par l’arret attaqué et par le jugement dont la cour a adopté les motifs, que les 
affiches apposes, en mai 1900, par le syndicat des ouvriers typographes des Limoges et defendant aux members de 
la Federation Francaise du livre de travailler à l’imprimerie Dumont, n’avaient exercé aucune influence sur les 
ouvriers non syndiquées, auxquels, d’ailleurs, elles ne s’adressainet pas, et n’avaient cause au demandeur en 
cassation aucun prejudice appreciable;- Qu à cette constation, l’arret ajoute que l’interdiction don’t il s’agit, 
determine par le refus de Dumont d’accepter le tariff syndacal dans l’ensemble de ses dispositions, n’a point eté 
abusive, et n’a été accompagnée ni de menaces, ni de manoeuvres déloyales; - Attendu que une telle mesure, prise 
en dehors de toute pensée de malveillance et pour la seule défense des interests professionnels du syndicat……. 
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admitted in many other cases. 
 
The court slightly widened the notion of abuse of rights, including the 
hypothesis of mixed motives, only to preserve an ample scope for unions’ 
liability; if motivated by a combination of desire to further professional 
interests and malevolent intent to harm the union would incur in liability. 
Further, the court’s reference to the absence of damage, seems to imply that a 
boycott which is in fact harmful to the employer would be abusive. By requiring 
the absence of damage, the court emptied of any meaning and effectiveness the 
union’s exercise of its right. As with the Bordeaux decision, the court ended up 
delivering a pro-labor decision, but it was careful not to alter significantly the 
balance of power in industrial relations. 
 
The ambiguous potential of the doctrine of abuse of rights is even more 
evident in cases dealing with the right to strike. By affirming the workers’ 
right of coalition, the legislator had provided labor with a powerful tool in the 
increasingly heated social struggle. However, courts and commentators were 
quick to turn the doctrine into a device for curbing labor’s power. As any other 
right, the right to strike, Josserand suggested, is attributed for a specific 
purpose, that of furthering the workers’ professional interests; any exercise of 
the right that departs from this purpose amounts to an abuse161.  
 
A 1896 decision of the Cour de Cassation well illustrates this attitude162. 
The case involved an intra-labor conflict. Twelve workers of a boilermaking 
firm based in Nantes had threatened to strike in order to induce the employer 
to discharge their supervisor, Monsieur Monnier, because of his abusive and 
authoritarian behaviour. As a consequence of his supervisees’ threats to strike, 
Monsieur Monnier was discharged and, finding it hard to find a suitable and 
well paid job in Nantes, had to move to nearby Saint-Nazaire. Monnier’s claim 
                                               
161 LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE L’ABUS DES DROITS (1905) p. 27: comme tous les autres, le droit de gréve doit avoir été 
concédé dans un but déterminé; il doit etre pourvu d’une finalité, sinon, il faut le rayer de nos lois. Cette finalitéla 
jurisprudence et , plus spécialment la cour de cassation,  l’ont parfaitment dégagée: elle s’identifie avec l’intérest 
professionnels  des ouvriers ou des employés; c’est pour la sauvegarde de ces intérests que le droit de coalition 
leur a été accordé et c’est seulement s’ils le font servir ° cet usage qu’ils auront carte blanche et qu’ils pourront 
prétendre l’iimunité ° raion des faits de gréve. Sinon. Le droit ayant été devié de son but, devient, dans la mesure 
du préjudice causé par sa rèalisationn, générateur de responsabilite. 
162 Civ., June 9, 1896, D.P. 1896.I.582; S 1897.I.27. 
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for damages was rejected by the Tribunal of Nantes and, subsequently, by the 
Court of Appeal of Rennes. While the two lower courts found that the 
boilermakers had legitimately exercised their right to sell their labor, the Cour 
de Cassation took a different approach. The workers, the court found, had 
abused their right. Although the threats were neither violent nor fraudulent, 
they were inspired by mere malevolence rather than by the purpose of 
safeguarding the workers’ professional interests.   
 
Given that, after the abrogation of art 416 c.pén., threats to strike not accompanied 
by violence of fraud and addressed to an employer as part of an organized plan are 
legitimate if they serve the purpose of defending a professional interest;- Given, 
nevertheless, that such threats do not amount to a wrong commanding reparation 
when, inspired by a purely malevolent spirit, have as an effect that of imposing to 
the employer the discharge of an employee without any serious complaint 
justifying it… 
 
The court interpreted narrowly the workers’ goal and interests. Turning a blind 
eye to the fact that the latter’s action, being a reaction to Monnier’s abuses, did, 
in fact, reflect a professional interest to a peaceful and congenial work 
environment, the court detected spite and malice. 
 
A 1892 decision of the Court of Chambery regarding a similar case of 
intra-labor conflict evinces a analogous attempt to deploy a restrictive notion of 
“professional interest” to streamline unions’ power. Members of a union had 
threatened to call a strike if the employer did not discharge a worker, Mr Joost, 
who had withdrawn from the union. The court weighed the workers’ right to 
strike against the plaintiff’s “natural right to freely exercise his craft” and 
found that the workers had abused their right. The exercise of the workers’ 
right, the court held, served no professional interest, being exclusively driven 
by a malicious intent to harm. The court suggested that it is  functional to the 
pursuit of a “professional interest” any action concerning salaries, relations 
with the employer or work conditions. Omitting any mention of organized 
labor’s interest in consolidating its bargaining power by eliminating and 
containing scabs, the court reasoned that Mr Joost, far from being an 
exceptional and indispensable employee, was “un home indifferent en soi”, 
whose permanence or discharge would hardly have impacted salaries, work 
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conditions, or the workers’ bargaining power163. 
 
The decisions of the French courts aroused anxiety and concern among 
Italian commentators. Responding to an isolated voice who had praised the 
above mentioned decision of the Tribunal of Bordeaux, Mario Rotondi did not 
spare his transalpine colleagues blunt criticism164. Fortunately, Rotondi noted, 
since in Italy the “right to strike” is not explicitly sanctioned and, thereby, 
amounts to a mere “liberty”, no similar cases arise. Hopefully, he added, Italian 
courts, if confronted with similar cases, would be firm in upholding freedom of 
contract.  
 
 While in late nineteenth century Italy the significance of abuse of rights 
for labor cases was modest, the transition from strike as “crime” to strike as 
“liberty” to strike as “right” having been fully completed only with the 1948 
Constitution,165 nevertheless, reasonableness tests proved critical for limiting 
the scope of labor’s “liberty to strike”. The Sardinian-Italian criminal code, 
adopted after unification and in force until 1890, punished every combination 
of workmen which tended, without reasonable cause, to impede, suspend or 
raise the price of labor when the combination had commenced active 
operations166. As observers have noted, the Italian post-unitary judiciary, 
deeply “borghese” and hardly inclined to sympathize with the working classes, 
effectively emptied the “reasonable cause” clause of any meaning167.  
 
In 1882, in a rare pro-labor decision, the Corte di Cassazione of Palermo 
rejected the inferior court’s contention that a reasonable cause existed only 
when workers were reacting to the employer’s abusive attempt to reduce 
                                               
163 Civ. June 22 D.P. 1892.I.449; S 1893.I.41.  Attendu que les assignements du syndicat constituent à l’encontre 
de Joost une attenite a droit naturel qu’a tout l’homme d’exercer librement son industrie en se conformant aux 
lois; que sans doute les ouvriers syndiqués avaient de leur coté la droit de se mettre en grève, mais qu’il n’est 
permis à persone d’abuser de son droit; qu’il y a abus d’un droit toutes les fois que celui qui prétend l’exercer 
n’agit que dans le but de nuire à altrui, san aucun intéret pour lui-meme; que, dans l’espéce, Joost était, comme les 
intimés le reconnaissent dans leurs conclusions, “un homme indiffeérent en soi”; que son maintien dans l’usine, 
pas plus que son exclusion, ne pouvait avoirune influence quelconque sur la hausse ou la baisse de salaries, les 
rapports des ouvriers avec le patron, ni sur aucune des conditions de travail; 
164 MARIO ROTONDI, supra note 147 at 70-71 
165 Pietro Calamandrei, Significato costituzionale del diritto di sciopero, RGL 1952 I 221; GIOVANNI TARELLO, TEORIE E 
IDEOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO SINDACALE ITALIANO (1972) 
166 GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, supra note; 150  Francesco S. Nitti, supra note 150. 
167 GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, supra note 150. 
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salaries168. Rather, the court took a liberal approach, arguing that the 
existence of a reasonable cause is to be assessed in light of the special 
circumstances and the peculiar economic conditions of the individual case. 
However, decisions drawing a broad notion of reasonableness were scant. By 
and large courts limited workers’ “liberty to strike” either by narrowing the 
notion of “reasonable cause” or by referring “reasonableness” to the means 
relied upon by the workers rather than to the cause of the strike.  For instance, 
in a 1886 decision of the Corte di Cassazione of Torino, the scope of 
“reasonableness” was significantly narrowed. The local “workers’ society” had 
sought to negotiate with the employer an employment rotation scheme 
involving both employed members of the society and unemployed members. 
The court found that the employer’s refusal to accept the scheme did not 
constitute a “reasonable cause” for the strike which followed. Resuming the 
language of “liberty” and “individual will” the court argued that the scheme 
proposed by the union was an unreasonable violation of the employer’s freedom 
of contract169.  
 
Courts’ ambiguous use of abuse of rights in labor cases may be 
understood as partly driven by a larger ambivalent sentiment of “social 
solidarity” which became dominant in late nineteenth century France and 
Italy, translating in an outpouring of social legislation as well as in efforts at 
what is known as “avant-garde capitalism”170. While in 1905 the idea of a 
national obligation to “social solidarity” sparked vivid debate in the French 
legislature as well as in the public opinion, between the 1890s and the 1910s a 
considerable body of legislation designed the main lines of the welfare system. 
Similarly, in Italy, in less that a decade, an old age pension law, a law for 
compulsory insurance against accidents, a Factory Act, a Public Health Act, 
malaria legislation and a bill regulating labor contracts were passed. 
Capitalists also joined in this policy of solidarity. Rugged individualism seemed 
passé, the labor precepts of conventional conservative capitalism amoral, and 
experiments at a new variant of “avant-garde capitalism” flourished171. Major 
private enterprises in the French industrial firmament launched a 
                                               
168 Cass Palermo, May 22, 1882, in 16 RIVISTA PENALE 509 (1882). 
169 Cass Torino, March 18, 1886, in  24 RIVISTA PENALE 50 (1886). 
170 J-J. Ermenc, Avant-Garde Capitalism in France, 31 THE FRENCH REVIEW 129 (1957). 
171 Id.,  More recently see: JANET R. HORNE, A SOCIAL LABORATORY FOR MODERN FRANCE (2002). 
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comprehensive strategy of social cushioning, running the gamut from citès 
ouvrières, to health, welfare and education plans. While the influence of men 
such as Sismondi, Fourier, Proudhon and Louis Blanc, increased the sensitivity 
of the reflective capitalists to the appalling social conditions engendered by 
industrialization, observers warn, the persistence of avant-garde capitalism 
required more than humanitarian impulses. Concern with higher productivity 
and financial profits was critical. At a moment when France’s anomalous 
economic development172 was finally gaining speed and the size of production 
units was expanding, a satisfied, willing and educated workforce was crucial 
for the functioning of the industrial system.  Abuse of rights was private 
lawyers ’ and judges’ contribution to this wider solidaristic strategy. It allowed 
them to endorse and circumscribe labor’s claims, safely balancing the latter’s 
demand for more fair and just conditions and capital’s managerial freedom and 
control.  
 
 
IV. THE JURISTS  BATTLE OVER ABUSE OF RIGHTS 
 
If abuse of rights’ actual impact hardly explains the rage of the storm it 
originated, what was it that roused jurists’ fervor? A plunge in the heart of the 
controversy suggests that abuse of rights was the site where crucial 
methodological, professional and political battles were fought. Duelling tightly, 
at times with striking exhibitions of rhetorical bravura, French and Italian 
jurists debated over a number of critical questions. Through abuse of rights the 
powerful professional guild of the civilistes or civilisti sought to defend the 
citadel of its legal science, besieged by new legal disciplines; they contended 
over the shaping of coherent and antithetical cultural identities; they furthered 
opposite visions of the modern socio-economic order; they advanced different 
conceptions of the nature of law and the boundaries between normative 
systems; finally, they endorsed conflicting ideas as to the goals and the method 
of legal science.  
 
                                               
172 The debate over the retard of French economic growth is wide; for the classical retardationist view, see DAVID 
S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS (1969); for the revisionist view see Rondo Cameron and Charles E. 
Freedman, French Economic Growth, 7 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY 3 (1983). 
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A.  The Professional Battle: The Civilistes  Resistance to the Disintegration of Private Law 
 
The battle over abuse of rights was, in the first place, a professional 
battle over the scope of private law and its role in modern society. 
Industrialization, technological developments and increasing social 
interdependence had rendered “Roman-Bourgeois private law” obsolete and 
inadequate. The conceptual unity of the system was under attack173. New legal 
fields such as zoning law, labor law, welfare law, were being carved out of 
private law. The proliferation of these new fields threatened the professional 
power of private lawyers. It entailed the formation of new disciplinary tools 
and vocabularies, saluted as innovative and more responsive to rapid socio-
economic change, as well as the consolidation of new academic power-groups 
challenging the long unrivalled primacy of the civilistes. 
 
Not only were the latter loosing to new academic potentates, they were 
also loosing to the legislator. Their traditional role as interpreters and 
“administrators” of the Civil Code was at risk as the centrality of the latter was 
displaced by a burgeoning body of “special legislation”. Abuse of rights was part 
of private lawyers’ defense strategy. Heralded as a product of the most refined 
European private law science, rooted in Roman sources and in the elaborations 
of the Commentators and the Humanists, abuse of rights had the merit of 
being a private category susceptible of application to a variety of legal 
questions raised by the new socio-economic conditions, questions that would 
have otherwise fallen in the domain of the new disciplines174. Progressive 
civilistes envisaged it as a critical tool for negotiating the new terms of liberty 
in modern industrial society without yielding to legislative intervention and 
the new legal disciplines. More specifically, abuse of rights was one of the 
means through which progressive private lawyers sought to offer tools and 
guidance to new disciplines, preserving their role as custodians of “the legal 
science”. Labor law, zoning law, welfare law were to develop under the aegis of 
the civilistes’ science rather than in antagonism to it175. 
                                               
173 FRANZ WIAECKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE (WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY) 
(1995). 
174 Mario Rotondi’s traces a  long genealogy of abuse of right running from Cino da Pistoia through Baldo degli 
Ubaldi to Alessandro Tartagno and Alciato; see MARIO ROTONDI, supra note at 104 ff. 
175 Giovanni Cazzetta, Leggi sociali, cultura giuridica ed origini della scienza giuslavoristica  in Italia tra Otto e Novecento, XVII 
QUADERNI FIORENTINI, 156 (1980) 
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Not only was abuse of rights critical to the civilistes’ struggle against the 
disintegration and the de-centering of their science, it was also the site where a 
methodological conflict between the civilistes themselves took place. The 
conflict between the devotees of formalism, committed to deductive reasoning 
and abstract conceptual architectures, and the champions of a sociological 
approach privileging the study of law in its relation to social change. Again, the 
methodological rift had implications for the fragile equilibria of professional 
power. The proponents of the new sociological approach, who were scientifically 
dominant but temporally subordinate, challenged the very criteria sanctioning 
the power of the old formalistic guard176.  
 
The formalists rejected the doctrine of abuse of rights, disputing its 
conceptual soundness. The notion of abuse of rights, they claimed, does not 
pertain to the domain of the legal; it is a social phenomenon hardly 
translatable in a legal concept.  As a legal concept, abuse of rights is a 
contradiction in terms, laying on a structural contradiction between right and 
abuse. Planiol was the most vocal expounder of the formalist critique: 
 
The formula abuse of rights is a logomachy, since if I use my own right, my act is 
licit and when it is illicit it is because I have exceeded my right and acted sine jus, 
iniuria as the Lex Aquilia says. To reject the category abuse of rights is not to try 
to hold licit the various damaging activities repressed by our courts. It is only to 
note that an abusive act to the extent that it is illicit is not the exercise of a right 
and that abuse of rights is not a category distinct from “illicit act”. In other words,  
the right ends where the abuse begins177. 
 
Planiol’s idea of a logomachy became the adagio restlessly repeated by 
the formalists178. However, faced with a subtle conceptual problem requiring a 
re-designing of the traditional categories and a modification of the conceptual 
architecture of civil liability, even jurists who were timidly sympathetic to the 
concept of abuse of rights defensively retreated. Rotondi’s metaphor of the 
alpinist marvelously captures their sense of fear and impotence: 
                                               
176 See GUIDO ALPA, LA CULTURA DELLE REGOLE (1999) PAOLO GROSSI, SCIENZA GIURIDICA ITALIANA (2000); 
CHRISTOPHE JAMIN, LA DOCTRINE (2003). 
177 MARCEL PLANIOL, supra note 8.  
178 In Italy, both Rotondi and Brunetti parrot Planiol: GIOVANNI BRUNETTI, IL DELITTO CIVILE (1906) at 173-
176; MARIO ROTONDI, supra note at 18 
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Our position in wandering through such disparate fields resembles that of an 
alpinist who, after long roaming through mountain valleys, finds himself not  at 
the summit, but in front of a steep slope and looses the hope of conquering the 
summit. Showing at which conclusions any theory of abuse of right fatally leads 
may inspire prudence in embarking in dangerous paths. 
 
A prudent alpinist, Rotondi called for a mitigation of the absolutist notion of 
rights, but ended up retreating within the safe boundaries of formalistic legal 
science. 
 
Conversely, proponents of the sociological approach saw abuse of rights, 
as an organic emanation of social facts and needs and a crucial conceptual 
category. The extraordinary development of the social sciences, they suggested, 
should make jurists and judges aware of their role, i.e. governing and directing 
socio-economic evolution. In his monographic study of abuse of rights, Tedeschi 
urged his colleagues to disregard the dictates of abstract logic, facing the 
challenges posed by real life: 
 
Often, out of respect for traditional and widely recognized principles, theories that 
manifestly clash with the real necessity of things are still payed tribute; out of love 
for symmetry and abstract logic the real moral, psychological ed economic forces 
that govern the world are replaced with juridical categories. 
 
 
B.  Roman v. Medieval: Different Images of the Roman in Service of Legal/Cultural Identity 
 
Abuse of rights also raised crucial identity questions. It involved 
contradictory re-constructions of the Roman past as well as the creation of 
neatly differentiated legal/cultural identities. The Roman legacy was central to 
the civilian identity, differentiating it from the Anglo-American. Both the 
critics and the advocates of abuse of rights cherished and claimed for 
themselves the Roman legacy juxtaposing it to the “medieval” which they 
coloured with a pejorative connotation.  
 
The former envisaged abuse of rights, in the form of aemulatio, as a 
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medieval creation, alien to Roman law179. In their characterization, “Roman” 
stands, to a large extent, for Roman/Classical and equates absolutism and 
individualism. They claimed that the medieval meaning of the word aemulatio, 
i.e. acts lacking any utility and exclusively inspired by a malicious intent, 
hardly approximates any of the meanings the word had in classical Latin180. 
Further, the critics of abuse of rights interpreted restrictively the Roman 
sources offered by their adversaries as evidence of the existence of the doctrine 
in Roman law. These texts, they argued, were either too broad and, therefore, 
merely declamatory, or they bore no relation to the topic of aemulatio, or they 
concerned public law and were hardly extensible to private law181. Although 
conceding that the individualistic Roman/Classical law was partially modified 
in Justinian’s time, the critics of abuse of rights regarded the doctrine as a 
medieval coinage. The prohibition of aemualtio, they noted, was masterfully 
introduced by the Commentators as a response to new Christian ethic and to 
the unexpected legal questions posed by the development of urban life. In their 
assessment, abuse of rights was plagued with all the defects typically 
associated, in the Enlightenment literature, with things medieval: excessive 
complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability182.  
                                               
179 Vittorio Scialoja notes with irony and contempt: “questa in breve è la teoria dell’emulazione segnata in ogni sua 
parte dallo stampo medievale e che tuttavia volea derivarsi dal diritto romano.” See the note to Cassazione 
Firenze 1877, supra note at 486. 
180 See Vittrio Scialoja, supra note at 426: “Cicero in the Tusculane: lib IV cap. 8 § 17 aemulatio autem dupliciter illa 
quidam dicitur ut et in laude et in vitio nome hoc sit. Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur….et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo, 
quod concupierit, alius potiatur, ipse careat. He adds: ma il senso che fu dato a questa voce  dai giuristi medievali e che 
nel linguaggio giuridico essa conserva tuttora, non corrisponde esattamente ad alcuno di quelli dichiarati dal latino 
classico, sebbene si avvicini al secondo”.  
181 Id., “fr. 3 de oper. Publ. 50, 10 opus novum privato etiam sine principis auctoritate facere licet, praeterquam si ad 
aemulationem alterius civitatis pertineat vel mateiram seditionis praebeat vel circum theatrum vel amphitheatrum esso riguarda 
il diritto pubblico ed è motivato dalla ragion politica della tranquillità dello stato. Da esso si poteva bensì derivare 
l’inibizione di elevare fortezze e castelli ma non se ne doveva mai estendere l’applicazione al campo del diritto 
privato.  Fr. 38 de rei vindicatione 6, 1 Celso scriveva: ….constituimus vero, ut, si paratus est dominus tantum dare, 
quantum habiturus est possessor his rebus ablatis, fiat ei potestas: neque malitiis indulgendum est, si tectorium, puta quod induxeris, 
picturasuqe corrodere velis, nihil laturus nisi ut officias; il testo perciò non ha a che fare con l’emaulazione, come si intese 
dipoi, e la massima malittis non est indulgendum va accettata nei limiti posti dal testo medesimo, cioè nel caso di 
conflitto di diritti, dei quali l’uno abbia il suo fondamento nell’utilità di colui al quale è concesso contro l’altro.  
Gaio, Ist libro I § 53: male enim nostro iure uti non debemus; qua ratione et prodigis interdicitur bonorum quorum aministratio. 
Tutti color che hanno qualche pratica con gli scritti dei giureconsulti romani sanno che bisogna guradarsi 
dall’accettare le definizioni e le massime generali da essi formulate, le quali sono per lo più troppo estese e quindi 
false”. 
182 Abuse of rights was seen an excessively complex rule (an exception to the general rule, the right of the 
property holder is absolute, harboring  in itself a further long list  of exceptions to its fundamental postulate: the 
intention to harm cannot  be presumed, the burden of proof  is on the plaintiff), allowing a broad and arbitrary 
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Conversely, the champions of abuse of rights claimed for the doctrine a 
Roman lineage183. However, the “Roman” they invoked hardly resembled that 
of their adversaries. They constructed an alternative Roman archetype, 
downplaying the individualist and egoistic traits of Roman law and 
emphasizing its social and equitative aspects. The Roman texts interpreted 
restrictively by their adversaries were subject to extensive analogical readings. 
Further, the advocates of abuse of rights viewed the emergence of the theory of 
aemulatio as part of a broader shift towards a social and equitative law. 
Aemulatio, along with the wealth of equitative devices designed by praetorian 
law, the extra-ordinem procedure and the bona fides typical of the ius gentium, 
mitigated the rigor of the ius civile184.  
 
Reframed in social terms, the Roman archetype provided the champions 
of abuse of rights with a crucial tool for shaping a coherent civilian, or “Roman-
Germanic”, identity and for differentiating it from the Anglo-Saxon. The 
alleged absence of the doctrine in the common law bolstered bold claims as to 
the respective nature of the two “races”, the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon. 
Josserand and his followers were eager to vindicate altruism and equity as the 
defining features of the “Latin race” as opposed to the individualist and 
absolutist nature of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.  
 
The legal world is crossed by a twofold current: the individualist current and the 
                                                                                                                                               
equitative judgment by the courts; see cardinal DE LUCA, IL DOTTOR VOLGARE (1673) LUDOVICO MURATORI 
DEI DIFETTI DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA, (1742); Vittorio Scialoja, with obvious critical and ironic intent, reports 
the doctrine as it appeared from the medieval and subsequent texts: “l’emualzione si divide in buona e cattiva; la 
prima è una virtù, la seconda è un vizio. In quest’ultima peraltro si deve distinguere l’aemulation putative licita, 
cioè quella per cui si nuoce ad altri col fine di giovare a se stesso e l’aemualtio vera illicita per cui si nuoce animo 
nocendi. L’emulazione non si presume; deve provarsi da chi l’allega ma se circostanze particolari favoriscano la 
congettura dello spirito di emulazione si fa eccezione alla regola. Le principali di queste circostanze sono: ….” and 
then he lists 14 circumstances, among which “quando il vicino abbia una bella moglie o belle ragazze perché si 
suppone l’opera sia fatta pel fine disonesto di vederle e trattenersi con loro;  quando si alzi l’edificio o si apra la 
finestra in modo da vedere i segreti dei vicini o da gettare lo sguardo indiscreto nell’abitazione o nell’orto di 
monache e frati”. 
183 See Louis Josserand supra note at 355: responding to Ripert he notes: “dans cette direction, on va jusqu’à 
présenter la thése de l’abus comme un poison nevu d’Asie, par le canal de la République des Soviets, oubliant que 
ce prétendu virus a une origine romaine”.  
184 See MARIO ROTONDI supra note at 75 offering an estensive reading of the same passages discussed by Scialoja. 
See also Loius Josserand supra note at 314: “de meme que le préteur romain avait fait sortir du vieux droit civil 
tout un droit noveau, plus humain et plus souple, ainsi nos tribunaux et nos auterus s’effrocent  de dégager de 
notre codification immobile”. 
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social current. The individualist current, which deserves the epithet of absolutist, 
is the on e which characterizes the Anglo-Saxon race.  Profoundly individualist the 
Anglo Saxons are in their institutions, in their philosophy, in their behavior. If 
their most outstanding philosophers praise with pleasure the inexorable laws 
governing the struggle for life and natural selection, their jurists, in nice 
symmetry,  hold a rigorous and merciless conception of law;  most of all they want 
legal weapons, means of action. In fact, for them, acting is everything; the only 
individuals who count in their eyes are those who act. The task of the legislator is 
not that of securing the reign of distributive justice but that of allowing citizens to 
fully develop their faculties. This is the purpose for which they attribute rights, 
prerogatives that can be exercised to pursue any goal, weapons that can be used 
any direction to satisfy any interest, passion or caprice. This is the theory of 
splendid isolation transposed from the nation to the individuals who invoke, for 
their rights and vis à vis the equal rights of others, the application of  the doctrine 
of Monroe185. 
 
To the contrary, the “Latin race” and its Germanic progeny, altruistic 
and benevolent by nature, set out along a progressive evolutionary path 
leading to a social law and a conception of right as instruments of social 
harmony. This conception, of which abuse of rights is the quintessential 
manifestation, originated in the law of the Roman Republic and of the Empire 
and found fertile breeding ground in the Germanic countries, fully blossoming 
in the German BGB186.  
 
                                               
185 See LOIUS JOSSERAND, DE L’ABUS DE DROIT, supra note at 7, 8. Josserand’s rage seems irrepressible and does 
not spare Frederick Pollock: “The applications of this point of view are innumerable; English and American 
jurists apply it unpityingly and even with pride, and especially Frederick Pollock, justly of the most well-known 
jurists. In his outstanding work on tort law “The Law of Torts” this author shows with a wealth of examples 
taken from everyday life, this principle cherished by his compatriots, i.e. the immunity in the exercise of common 
rights”. 
186 In the mind of the participants in the debate the problem of abuse of rights was inextricably linked to the 
question of legal/cultural identity. If Josserand viewed the doctrine as a critical element differentiating Roman-
Germanic legal systems from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Italian jurists seemed eager to mark the originality of 
their legal culture vis à vis the French by claiming paternity over abuse of rights. Avvocato Sebastiano Gianzana in 
a well known work on water rights published in 1879 presented  aemulatio, as a distinctively Italian doctrine and 
was eager to prove that its existence antedated the French influence by emphasizing its significance in  pre-
unification legal systems. “And this (aemulatio), which was really an Italian doctrine, didn’t fail to pass into our 
legislative systems: relying on the authority of Tesauro as well as of the Sardinian Royal Constitutions, we have 
already mentioned, a propos of the appropriation of superfluous waters, that in Piedmont, until the 1500s, a 
special magistrato delle aque was called to determine whether there were superfluous waters and to redistribute 
them fairly among those who were in need.  Also, a splendid embodiment of this theory was the diritto di 
insistenza (???), long recognized by Piedmontese courts, as Richieri attests, which the courts, in the interest of 
collective prosperity, turned into a weapon for the weak, bridling the powerful owners of irrigation canals”. 
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But in Rome the rigor of this system did not last long; the citizens of the Republic 
and of the Empire shaped a conception of rights more in line with the spirit of the 
Latin race, so sensitive and so inclined to altruistic sentiments: this conception is 
precisely that of abuse of rights. […] But it is not in Rome or among the Latin 
people that this conception was fully systematized: the German countries were to 
be the fertile breeding ground for this full blooming. [in the German texts and 
contrary to Anglo-Saxon law] rights are no longer individual prerogatives that each 
individual exercises in her own manner; they are social concepts that are to be 
exercised socially, in a certain way, according to a certain spirit; they are 
instruments of peace and, under any circumstance or pretext, can they be turned 
into war machines; they have to accomplish their destiny rather than rebel against 
it. 
 
C.  Law v. Morals: The Debate on Positivism and Natural Law 
 
Further, the debate over abuse of rights became the site for formidable 
attacks to nineteenth century legal positivism and hints at a “new naturalism”. 
The doctrine of abuse of rights, critics claimed, rests on a dangerous confusion 
between two neatly demarcated domains: law and morals. The two systems of 
norms differ as to their ontological nature, reach and purpose. In his lengthy 
study “Il Delitto Civile”, Giovanni Brunetti provided the standard formulation 
of the argument: 
 
The violation of moral norm characterizes, by and large, the factual patterns that 
are usually qualified as abuse of rights. However, as we have demonstrated with 
multiple arguments and from different perspectives, a fact cannot be declared 
illegal, even if it results in damage, for the only reason that it offends morality. 
Admitting that the objective limits of rights are to be found in moral norms, rather 
than exclusively in legal norms, would mean that not only legal norms but also 
moral norms provide a legal definition of human actions would therefore entail a 
confusion between law and morals187. 
 
In a similar vein, though with sharper critical verve, Vittorio Scialoja 
acknowledged the need for equitative temperaments but claimed that abuse of 
rights is the expression of a sentimental and bizarre aequitas  cerebrina rather 
than of juridical equity: 
 
But here they [the proponents of abuse of rights] say that equity calls for a 
                                               
187 GIOVANNI BRUNETTI supra note at 187 
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temperament of the rigor of law and that you cannot speak of law when a right is 
exercised with the intent to harm. First of all, what is equity? The word has 
multiple meanings: the ancient world distinguished between naturalis aequitas, 
civilis aequitas, aequitas canonica, aequitas scripta and aequitas non scripta and a 
form of equity they nicely called cerebrina, that is bizarre and wild, an equity that 
everyone measures differently and that, lacking any rationality, is to be rejected. 
Unfortunately aequitas cerebrina left deep traces and plays no little role in the 
question of aemulatio188. 
 
The critics of abuse of rights were profuse in emphasizing the dangers of 
a confusion between law and morals. Some expressed deep concern regarding 
judges’ ability to fulfill the daunting task of penetrating individual consciences. 
Subtle technicians, judges are ill equipped to penetrate the complexities of 
human psychology189. Others noted with alarm the risk of a despotic drift. In a 
widely quoted passage, Adhemar Esmein noted that by substituting the notion 
of moral fault for that of legal fault, the theory of abuse of rights, turns the 
judge into a censor, opening the way for dangerous attacks to individual liberty 
and the rule of law190.   
 
Those who favoured abuse of rights devoted rivers of ink to refute the 
law v. morals argument. Their response entailed a twofold claim: a descriptive 
assertion and a normative postulation. Descriptively, they denounced the idea 
of a neat separation between the two domains as a chimera191 and an outdated  
legacy of the Natural Law school that triggered the shift from one excess to the 
other: from the lack of boundaries between law and morals typical of the 
Middle Ages to the rigid separation of the revolutionary era192. Philosophers, 
moralists and jurists have racked their brains trying to draw coherent criteria 
for distinguishing between the realm of law and that of moral, but their efforts 
are doomed to failure. The boundaries between law and moral are highly 
                                               
188 Vittorio Scialoja, note to Cassazione Firenze, supra note at 490 
189 M. Marc Desserteaux, Abus de droit ou conflit de droits, REV. TRIMESTRIELLE 121 (1906). See also LOUIS 
JOSSERAND supra note at 351 responding to Saleilles’s critique that an inquiry into the subjective intent is both a) 
dangerous b) not useful 
190 Adhemar Esmein, S. 1898. I . 17 
191 LOIUS JOSSERAND, supra note at 348: nous répondrons qu’à notre sentiment ces frontiéres n’ont jamais esisté 
que dans l’imagination des juristes, ou de bon nombre d’entre eux du moins: toujours elles furent inceratines et 
chimerique”. 
192 MARIO ROTONDI supra note at 183. 
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flexible and constantly shifting. The two domains are interconnected, legal 
norms and moral norms springing from the same breeding ground, the common 
conscience of the people193. In Josserand’s words, “law and morals are one and 
the same thing, the latter being social moral, moral in action”; moral, he added, 
is the crucible where law is elaborated”. From a normative point of view, the 
advocates of abuse of rights claimed that law and morals ought to be 
intertwined. The degree of mutual communication between the two domains, 
Rotondi argued, echoing Josserand, is an indicator of social and legal progress. 
A legal system divorced from ethical considerations is repugnant and odious to 
the collective sensitivity of modern societies194.  
 
The contending parts envisaged the question of defining what is law and 
what is not law as a critical one. To the champions of abuse of rights the old 
positivistic paradigm seemed no longer able to mediate and disguise its 
inherent contradictions. The tension between the premise of the ultimate 
existence of a natural and inherently rational law and the claim that positive 
law is the translation of this natural rational law in positive rules appeared no 
longer containable, if not at the price of blatant contradiction. The French Ecole 
de l’Exegese and its Italian followers had obliterated the naturalistic premise to 
fully realize its corollaries: codification, the rule of law and the judge as the 
bouche de la loi195. 
 
A plausible mediation for the old guard of formalists, this mediation was 
unsatisfactory for the new generation of social jurists who were fighting the 
battle for abuse of rights. The latter propounded a new naturalism196 which 
was a blend of philosophical positivism, historicism and natural law. 
Familiarity with the teachings of the Historical School and the enthusiastic 
acceptance of postulates of positivistic philosophy led them to foreground law’s 
                                               
193  GIOVANNI TEDESCHI, L’ABUSO DEL DIRITTO, (1908) at 92; Louis Josserand  supra note at 348. 
194 MARIO ROTONDI supra note at 83; LOUIS JOSSERAND, supra note at 349 alluding to Italian legal philosopher 
Giorgio Del Vecchio and the resurgent tradition of natural law, claimed that “In fact, law is deeply imbued in 
moral, it is, as he [Del Vecchio] rightly said, “le profit social de l’éthique” and luckily so, otherwise it would 
become simply odious and insensate”. 
195 See Mario A. Cattaneo, entry “Positivismo giuridico”, NOVISSIMO DIGESTO, vol. defining this “Illuminismo 
giuridico decapitato” (Legal Enlightnement beheaded). 
196 See Giovanni Marino, Positivismo e Giurisprudenza. Biagio Brugi alla Congiunzione di Scuola Storica e 
Filosofia Positiva (1986) p. 28 ff. 
di Robilant ABUSE OF RIGHTS  91 of 99 
historical and social substratum and its restless evolution. Commitment to a 
rejuvenated brand of natural law inspired their belief in the moral perfecting of 
law. Rejecting any positivistic deference to the command of the legislator, the 
advocates of abuse of rights envisaged law as social product constantly 
responding to new felt needs and evolving towards moral perfection197. The new 
paradigm, however, did not escape contradiction. The old tension between the 
natural law foundations of the legal order and legal positivism reappeared as 
the tension between the perfection of natural law and the positive materiality 
of legal/social facts198.  
 
D.  Individualism v. Solidarism: Different Visions of the Social Order 
 
However, in the skirmish over abuse of rights, the highest peak of 
tension was reached when the two factions contended over opposite visions of 
the social order. The question of abuse of rights was critical to the debate over 
individualism and solidarism, urging jurists of various tendencies to confront 
it. The respective alignment and positioning in the debate is revealing. While 
the old guard of the classical individualist school rejected the concept, the 
“legal socialism” movement showed skepticism and little interest199. In France, 
Josserand’s theory, regarded as a radical manifestation of socialism by Ripert, 
was dismissed as neither useful nor original by a foremost spokesman of legal 
socialism, Emmanuel Lévy. Leon Duguit’s neglect of abuse of rights, on the 
                                               
197 See BIAGIO BRUGI, LA PROPRIETÀ (1911), at 95; Id., L’abuso del diritto come concetto giurisprudenziale in Rendiconto 
ACCADEMIA LINCEI XXIII (1914) AT 37 FF.  
198 So evident, for example in GIOVANNI NOTO SARDEGNA, L’ABUSO DEL DIRITTO (1909). Noto Sardegna 
invokes “gli immutabili principi della legge morale svelati alla coscienza per mezzo della ragione divina scintilla 
che lo illumine costantemente, dote sublime che costituisce l’eccellenza e la superiorità della sua natura”, but then 
he emphisizes time and again the need to take into account the material positivity of human needs and the 
struggle for life. 
199 See EMMANUEL LEVY, LA VISION SOCIALISTE DU DROIT (1926); for Levy abuse of rights is artificial, 
contradictory and superfluous; he sees no need for a separate conceptual category, abuse of rights falls whithin a 
broader rule of civil liability:; p. 48 pour éhcapper à cette contradiction pratique, on a construit la théorie 
artificielle  et théoriquement contradictoire de l’abus de droit; nous serions responsables, en principe, quand nous 
agissons sans droit, et, par exception, quand nous exercons abusivement notre droit. Or cette exception, c’est la 
régle meme: nuos sommes obliges parce que nous exercons notre droit contre le droit d’autrui; alors seulment il 
peut etre question de résoudre le conflit entre notre liberté et la liberté d’autrui. In Italy see: CESARE NANI, IL 
SOCIALISMO NEL CODICE CIVILE (1892); GIOVANNI VADALÀ PAPALE, CODICE PRIVATO SOCIALE (1893); 
GIOVANNI SALVIOLI, I DIFETTI SOCIALI DELLE LEGGI VIGENTI DI FRONTE AL PROLETARIATO ED IL DIRITTO 
NUOVO (1906); GIOELE SOLARI, SOCIALISMO E DIRITTO PRIVATO. INFLUENZA DELLE DOTTRINE SOCIALISTE SUL 
DIRITTO PRIVATO (1906); EMANUELE GIANTURCO, L’INDIVIDUALISMO ED IL SOCIALISMO NEL DIRITTO 
CONTRATTUALE (1891). 
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other hand, was a corollary of his rejection of the very notion of subjective 
rights as a metaphysical, or better theological, concept200. Similarly, in Italy, 
the most prominent socialists, Cimbali, Salvioli and Vadalà Papale, barely 
mentioned abuse of rights. Significantly, the champions of abuse of rights were, 
by and large, either the proponents of a blander solidarism or the vanguard of 
the classical school, eager to strengthen the individualist system of private law 
by tempering its most blatant asperities.  
 
The critics of abuse of rights envisaged society as the sum of independent 
spheres of action; they advanced an absolutist notion of rights and they 
cherished individual freedom as the highest moral principle. Tirelessly 
invoked, the geometrical metaphor of the spheres well exemplified their vision 
of society. Individual freedom of action is the central pillar of society’s 
legal/political structure. Individuals are endowed with rights that are ample 
and absolute within their sphere; the legislator is called to police the 
boundaries of the respective spheres of freedom, securing their harmonic 
coexistence. Any act that remains within the perimeter of the individual’s 
sphere is not an abuse. Scialoja’s formulation of the geometric metaphor is 
wonderful in its complexity: 
 
In fact, law in an objective sense, traces the limits of the single individual liberties: 
but as we said above, these limits are traced according to necessity. The single 
liberties resemble polyhedra that touch each other in every point of their 
periphery, so that you cannot exit from one without invading the other; but, 
conversely, as far as you don’t invade an another’s, you don’t exit your own. Hence 
as long as there is not legal invasion of another’s right, either of single individuals 
or of society, nobody can be said to have transgressed the limits of her right. 
 
The critics condemned the doctrine of abuse of rights as an inadmissible 
interference with this harmonious coexistence of separate spheres as well as a 
dangerous attack to the highest moral principle, i.e. individual liberty. Again, 
Scialoja’s words are crisp and clear: 
 
And note how this liberty [individual liberty] is a warranty of morality itself, a 
liberty that looses its real nature when it subject to external coercion […] The 
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social interest that law pursues by allowing the owner to act, even if animated by 
wrong purposes, is that of liberty. The inquisition about the owner’s intent destroys 
liberty, while law cherishes this liberty and hence impedes this inquisition. 
 
In more dramatic tones, others saw abuse of rights as an aberration and 
the master-way to socialism. Georges Ripert’s review of Josserand’s recently 
published “De l’esprit de droits ed de leur relativité” waged a bold attack to the 
social school based in Lyon by evoking the specter of “Soviet materialism”. 
Reporting Josserand’s words of praise for the doctrine of abuse of rights as 
formulated in the Sovietic Code, Ripert noted: 
 
The University of Lyon seems to have an inclination towards the Code Civil of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Its Institut de Droit Comparé has provided a translation 
presented by Mr. Lambert as a magic mirror refracting the guiding principles of a 
new legal regime. Mr Josserand, in turn, seems to look at law through this mirror. 
[….] This book [Josserand’s] which opens with an invocation of the principles of 
eternal justice against these of strict law, that in certain pages seems to be written 
by a whole-hearted idealist, ends, in a peculiar contradiction, by taking as a model 
the code of a purely materialist society lost in the absurd dream of entirely rational 
economy201. 
 
  Conversely, although with different nuances and in varying degree, the 
champions of abuse of rights advanced a relativistic conception of rights and a 
notion of “social freedom”. They deemed their opponents’ image of an 
harmonious coexistence of absolute spheres of  freedom artificial and their 
absolutist view of rights dangerous. Referring to the geometrical image of 
individual liberties as neighboring polyhedra, Rotondi suggested that: 
 
What appears so clear in theory turns out to be problematic in practice, since 
human activity is so intense and restless, multifarious and mutable that law 
inevitably fails to foresee all its manifestations, so that the perimeters [delimiting 
the spheres of liberty], far from being determined with mathematical precision fade 
in a grey zone, in a hinterland that separates the two legal spheres in a way that 
the right and the wrong, as Manzoni would say, or better, the right of the one and 
the right of the other cannot be separated with a neat cut. 
 
 “Subjective rights” seemed to Josserand and his Italian followers “powerful 
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war-machines susceptible of being deployed against society at large or against 
single individuals” and hence a conceptual category at variance with the laws 
of solidarity governing a highly interdependent society. Modern industrial 
society, the advocates of abuse of rights claimed, mandates a different notion of 
freedom and a relativistic conception of rights. Rights are a guarantee of 
freedom but this freedom, far from being an abstract, egoistic and anti-social 
liberty, is a “social freedom”, embodying a higher ideal of solidarity and justice. 
As instruments of social freedom rights are relative rather than absolute. The 
freedom of the right holder encounters a limit in the content or social function 
of the right itself; rights are to be exercised in accord to their social function 
rather than for the pursuit of whatever individual goal or interest. 
 
[…] and the relativity of rights has long been postulate because of their origin: 
social products, rights are to serve a social purpose. Whatever idea one has 
regarding the origins of law and even if one acknowledges the existence of some 
sort of natural law, prior and superior to positive law, one has to admit that our 
individual prerogatives  presuppose the consent of the social community, whether 
emanating expressly from the public powers or coming directly from the collective 
consciousness […] In any way, individual prerogatives, even the most egoistic, are 
social products in form and in substance; it would be unconceivable that they could 
be exercised at the right holder’s convenience, diverted from their original purpose 
and employed for any goal; it would be at contrary to their origin as well as to the 
most urgent need of the social community which confers them. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The story of abuse of rights in the United States and in continental 
Europe, I noted earlier, speaks to contemporary private lawyers called to re-
think the nature and role of private law in the era of post-national sovereignty 
and the crisis of social democracy. Comparative law’s potential as a tool for 
large-scale legal reform has been the object of dispute in recent decades. Some 
have argued that comparative law may have a constraining effect, reinforcing 
legal professionals’ “fetishism of the actual”. The existing variations among the 
legal institutions of Western capitalist democracies, they suggest, represent 
only a subset of a larger inventory of unrealized possibilities202. Others have 
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envisioned comparative legal analysis as a trigger for institutional 
imagination, providing radical reformers with a repertoire of alternative 
legal/institutional arrangements that have proven effective under real life 
conditions203. This article suggests that comparative law may help fostering 
private layers’ imagination by casting light on the potentialities and limits of 
the revival of abuse of rights as a tool for redressing distributive inequalities.  
 
Contemporary private lawyers face challenges which resemble the ones 
encountered by European and American jurists at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. Social democracy in its two Western manifestations, the New Deal 
regulatory state and the celebrated “European Social Model” have long been in 
crisis204. Although more a normative vision than a consolidated reality, the 
European Social Model has evolved in the post-war era as a unique 
combination of social and economic policies furthering security and promoting 
growth and productivity. These policies were encapsulated in the institutional 
arena of the nation-state205. However, world social and economic developments 
have disempowered member states, severely limiting the ability of European 
social capitalism to live up to its promises.  The monetary union has 
constrained member states’ leverage in formulating and implementing 
monetary and fiscal policies and, in turn, re-distributive programs. 
Liberalization and privatization policies have reduced the possibility of using 
public-sector industries as an employment buffer. Further, European 
competition policies have limited the possibility of resorting to state aids to a 
similar effect206. As the rise of modern industrial society called jurists to re-
think the terms of liberty, balancing economic freedom and social security, 
economic globalization and regional integration confront contemporary lawyers 
with the dramatic tension between market-making and market-correcting 
policies.  
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Faced with this tension, European private lawyers have shown novel 
interest for abuse of rights. Some believe that abuse of rights has a long history 
but little future. They contend that the need to prove the right holder’s 
intention is too onerous, that the doctrine is too rigid as a tool for balancing 
conflicting interests and that similar equitable results are best achieved 
through other means207. Others, retrieving the language of nineteenth century 
“social” jurists, invoke a coherent and social European private law, in which 
abuse of rights would play a novel role as a tool for achieving social values. For 
instance, they call for the revival of an objective notion of abuse of rights in 
European contract law. Contractual rights are seen as endorsing a variety of 
larger socio-economic interests and their exercise for a purpose contrary to 
such interests is deemed to be abusive208. Still others suggest departing from 
the vocabulary of the “social”, and even setting aside the very word “social”, 
loaded with implications and bent to serve hegemonic projects, to develop new 
legal/institutional answers. More specifically, they claim that abuse of rights, 
as other notions of nineteenth century “social” private law, is to be fully 
updated to the current vocabulary209. 
 
The comparative examination of American and European nineteenth 
century abuse of rights theories and cases, I believe, provides contemporary 
reformers with two cautionary tales. Progressives’ faith in abuse of rights as a 
tool for social justice in European private law may be misplaced: abuse of 
rights may fail to deliver what promises.  
 
First, it may fall short of rectifying the market-oriented language of 
European private law. In its nineteenth century life, abuse of rights hardly 
challenged the individualistic premises of modern private law, leaving largely 
intact the language of free will, individual autonomy and absolute property. 
Similarly, today, abuse of rights may delude those who advocate a new social 
lexicon for European private law. Abuse of rights, advocates of its revival hope, 
would encourage a new vocabulary of “shared fundamental values concerning 
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the social and economic relations between citizens”. It would challenge the idea 
of rights as freedoms that simply exist, drawing attention on the relativity of 
rights and on rights’ “purpose”. Further, it would privilege notions of “public 
interest” and duties of “solidarity”. Yet, abuse of rights may prove little more 
than an acoustic concession to a nineteenth century social vocabulary largely 
inadequate to make sense of the questions faced by contemporary private 
lawyers210. It may fail to address the complexity of class structure in a 
globalized socio-economic order where weaker strata are plural, layered and 
often engaged in a zero-sum competition. Further, abuse of rights may prove of 
limited impact because part of an emerging supra-national legal vocabulary 
which coexists with deeply-rooted national legal traditions where the doctrine 
has been framed and interpreted to very different effects. 
 
Second, abuse of rights may fail to deliver progressive distributive 
outcomes. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, American and 
European cases show, abuse of rights resulted in highly diverse and ambiguous 
outcomes, only occasionally re-dressing distributive asymmetries. The case law 
of the European Court of Justice on abuse of rights displays a similar 
ambiguity. In recent decades, the Court has used the doctrine to disqualify 
individuals from relying upon a right conferred by a EU provision in 
circumstances deemed undeserving.211 By and large, the Court has framed the 
notion of “abuse” in objective terms, requiring a combination of objective 
circumstances in which, despite the formal observance of the conditions laid 
down by EU provisions, the purpose of those rules has not been attained212. 
                                               
210 Duncan Kennedy, supra note 13. 
211 See the opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in the Halifax case, C-255/02, delivered on April 7th 
2005. Maduro discusses the two main contexts in which the notion of abuse has been analysed by the Court.” 
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The outcomes, however, has proven double-edged. In the field of tax 
avoidance, the doctrine has been used to prevent stronger parties’ fiscal abuses. 
Through abuse of rights, the Court has enabled the tax authorities of a 
Member state to reject companies’ claims for recovery or deduction of input 
VAT where the transaction on which the right is based are aimed at artificially 
creating the conditions to justify the application for deduction213. On the other 
hand, in the area of free movement of persons and workers, abuse of rights 
raises critical issues. In an enlarging Europe, where the volume of free 
movement has increased dramatically, Member States have increasingly 
invoked abuse of rights to prevent individuals from using the opportunity 
afforded by EU law to “abusively” obtain social advantages or residency 
permits or to evade restrictive national immigration rules. While the Court has 
tended to narrow the application of the doctrine, the possibility that abuse of 
rights might operate as an effective tool for emasculating weaker parties’ social 
and economic rights is far from remote214 
 
Abuse of rights’ ambiguity as a “social corrective” raises broader 
questions as to the nature and the structure of contemporary private law. Over 
the course of the last two centuries, private law has evolved to reflect, facilitate 
and legitimate changes in Western societies’ economic, political and ideological 
structure. The legal fabric of the new order established by the French 
Revolution and the modern bourgeoisie, “classical” nineteenth century private 
law consisted of an essential framework meant to organize and police the free 
interaction between autonomous individuals. In the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century, the structure of “classical” private law was altered 
to accommodate the development of industrial society and to reflect the social-
                                                                                                                                               
of a set of objective circumstances. Provided that those objective circumstances are found to exist one must 
conclude that a person who relies upon the literal meaning of a Community law provision to claim a right that 
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democratic compromise. Called to ensure simultaneously market efficiency and 
non exploitative distributive outcomes, private law was re-organized according 
to a binary structure “rights/will + corrective”. Abuse of rights, good faith, 
unconscionability, the labor contract were conceived as “correctives” allowing 
the effective enjoyment of rights and mitigating the most blatant distributive 
inequalities215.  
 
Faced with new challenges, contemporary private lawyers interrogate 
the enduring desirability of the binary structure “rights/will + corrective”. In 
Europe, while market liberals advocate the “un-making” of private216, i.e. the 
rolling back of social correctives, progressives invoke “flex-security” and call for 
setting up “social correctives” at the supra-national level. The most promising 
avenue, however, might be that indicated by a growing strand of 
“experimentalist” private law scholarship217. A “freedom-promoting” private 
law, capable of expanding the set of viable options an individual faces and of re-
dressing distributive asymmetries, might look very different from binary 
twentieth century private law. Rather than “limiting” and “correcting” rights, 
experimentalist private lawyers direct attention to the need for recasting 
rights, expanding the domain of resources subject to rights and devising new 
criteria of ownership218. 
 
 
 
* * * 
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